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Abstract
Matching problems involve a set of participants, where each participant has a capacity
and a subset of the participants rank a subset of the others in order of preference (strictly
or with ties). Matching problems are motivated in practice by large-scale applications,
such as automated matching schemes, which assign participants together based on their
preferences over one another.
This thesis focuses on bipartite matching problems in which there are two disjoint sets
of participants (such as medical students and hospitals). We present a range of eﬃcient
algorithms for ﬁnding various types of optimal matchings in the context of these prob-
lems. Our optimality criteria involve a diverse range of concepts that are alternatives to
classical stability. Examples include so-called popular and Pareto optimal matchings, and
also matchings that are optimal with respect to their proﬁle (the number of participants
obtaining their ﬁrst choice, second choice and so on).
The ﬁrst optimality criterion that we study is the notion of a Pareto optimal match-
ing, a criterion that economists regard as a fundamental property to be satisﬁed by an
optimal matching. We present the ﬁrst algorithmic results on Pareto optimality for the
Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA), which is a many-to-one variant of the
classical House Allocation problem, as well as for the Hospitals-Residents problem (HR),
a generalisation of the classical Stable Marriage problem. For each of these problems,
we obtain a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings, and then use this to obtain a
polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching.
The next optimality criterion that we study is the notion of a popular matching. We
study popular matchings in CHA and present a polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a
maximum popular matching or reporting that none exists, given any instance of CHA.
We extend our ﬁndings to the case in CHA where preferences may contain ties (CHAT)
by proving the extension of a well-known result in matching theory to the capacitated
bipartite graph case, and using this to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a
maximum popular matching, or reporting that none exists.
We next study popular matchings in the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation prob-
lem (WCHA), which is a variant of CHA where the agents have weights assigned to them.
We identify a structure in the underlying graph of the problem that singles out those edges
that cannot belong to a popular matching. We then use this to construct a polynomial-
time algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum popular matching or reporting that none exists, forii
the case where preferences are strict.
We then study popular matchings in a variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem
with Ties and Incomplete preference lists (SMTI), where preference lists are symmetric.
Here, we provide the ﬁrst characterisation results on popular matchings in the bipartite
setting where preferences are two-sided, which can either lead to a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for solving the problem or help establish that it is NP-complete. We also provide
the ﬁrst algorithm for testing if a matching is popular in such a setting.
The remaining optimality criteria that we study involve proﬁle-based optimal match-
ings. We deﬁne three versions of what it means for a matching to be optimal based on its
proﬁle, namely so-called greedy maximum, rank-maximal and generous maximum match-
ings. We study each of these in the context of CHAT and the Hospitals-Residents problem
with Ties (HRT). For each problem model, we give polynomial-time algorithms for ﬁnding
a greedy maximum, a rank-maximal and a generous maximum matching.Contents
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A selective review of the literature
1.1 Motivation
Matching problems are motivated in practice by large-scale applications, such as auto-
mated matching schemes, which assign participants together based on their preferences
over one another. In Scotland [27] and the USA [49] for example, centralised automated
matching schemes, such as the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) and the Na-
tional Resident Matching Program (NRMP) respectively, annually construct allocations of
graduating medical students to hospital posts. In Singapore, a centralised matching mech-
anism is used to assign primary school students to secondary schools [61]. In Romania [36],
the Netherlands [11] and the USA [52–55], systematic programs have been established for
managing kidney exchange. Additionally, there are many other examples of centralised
matching schemes in various countries, in educational, vocational and medical contexts.
Matching problems involve a set of participants, where each participant has a capacity
and a subset of the participants rank a subset of the others in order of preference (strictly
or with ties). The term matching implies the attempt to assign each participant to one or
more acceptable partner(s) in some way to meet some speciﬁed criterion without exceeding
the capacities of the participants. Given the large number of participants typically involved
in the types of matching schemes discussed above, constructing matchings manually is
time-consuming, error-prone and infeasible for large instances. Algorithms automate the
process and again, given the typical sizes of input datasets, it is vital to ensure that
algorithms for matching problems are as eﬃcient as possible. In its broadest sense, the
notion of eﬃciency involves all the various computing resources needed for executing an
algorithm. The measure of eﬃciency that will be the prime focus of this research is the time
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requirement of a given algorithm because it is often the dominant factor that determines
whether or not a particular algorithm is useful in practice, regardless of potential increases
in processing power [21].
Furthermore, given the applications of matching problems, and the implications of a
participant’s allocation in a matching for their quality of life, it is of paramount importance
that the matching algorithms that drive such applications should optimise in some sense,
and insofar as is possible, the satisfaction of the participants according to their preferences.
There are many ways to classify matching problems and a convenient distinction can
be made between a bipartite matching model in which there are two disjoint sets of par-
ticipants, and a non-bipartite model in which there is only a single set of participants.
Three-dimensional matching problems (in which there are three disjoint sets of partici-
pants) have also been considered but a number of variants have been shown to be NP-
complete [21,45,58]; thus it is unlikely that there exist eﬃcient algorithms for the solution
of such problems. In addition, matching problems may be further sub-divided according
to the types of preference lists that are involved (two-sided or one-sided) as well as the
kind of mapping that is being sought in order to assign the members of one side to the
other, so that it is possible to classify these problems as follows:
1. Bipartite matching problems
(a) One-sided preference lists
i. One-one mapping, e.g., House Allocation problem
ii. Many-one mapping, e.g., Capacitated House Allocation problem
(b) Two-sided preference lists
i. One-one mapping, e.g., Stable Marriage problem
ii. Many-one mapping, e.g., Hospitals-Residents problem
2. Non-bipartite matching problems
(a) One-one mapping, e.g., Stable Roommates problem
For bipartite matching problems with preferences, an extensively studied problem is
the classical Stable Marriage Problem (SM) [17], in which the participants consist of
two disjoint sets of agents, say n men and n women, each of whom ranks all members
of the opposite sex in order of preference and a matching is just a one-one mapping
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between the two sets. Note that we henceforth use the term agents to refer to those
participants in matching problems who have preference lists. Hence, the agents in an
SM instance are the men and women. Alternatively, bipartite matchings can also involve
many-one mappings. For example, in the context of the Hospitals-Residents problem
(HR) [17,22], the participants are residents (graduating medical students) and hospitals,
with each member of the latter set having some ﬁxed number of “posts”(its capacity).
All participants are agents since each resident ranks a subset of hospitals in order of
preference and vice versa. A matching is an assignment of residents to hospitals so that no
hospital exceeds its capacity. These are examples of bipartite matching problems where
the preference lists are two-sided.
Alternatively, preference lists for bipartite matching problems can be one-sided. An
example of this type of problem is the House Allocation problem (HA) [1,3], where an
attempt is made to allocate a set H of objects (e.g., houses, posts etc) using a one-one
mapping among a set A of agents, each of whom ranks a subset of H in order of preference.
The Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA) is a generalisation of HA in which
a many-one mapping of A to H is sought instead. In addition to bipartite matching
problems, non-bipartite matching problems are also widely studied. In the classical Stable
Roommates problem (SR) [17,25], the participants consist of a single set of agents each
of whom ranks the others in order of preference, and a matching is a partition of the set
into disjoint pairs of roommates.
The focus of this research will be the bipartite matching model which underpins most of
the aforementioned matching schemes. We explore a diverse range of optimality concepts
that are applicable to many new and also well-studied bipartite matching problems, and
ﬁnd eﬃcient algorithms for constructing matchings that are optimal according to these
criteria. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we give a
brief overview of several important results from matching theory in bipartite graphs; some
of these will subsequently be used by the algorithms that we will describe for the bipartite
matching problems considered in this thesis. Reviews of previous results on bipartite
matching problems with one-sided preferences, bipartite matching problems with two-
sided preferences and non-bipartite problems are then contained in Sections 1.3, 1.4 and
1.5 respectively.
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1.2 Theory of matching in bipartite graphs
1.2.1 Unweighted Graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph with n1 vertices in U, n2 vertices in W and m
edges. Also, let n = n1 +n2. A matching M of G is a subset of E such that no two edges
in M share a common vertex. We say that an edge e ∈ E is matched if e ∈ M; otherwise,
e is unmatched. Similarly, we say that a vertex v ∈ U ∪W is matched in M if it is incident
to an edge in M or unmatched otherwise. We deﬁne the cardinality of the matching M,
denoted by |M|, to be the number of edges in M. A matching M is maximal if M is not a
proper subset of any other matching in G. A matching M is maximum if M contains the
largest possible number of edges. Note that every maximum matching must be maximal,
but the converse need not be true. A matching M is perfect if every vertex in U ∪ W is
matched in M. Given an arbitrary matching M, an alternating path is a path P in which
the edges of P are alternatively in M, and not in M. An augmenting path with respect to
M is an alternating path whose end vertices are unmatched. The following theorem due
to Berge gives one of the most fundamental results underpinning matching theory.
Theorem 1.2.1 (Berge [8]). Let M be an arbitrary matching in G. Then, M has maxi-
mum cardinality if and only if there is no augmenting path with respect to M.
This theorem gives rise to the classical augmenting path algorithm for ﬁnding a max-
imum matching in any bipartite graph G [46], as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
runs in stages where a search for an augmenting path is conducted in each stage.
Starting from the unmatched vertices in U, it is straightforward to see that the search
for an augmenting path relative to M can be organised as a restricted breadth-ﬁrst search
in which only edges not matched in M are followed from vertices in U and only edges
matched in M are followed from vertices in W, to ensure alternation. If any augmenting
path exists, then it is clear to see that this search will ﬁnd one, which we denote by P.
The algorithm then augments the current matching M with P by inverting the matched
edges in P, i.e. the matched edges in P become unmatched, and vice versa, so that we
increase the cardinality of M by 1. If an augmenting path does not exist, then M is
maximum by Theorem 1.2.1. It is easy to see that a search for an augmenting path using
the method described above takes O(n + m) time. Since there are at most O(n) such
searches, it follows that the classical augmenting path algorithm can thus be made to run
in O(n(n + m)) time.
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Algorithm 1 Classical augmenting path algorithm
1: M := ∅;
2: while G admits an augmenting path P with respect to M do
3: M := M ⊕ P;
4: return M;
However, faster algorithms for ﬁnding a maximum matching in a given bipartite graph
exist, and the best known algorithm is due to Hopcroft and Karp [23]. Their approach
is similar to the classical augmenting path algorithm but in each stage, a maximal set
of vertex disjoint augmenting paths of shortest length is found and used to augment the
matching instead of a single augmenting path. The importance of this is that the number
of searches is reduced to at most O(
√
n), and the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm thus runs in
O(
√
nm) time. Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.2.2 (Hopcroft and Karp [23]). Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph,
with n vertices in U ∪ W and m edges in E. Then, a maximum matching in G can be
found in O(
√
nm) time.
1.2.1.1 Capacitated graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph in which each vertex vi ∈ U ∪W has an associated
capacity ci ≥ 1. We refer to G as a capacitated bipartite graph and a matching M of G is a
subset of E such that for each vi ∈ U ∪ W, |e ∈ M : vi ∈ e| ≤ ci. Note that in this thesis,
we are concerned only with capacitated bipartite graphs in which the vertices in U have a
capacity equal to 1 (and the vertices in W can have non-unitary capacity). The problem
of ﬁnding a maximum matching in G is also referred to in the literature as the maximum
cardinality degree-constrained subgraph problem or maximum cardinality DCS in short,
and Gabow’s algorithm [15] provides the fastest way to solve this, taking O(
√
Cm) time,
where C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the vertices in W.
1.2.2 Weighted Graphs
Let G = (U,W,E) be a bipartite graph where each edge e ∈ E has an associated weight
wt(e) ∈ N. We deﬁne the weight of a matching M of G as wt(M) =
P
e∈M wt(e). A
common problem, given any weighted bipartite graph G, is to ﬁnd a maximum weight
matching of G. This is also known as the Assignment problem [46].
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For the case where all vertices have capacity 1, the running time of the best algo-
rithm is usually stated as O(nm + n2 logn) [14]. For the capacitated bipartite graph,
the fastest time to solve the problem is due to Gabow’s algorithm for the maximum
weight degree-constrained subgraph problem, or maximum weight DCS in short, which
takes O(C min(mlogn,n2)) time [15].
1.2.3 Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
Let G be some bipartite graph where all the vertices have capacity 1. The Edmonds-
Gallai Decomposition (see [4,35,47]) is a well-known result in matching theory that gives
an important characterisation of maximum matchings in G. That is, let M be a maximum
matching in G. Then, the vertices of G can be partitioned into three disjoint sets: E, O,
and U. Vertices in E, O, and U are called even, odd and unreachable respectively. A
vertex v is even (odd) if there exists an alternating path of even (odd) length from a
vertex that is unmatched in M to v. If no such alternating path exists, v is unreachable.
We henceforth refer to this vertex labelling as an EOU labelling. The fundamental results
of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition are summarised in the following lemma, the proof
of which can be obtained explicitly from [4].
Lemma 1.2.1. Let E, O, and U be the vertex sets deﬁned by G and M above. Then,
(a) The sets E, O and U are pairwise disjoint. Every maximum matching in G partitions
the vertices into the same sets of even, odd and unreachable vertices.
(b) Every maximum matching M in G satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) every vertex in O and every vertex in U is matched;
(ii) every vertex in O is matched to a vertex in E;
(iii) every vertex in U is matched to another in U;
(iv) |M| = |O| + |U|/2.
(c) No maximum matching in G contains an edge between two vertices in O or a vertex
in O with a vertex in U. There is no edge in G connecting a vertex in E with a
vertex in U, or between two vertices of E.
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1.3 Bipartite matching problems, one-sided preference lists
1.3.1 House Allocation Problem
Bipartite matching problems involving two sets of participants, namely a set of agents and
a set of objects, are commonly referred to as House Allocation problems [1–3,16,19,24].
These problems have been widely studied not only due to their theoretical interest, but also
in view of their practical importance. Widespread applications occur in real-life resource
allocation problems such as campus housing allocation in US universities [1], hence the
problem name; in assigning probationary teachers to their ﬁrst posts in Scotland; and in
Amazon’s DVD rental service.
An instance I of the House Allocation problem (HA) comprises two disjoint sets A
and H, where A = {a1,a2,...,an1} is the set of agents and H = {h1,h2,...,hn2} is the set
of houses. Each agent ai ∈ A ranks in strict order a subset of those houses in H giving
rise to his preference list. If ai ranks a house hj ∈ H in his preference list, we say that ai
ﬁnds hj acceptable. An agent ai prefers one house hj to another house hl if hj precedes
hl in ai’s preference list. We deﬁne the underlying graph of I to be the bipartite graph
G = (A,H,E), where E is the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the
agents. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
Given an agent ai ∈ A and an acceptable house hj ∈ H for ai, we deﬁne rankai(hj)
to be the number of agents that ai prefers to hj plus 1. If rankai(hj) = k, we say that
hj is the kth choice of ai. Let (ai,hj) ∈ E be any edge. Then, we deﬁne the rank of
(ai,hj) to be r(ai,hj) = rankai(hj). Let z ≤ n2 be the maximum length of any agent’s
preference list in I. Clearly, z corresponds to the largest rank of a house taken over all
agents’ preference lists in I. We assume that no agent has an empty preference list and
each house is acceptable to at least one agent, i.e., m ≥ max{n1,n2}.
An assignment M is a subset of A × H such that (ai,hj) ∈ M only if ai ﬁnds hj
acceptable. If (ai,hj) ∈ M, we say that ai and hj are assigned to each other, and we
call ai and hj partners in M. A matching is an assignment M such that (i) each agent is
assigned to at most one house in M, and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is assigned to at most one
agent in M. If a participant p ∈ A∪H is assigned in M, we denote by M(p) the participant
that p is assigned to in M. If p is not assigned in M, we say that p is unassigned. Given
two matchings M and M0 in G, we say that an agent ai prefers M0 to M if either (i) ai is
assigned in M0 and unassigned in M, or (ii) ai is assigned in both M0 and M and prefers
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M0(ai) to M(ai). We use M to denote the set of all matchings in I.
Several variants of HA may be formulated as follows.
1.3.1.1 Variants of HA
First of all, we can have a straightforward extension of HA by allowing ties in the agents’
preference lists. A tie between two houses hj and hl occurs in an agent ai’s preference
list when rankai(hj) = rankai(hl), and we say that the agent ai is indiﬀerent between hj
and hl. The problem then becomes known as the House Allocation problem with Ties, or
HAT for short.
We can have a variant of HA in which each agent a has an assigned positive weight w(a)
that indicates his priority (which may be based on such objective criteria relevant to the
matching application). This is known as the Weighted House Allocation problem, denoted
by WHA, or WHAT if ties are present. If the houses are allowed to have non-unitary
capacity, we then have a generalisation of HA that is known as the Capacitated House
Allocation problem, denoted by CHA, or CHAT if ties are present. A third possible
variant of HA combines WHA and CHA by letting the agents have a positive weight
to indicate their priority, and allowing the houses to have non-unitary capacity. This is
known as the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation problem, denoted by WCHA, or
WCHAT if ties are present.
We remark that all the notations and terminology that were deﬁned for HA in Section
1.3.1 carry over directly to each of its variants with the exception of some terms that we
will require to deﬁne separately. We henceforth assume these deﬁnitions in any variant of
HA in the rest of this thesis and explicitly deﬁne relevant concepts only where we need to
adapt them to the context of the variant.
In each of CHA, CHAT, WCHA and WCHAT, we require to redeﬁne a matching
since each house hj may now have a non-unitary capacity cj ≥ 1, and a many-one mapping
of the agents and houses is sought in these contexts instead. Here, we deﬁne a matching
to be an assignment M such that (i) each agent is assigned to at most one house in M,
and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is assigned to at most cj agents in M. Consequently, M(hj)
refers to the set of agents assigned to hj in M (which could be empty) in these contexts.
If |M(hj)| < cj, we say that hj is undersubscribed in M; otherwise hj is full in M. We
also let C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
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1.3.2 Optimality criteria for bipartite matching problems
For bipartite matching problems with one-sided preferences, various criteria as to what
constitutes an “optimal” matching have been considered. In this section, we give a review
of the optimality criteria that are considered in this thesis.
1.3.2.1 Pareto optimal matchings
One solution concept that has received much attention, particularly from the Economics
community is Pareto optimality [1–3,7,51,56,57], because it is regarded by Economists
as a fundamental property to be satisﬁed in the context of matching problems. Let I be
an instance of HA or any or its variants. Then, we may deﬁne a relation ≺ on M based
on the preference of agents over matchings in I (as deﬁned above): that is, given any two
matchings M and M0, M0 ≺ M if and only if no agent prefers M to M0, and some agent
prefers M0 to M. A matching M is deﬁned to be Pareto optimal if and only if there is no
other matching M0 such that M0 ≺ M.
Various algorithms exist for ﬁnding a Pareto optimal matching in any given instance of
HA, the most straightforward being a greedy algorithm known as the serial dictatorship
mechanism [1,56] which considers each agent a in turn, and gives a his most preferred
vacant house (if such a house exists). However, such an algorithm may fail to ﬁnd a
Pareto optimal matching of maximum cardinality (henceforth a maximum Pareto optimal
matching), which is undesirable in applications that seek to assign as many agents as
possible (see Chapter 2 for further details).
Abraham et al. [3] gives the fastest algorithm, which takes O(
√
nm) time, for ﬁnding a
maximum Pareto optimal matching given an HA instance. In this thesis, we extend their
results to the capacitated bipartite graph case in Chapter 2 by constructing an O(
√
Cm)
time algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given any instance of
CHA. Since the deﬁnition of a Pareto optimal matching in WCHA is identical to that in
CHA, this algorithm can also be used for the analogous problem in the weighted capaci-
tated bipartite graph case.
1.3.2.2 Popular matchings
Another important solution concept is that of a popular matching. Let I be an instance
of CHAT. Also, let M and M0 be two arbitrary matchings in I and let P(M,M0) denote
the set of agents who prefer M to M0. We say that M is more popular than M0 if
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|P(M,M0)| > |P(M0,M)|, i.e. the number of agents who prefer M to M0 is greater than
the number of agents who prefer M0 to M. A matching M in I is popular if there is no
other matching M0 in I that is more popular than M.
We remark that the deﬁnition of a popular matching can be extended to WCHAT in
the following way. First of all, given any two matchings M and M0 in a weighted setting,
we deﬁne the satisfaction of M with respect to M0 to be sat(M,M0) =
P
a∈P(M,M0) w(a)−
P
a∈P(M0,M) w(a). We then say that M is more popular than M0 if sat(M,M0) > 0. A
matching M is deﬁned to be popular if there is no other matching in the problem instance
that is more popular than M.
G¨ ardenfors [20] ﬁrst introduced the notion of a popular matching (referring to this con-
cept as a majority assignment) in the context of voting theory. We remark that the more
popular than concept can be traced back even further to the Condorcet voting protocol.
Popular matchings were then considered by Abraham et al. [4] in the context of HA. They
showed that popular matchings need not exist, given an instance of HA, and also noted
that popular matchings can have diﬀerent cardinalities. The same authors described an
O(n + m) algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum cardinality popular matching (henceforth a
maximum popular matching) if one exists, given an instance of HA. They also described
an O(
√
nm) counterpart for HAT.
Mahdian [37] showed that a popular matching exists with high probability given an
instance of HAT when (i) preference lists are random, and (ii) the number of houses is a
small multiplicative factor larger than the number of agents. To cope with the possible non-
existence of a popular matching, McCutchen [40] deﬁned two notions of a matching that
are, in some sense, “as popular as possible”, namely a least-unpopularity-factor matching
and a least-unpopularity-margin matching. McCutchen proved that computing either type
of matching is NP-hard. Abraham and Kavitha [5] considered voting paths in relation to
popular matchings in a dynamic matching market in which agents and houses can enter
and leave the market. Mestre [43] then described an O(n + m) algorithm for ﬁnding a
maximum popular matching if one exists, given an instance of WHA. He also described
an O(min(k
√
n,n)m) counterpart for WHAT, where k is the maximum priority of any
agent.
In Chapter 4, we consider popular matchings in CHAT. For the case where preference
lists are strict, we give an O(
√
Cn1 + m) time algorithm to ﬁnd a maximum popular
matching, or to report that none exists. We then show how to extend Lemma 1.2.1, an
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important result in matching theory, to the capacitated bipartite graph case, and use this
result to construct an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm to ﬁnd a maximum popular matching
or report that none exists in a given CHAT instance. We also consider the analogous
problem in WCHA in Chapter 5. There, we identify a structure in the underlying graph
of the problem that singles out those edges that cannot belong to a popular matching. We
then use this to construct a O(
√
Cn1 +m) time algorithm that ﬁnds a maximum popular
matching, or reports that none exists in a given WCHA instance.
1.3.2.3 Proﬁle-based optimal matchings
Finally, let I be an instance of HAT or any of its variants. Recall that z is the largest
rank of a house taken over all agents’ preference lists in I. Deﬁne the proﬁle ρ(M) of a
matching M in I to be the z-tuple (x1,x2,...,xz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), xi is the
number of agents who are assigned in M with one of their ith choice houses. Then, it is
possible to deﬁne at least three versions of what it means for a matching to be optimal
based on its proﬁle.
Informally, a greedy maximum matching is a matching that has lexicographically max-
imum proﬁle taken over all maximum matchings. On the other hand, a rank-maximal
matching is a matching that has lexicographically maximum proﬁle taken over all match-
ings. Finally, a generous maximum matching is a matching whose reverse proﬁle is lex-
icographically minimum taken over all maximum matchings. We remark that each of a
rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching must be Pareto
optimal; however, they are not necessarily popular.
The fastest combinatorial approach for ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching given an
HAT instance is described by Irving et al. [29], and this takes O(min(z∗√
n,n + z∗)m)
time where z∗ is the maximal rank of an edge in an optimal solution. Kavitha and Shah [33]
studied rank-maximal matchings in WHAT and described an O(min(z∗√
n,n+z∗)m) time
algorithm for solving the problem. In an unpublished manuscript [28], Irving describes
an approach based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm to ﬁnd greedy maximum and generous
maximum matchings in HAT.
In Chapter 7, we consider the individual problems of ﬁnding a rank-maximal, a greedy
maximum and a generous maximum matching in the context of CHAT. For the case of
ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching, we construct an O(min(z∗√
C,C+z∗)m) time algorithm
for solving the problem. For each of the cases of ﬁnding a greedy maximum and a generous
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maximum matching, we explore two alternative solutions for the problem, the faster of
which (in most practical applications as we shall show) takes O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time.
1.4 Bipartite matching problems, two-sided preference lists
1.4.1 One-one mapping: the classical Stable Marriage Problem
The classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) is a widely studied example of a combinatorial
problem in the category indicated by this subsection. An instance I of SM involves two dis-
joint sets U and W where U = {u1,u2,...,un} is the set of men, and W = {w1,w2,...,wn}
is the set of women. Each person p ∈ U ∪W ranks all members of the opposite sex in strict
order of preference giving rise to his/her preference list. We say that person p prefers q to
r if q precedes r on p’s preference list.
An assignment M is a subset of U × W such that (ui,wj) ∈ M only if ui and wj ﬁnd
each other acceptable. If (ui,wj) ∈ M, we say that ui and wj are assigned to each other.
A matching in I is an assignment M such that (i) each man is assigned to at most one
woman in M, and (ii) each woman is assigned to at most one man in M. If (ui,wj) ∈ M,
ui and wj are called partners in M. A blocking pair for M is a (man,woman) pair (ui,wj)
such that ui prefers wj to M(ui) and wj prefers ui to M(wj), where M(q) denotes q’s
partner in M for any person q in I. A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to
be stable.
Stable matching problems were ﬁrst studied by Gale and Shapley [17] in their seminal
paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”. There they gave an algorithm,
now widely known as the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm, that always ﬁnds a stable matching
for any instance of SM in O(n2) time [34]. Very brieﬂy, the algorithm involves a sequence
of “proposals” from members of one sex to members of the opposite sex and it terminates
when everyone becomes engaged. If the men were the proposers, then we obtain the man-
oriented version of the GS algorithm, otherwise the algorithm is known as woman-oriented.
The algorithm is inherently non-deterministic in that the order in which the proposals take
place is of no consequence to the result [22].
Gale and Shapley [17] observed that the man-oriented version of the GS algorithm
always gives the man-optimal stable matching, in which each man has the best partner
that he can have in any stable matching. The man-optimal stable matching is also woman-
pessimal, for each woman has the worst partner that she can have in any stable matching
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[41]. If the woman-oriented version of the GS algorithm is used, then this gives analogous
results: we obtain the woman-optimal stable matching which is man-pessimal. Gusﬁeld
and Irving [22] gave an extended version of the man-oriented GS algorithm which simpliﬁes
the process by deleting from a woman w’s preference list every man u0 who succeeds a
man u from whom she has received a proposal. This is because no such pair (u0,w) can
be part of any stable matching.
Several variants of the Stable Marriage problem exist and have been widely studied as
follows.
1.4.1.1 Incomplete lists
A natural variant of SM occurs when each person p in an SM instance I need not rank
all members of the opposite sex. Then the preference list for each person p contains a
subset of members of the opposite sex such that person p ﬁnds q acceptable if and only
if q appears in p’s preference list. We henceforth assume in all contexts where all the
participants are agents, that if an agent a ranks another agent b in a’s preference list, then
b also ranks a in b’s preference list. Furthermore, the numbers of men and women need not
be equal. We say that these preference lists are incomplete and use SMI (Stable Marriage
with Incomplete Lists) to denote this version of SM.
In this setting, a man ui and a woman wj are assigned to each other in a matching M
only if ui and wj are acceptable to one another. Thus, matchings need not be complete,
i.e. not all members of either sex need be assigned in a given matching in this setting.
Here, a (man,woman) pair (ui,wj) constitutes a blocking pair for M whenever (i) ui and
wj ﬁnd each other acceptable, (ii) ui is either unassigned in M or prefers wj to M(ui),
and (iii) wj is either unassigned in M or prefers ui to M(wj). A matching in an instance
of SMI is stable if it admits no such blocking pair. Every SMI instance admits a stable
matching [17], and Gusﬁeld and Irving [22] showed that the extended GS algorithm can
be used to ﬁnd a stable matching, given an SMI instance. Furthermore, for any matching
M in an instance of SMI, some agents may be unassigned in M, but the same agents are
unassigned in all stable matchings and as a consequence, all stable matchings in I have
the same cardinality [18].
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1.4.1.2 Ties
Another variant of SM occurs when the preference list of each person is allowed to contain
ties. We say that a person p is indiﬀerent between q and r if q and r appear in a tie in
p’s preference list, and use SMT (Stable Marriage with Ties) to denote this variant of
SM. The introduction of ties in a person’s preference list gives rise to three deﬁnitions of
stability, namely weak stability, strong stability and super-stability [26].
A matching M is deﬁned to be weakly stable if there does not exist any blocking pair
(ui,wj) such that ui and wj prefer each other to their partners in M. On the other hand,
a matching M is strongly stable if there does not exist any blocking pair (ui,wj) such
that either (i) ui prefers wj to M(ui), and wj either prefers ui to M(wj) or is indiﬀerent
between them, or (ii) wj prefers ui to M(wj), and ui either prefers wj to M(ui) or is
indiﬀerent between them. We deﬁne a matching M to be super-stable if there does not
exist any blocking pair (ui,wj) such that ui either prefers wj to M(ui) or is indiﬀerent
between them, and wj either prefers ui to M(wj) or is indiﬀerent between them.
A weakly stable matching can always be found for an instance of SMT by simply
breaking the ties arbitrarily and then applying the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm to
the derived instance. This guarantees to produce a matching that is weakly stable in the
original instance with ties [22]. Also, all weakly stable matchings have the same cardinality
in this context. We remark that strongly stable matchings and super-stable matchings need
not exist for a given instance of SMT; hence, we do not devote any more attention to the
results concerning these versions of stability and refer the reader to [26] for more details.
1.4.1.3 Ties and Incomplete lists
SMT and SMI can be combined to give the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and
Incomplete lists, or SMTI in short. That is, a given preference list in SMTI can be
incomplete and can contain ties. In addition, the deﬁnition of weak stability can be
extended from SMT to SMTI in a natural way. A weakly stable matching may be found
using the same algorithm described for the corresponding problem in SMT. Unlike the
case in SMT, weakly stable matchings can have diﬀerent cardinalities, and Manlove et
al. [39] shows that the problem of ﬁnding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching
given an instance of SMTI is NP-hard, even if the ties are at the tails of the lists and on
one side only, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length two.
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1.4.2 One-many mapping: the Hospitals-Residents Problem
The Hospitals-Residents problem is a many-one extension of SM that was ﬁrst considered
by Gale and Shapley [17] and referred to in that paper as the College Admissions problem.
This problem has since invariably been known as the Hospitals-Residents problem mainly
because of its applications in the medical matching context such as the SFAS and NRMP
as mentioned in Section 1.1.
An instance I of the Hospitals-Residents problem (HR) comprises two disjoint sets R
and H, where R = {r1,r2,...,rn1} is the set of residents and H = {h1,h2,...,hn2} is the
set of hospitals. Each resident ri ∈ R ranks a subset of the hospitals in H in strict order
of preference giving rise to his preference list. Similarly, each hospital hj ∈ H ranks a
subset of the residents in R in strict order, giving rise to its preference list. If ri and hj
rank each other in their preference lists, we say that they ﬁnd each other acceptable, and
ri and hj are each an acceptable partner for one another. We say that a resident ri prefers
one hospital hj to another hk if hj precedes hk in ri’s preference list. Similarly, we deﬁne
the preferences of hospitals over residents. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a capacity cj which
indicates the maximum number of posts it may ﬁll. We deﬁne the underlying graph of I
to be the bipartite graph G = (R,H,E), where E is the set of edges in G representing the
acceptable hospitals of the residents. Let C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities
of the hospitals. We also let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
An assignment M is a subset of R × H such that (ri,hj) ∈ M only if ri ﬁnds hj
acceptable and vice versa. If (ri,hj) ∈ M, we say that ri and hj are assigned to each
other. A matching in I is an assignment M such that (i) each resident is assigned to at
most one hospital in M, and (ii) each hospital hj ∈ H is assigned to at most cj residents
in M. If a resident ri ∈ R is assigned in M, we denote by M(ri) the hospital that ri is
assigned to in M. We deﬁne M(hj) to be the set of residents assigned to hj in M (thus
M(hj) could be empty). We say that a hospital hj ∈ H is full in M if |M(hj)| = cj, and
undersubscribed in M if |M(hj)| < cj.
A blocking pair for M is a (resident,hospital) pair (ri,hj) such that
• ri and hj ﬁnd each other acceptable
• either ri is unassigned in M, or ri prefers hj to M(ri)
• either hj is undersubscribed in M, or hj prefers ri to its worst assigned resident in
M(hj)
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A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable, and every instance of
HR admits a stable matching [22]. Note that SMI is a special case of HR in which
cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H. Furthermore, we can extend the deﬁnition of a man-optimal and a
woman-optimal stable matching in SMI to a resident-optimal and a hospital-optimal stable
matching respectively in HR (see Section 1.6 of [22]). For any given instance I of HR,
eﬃcient algorithms exist to ﬁnd such stable matchings of I [22]. An HR instance can have
more than one stable matching. However, all stable matchings have the same cardinality,
and the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings [18,49]. Furthermore, any
hospital that is undersubscribed in one stable matching is assigned with exactly the same
residents in all stable matchings [50]. Collectively, these results are known as the Rural
Hospitals Theorem because of their historical signiﬁcance relating to the problems that
rural hospitals face when recruiting interns in the NRMP [22].
Given two matchings M and M0, we say that a resident ri prefers M0 to M if either
(i) ri is assigned in M0 and unassigned in M, or (ii) ri is assigned in both M0 and M and
prefers M0(ri) to M(ri). Unlike the case for residents, it is less straightforward to deﬁne
the preference of a hospital hj over two matchings since hj may have non-unitary capacity.
Given that the primary goal of many practical matching applications is to maximise the
number of agents assigned, as well as to optimise the satisfaction of the agents according
to their preference lists, we give what may be viewed as a deﬁnition of a hospital hj’s
preference over matchings in I as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.4.1. We say that the hospital hj prefers one matching M0 to another M if
1. |M0(hj)| > |M(hj)|, or
2. |M0(hj)| = |M(hj)| and hj prefers the worst resident assigned to it in M0 to the
worst resident assigned to it in M.
Note that even though there are no ties in hj’s preference list, Deﬁnition 1.4.1 allows
a hospital hj to be indiﬀerent between two matchings M and M0 if |M(hj)| = |M0(hj)|,
the worst resident assigned to hj is the same in both M and M0 but hj has diﬀerent sets
of residents assigned to it in M and M0. If hj does not prefer M0 to M, and also does not
prefer M to M0, we say that hj is indiﬀerent between M and M0.
As is the case in SMI, we can permit ties in the preference lists in this context, and use
HRT (Hospital-Residents problem with Ties) to denote this variant of HR. The deﬁnition
of weak stability carries over from SMTI to HRT in an analogous way to the extension of
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the deﬁnition of classical stability from SMI to HR. Since SMTI is a special case of HRT,
it follows that the problem of ﬁnding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching is
also NP-hard in HRT.
We remark that each of the concepts of a Pareto optimal matching, a popular matching
and a proﬁle-based optimal matching, can be deﬁned in SM, HR, and their respective
variants in the same way as the respective concepts were deﬁned in the context of HA and
its variants in Section 1.3.2. Given that stable matchings sometimes do not satisfy the
key requirement in many practical matching contexts, which is to maximise the number
of agents assigned in any given matching (as we shall show), we thus also apply these
optimality criteria to SM and HR and some of their variants, and obtain new results as
follows.
In Chapter 3, we study the problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
given an instance of HR, and describe an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm for its solution. We
also show how this algorithm can be adapted to solve the analogous problem given an
instance of SMI in O(
√
nm) time. We then consider the structure of popular matchings in
SMTI-SYM, a special case of SMTI where preference lists are symmetric, in Chapter 6.
Little is known about how to ﬁnd a maximum popular matching, or to determine that none
exists, in the bipartite setting where all the participants are agents (i.e. all participants
have preferences). A ﬁrst step in this direction is presented by our characterisation results
of popular matchings in SMTI-SYM in Chapter 6. There, we also give an O(
√
nm) time
algorithm for testing if a matching in a given SMTI-SYM instance is popular. We also
consider the individual problems of ﬁnding a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a
generous maximum matching in the context of HRT in Chapter 8. For each problem, we
explore two alternative algorithms for its solution, the faster of which (in most practical
applications as we shall show) takes O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time. We also show how this
algorithm can be adapted to solve the analogous problem given an instance of SMTI in
O(z(nm + n2 logn)) time.
1.5 Non-bipartite matching problems
1.5.1 Stable Roommates Problem
In an instance of the Stable Roommates (SR) problem, ﬁrst introduced by Gale and
Shapley [17], there is a set of n agents where n is even. Each agent ranks the n−1 others
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in strict order of preference. A matching M is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint
pairs. A blocking pair for M is a pair of agents {x,y} / ∈ M such that x prefers y to M(x)
and y prefers x to M(y) where M(q) denotes q’s partner in M for any agent q. A matching
is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
It is well-known that SM is just a special case of SR, since the set of stable matchings is
unchanged if we reduce an SM instance I into an SR instance by appending to the very end
of each agent’s preference list all the other agents that are of the same sex in I [22]. Not all
SR instances admit a stable matching [17], and Knuth [34] posed the question of whether
the problem of determining the solvability of SR instances might be NP-complete. This
question was answered by Irving [25], who gave an O(n2) algorithm for ﬁnding a stable
matching or reporting that no such matching exists. Alternative approaches for ﬁnding a
stable matching if one exists, given an SR instance have since been described [12,13,58–60].
As with SM, we may formulate an extension of SR where preference lists may include
ties and be incomplete (SRTI). In such a setting, the deﬁnition of a weakly stable matching
may be extended from the SMTI context in a natural way given an SRTI instance, and
weakly stable matchings, if they exist, can have diﬀerent cardinalities. The problem of
ﬁnding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching given an SRTI instance is NP-
hard [30,48].
We remark that, as in SM, HR and their respective variants, each of the concepts of a
Pareto optimal matching, a popular matching and a proﬁle-based optimal matching, can
be deﬁned similarly in SR and its variants as they were deﬁned in Section 1.3.2. Pareto
optimal matchings in SR was recently studied by Abraham and Manlove [7]. There,
the authors gave an O(
p
nα(m,n)mlog3/2n) time algorithm for the problem of ﬁnding a
maximum Pareto optimal matching in an SR instance I, where n is the number of agents,
m is the total length of the preference lists in I and α is the inverse Ackermann function.
Chung [10] considered popular matchings in instances of SR and noted that a stable
matching is popular; however, the same need not be true in the presence of ties. Abraham
et al. [6] studied rank-maximal matchings in a special case of SR in which roommate pairs
are ranked globally, and gave an O(min(z∗√
n,z∗+n)m) time algorithm for the solution to
the problem. Little is known about the individual problems of ﬁnding a popular matching
(if one exists) and ﬁnding proﬁle-based optimal matchings, given the general case of SR.
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Pareto optimal matchings in CHA
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, Pareto optimality is a solution concept that has received
much attention from the Economics community in the context of matching problems since
it is regarded as a fundamental solution concept. Pareto optimality interests us from the
point of view of this research because most of the associated algorithmic questions have
not, on the other hand, been considered extensively in the literature.
In this chapter, we study the problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in the context of CHA, a general case of bipartite matching problems with one-sided
preferences. The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We
give some terminology and preliminary results on Pareto optimal matchings in CHA in
Section 2.2. We then give a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in CHA in
Section 2.3, which we subsequently use in Section 2.4 to construct an O(
√
Cm) time
algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance I of CHA
where C is the total capacity of the houses and m is the total length of preference lists
in I respectively. Note that we reuse most of the terminology and notation from HA as
deﬁned in Section 1.3.1, and we explicitly deﬁne relevant concepts only where we need to
adapt them to CHA.
2.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
Let I be an instance of CHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying bipartite graph of
I as deﬁned in Section 1.3.1. Each house hj ∈ H has a capacity cj ≥ 1 which indicates the
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maximum number of agents that may be assigned to it. Recall from Section 1.3.1 that an
assignment M is a subset of A × H such that (ai,hj) ∈ M only if ai ﬁnds hj acceptable.
Furthermore, if (ai,hj) ∈ M, we say that ai and hj are assigned to each other, and we call
ai and hj partners in M. A matching M in an instance I of CHA is an assignment such
that (i) each agent is assigned to at most one house in M, and (ii) each house hj ∈ H is
assigned to at most cj agents in M. If an agent ai ∈ A is assigned in M, we denote by
M(ai) the house that ai is assigned to in M. We deﬁne M(hj) to be the set of agents
assigned to hj in M (thus M(hj) could be empty). We say that a house hj ∈ H is full in
M if |M(hj)| = cj, and undersubscribed in M if |M(hj)| < cj. We assume that no agent
has an empty preference list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent so that
m ≥ max{n1,n2}. Let C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
2.3 Characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings
Let M be a matching in I. We say that M is maximal if there is no agent ai ∈ A and
house hj ∈ H such that ai is unassigned in M, hj is undersubscribed in M and ai ﬁnds
hj acceptable. Also, M is trade-in-free if there is no (agent,house) pair (ai,hj) such that
ai is assigned in M, hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers hj to M(ai).
A cyclic coalition with respect to M is a sequence of distinct assigned agents C =
ha0,a1,...,ar−1i, for some r ≥ 2, such that ai prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai) for each i (0 ≤
i ≤ r−1). Henceforth, all subscripts are taken modulo r when reasoning about coalitions.
Given a cyclic coalition C, the matching
M0 = (M\{(ai,M(ai)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}) ∪ {(ai,M(ai+1)) : 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}
is deﬁned to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying C. We say that M is cyclic-
coalition-free if M admits no cyclic coalition. The following lemma gives a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a matching to be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance I of CHA. Then M is Pareto
optimal if and only if M is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free.
Proof. Let M be a Pareto optimal matching. Suppose for a contradiction that M is not
maximal. It follows that there exist an agent ai and a house hj such that ai is unassigned in
M, hj is undersubscribed in M and ai ﬁnds hj acceptable. Let M0 = M∪{(ai,hj)}. Then,
M0 ≺ M, a contradiction. Now, suppose for a contradiction that M is not trade-in-free.
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It follows that there exist an agent ai and a house hj such that ai is assigned in M, hj is
undersubscribed in M, and ai prefers hj to M(ai). Let M0 = (M\{(ai,M(ai))}∪{(ai,hj)}.
Then, M0 ≺ M, a contradiction. Finally, suppose that M admits some cyclic coalition C.
Let M0 be the matching obtained by satisfying C. Clearly then, M0 ≺ M, a contradiction.
Conversely, let M be a matching that is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-
free. Let us suppose for a contradiction that M is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists
some matching M0 such that M0 ≺ M. Let G be the underlying graph of I. We clone G
to obtain a cloned graph C(G) as follows. We replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones
h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j . We then divide the capacity of each house among its clones by allowing
each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if (ai,hj) ∈ G, then we add (ai,h
p
j) to C(G)
for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Let us then adapt the matching M in G to obtain its clone C(M)
in C(G) as follows. If a house hj in G is assigned to xj agents a1,...axj in M, then we add
(ap,h
p
j) to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj, so that |C(M)| = |M|. We repeat a similar process for
M0 to obtain its clone C(M0) in C(G).
Let us consider X = C(M) ⊕ C(M0) and let C be a connected component of X. It
follows that C is a path or cycle whose edges alternate between C(M) and C(M0). Now,
C cannot be an even-length alternating path that has more agents than houses or an an
odd-length alternating path whose end edges are in C(M), for otherwise we have an agent
who is assigned in M but unassigned in M0, a contradiction since M0 ≺ M. In addition,
C cannot be an even-length alternating path that has more houses than agents or an
odd-length alternating path whose end edges are in C(M0) because there then exists an
agent ai in C who becomes assigned in M0 to a house hj which is undersubscribed in M.
Now, since there are no ties in preference lists, ai must prefer hj to M(ai) for otherwise
M0 6≺ M. However, M is then not trade-in-free, a contradiction. Hence, C must be a
cycle. Here, each agent ai in C is assigned in both M and M0 and since M0 ≺ M, each ai
prefers M0 to M. However, C is then a cyclic coalition with respect to M, a contradiction.
It follows that M0 6≺ M and M is Pareto optimal.
Henceforth we will establish the Pareto optimality of a given matching M in an instance
I of CHA by showing that M is maximal, trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free. We now
show that Lemma 2.3.1 leads to an O(m) algorithm for testing M for Pareto optimality.
Let G be the underlying graph of I. Then, we can check if M is maximal and trade-in-free
in O(m) time by a traversal of the edges in G. To check if M is cyclic-coalition-free, we
construct the envy graph [3] of M as follows. We form a directed graph GM of M by
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA
1: M := ∅;
2: for each agent ai in turn do
3: if there exists some undersubscribed house in ai’s preference list then
4: let hj be the most-preferred such house;
5: M := M ∪ {(ai,hj)};
letting GM consist of one vertex for each agent assigned in M. We then construct an
edge from an agent ai to another agent aj in GM if ai prefers M(aj) to M(ai). It follows
that M is cyclic-coalition-free if and only if GM is acyclic. Note that even though M is a
matching of a CHA instance, all vertices in GM have only unitary capacity (being agent
vertices). It follows that a depth-ﬁrst search suﬃces to detect any cycles in O(m) time so
that these observations lead us to the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.2. Let M be a matching in a given instance of CHA. Then we may check
whether M is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
Now, given an instance I of CHA, a greedy approach using the serial dictatorship
mechanism of [1] gives us a straightforward algorithm, Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA as shown
in Algorithm 2, for ﬁnding a Pareto optimal matching M in I. Here, we consider each
agent ai in turn and give ai his most preferred house that is currently undersubscribed in
the matching built so far. The following lemma shows that the matching constructed by
the algorithm must be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let M be the matching returned by an execution of Algorithm Greedy-
PaCHA. Then, M is Pareto optimal.
Proof. For, suppose not. For each ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Consider an agent ai who is unassigned in M. It follows that Ai contains no
undersubscribed house hj, otherwise (ai,hj) would have been added to M, a contradiction.
Hence, M is maximal. If M is not trade-in-free, then there exists an agent ai who prefers
some undersubscribed house hj to M(ai). This is a contradiction, since hj must be full
at the point when we assign ai to M(ai). If M is not cyclic-coalition-free, let us then
consider the coalition C = ha0,a1,...,ar−1i which exists with respect to M. It follows that
there exists some agent ai (0 ≤ i ≤ r −1) in C who was considered ﬁrst by the algorithm.
By deﬁnition of C, ai prefers M(ai+1) to M(ai). Now, ai+1 must be considered by the
algorithm after ai. However, it follows that M(ai+1) must then have had at least one place
22Chapter 2. Pareto optimal matchings in CHA
Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 : 1
Figure 2.1: An instance I1 of CHA
free when ai was assigned to M(ai), a contradiction to the fact that the algorithm gives
each agent his most preferred undersubscribed house. Hence, M is Pareto optimal.
The main drawback of Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA is that a given CHA instance may
admit Pareto optimal matchings of diﬀerent cardinalities but Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA
may fail to ﬁnd a Pareto optimal matching of maximum cardinality. For example, Figure
2.1 shows a given CHA instance in which Algorithm Greedy-PaCHA returns a Pareto
optimal matching M1 = {(a1,h1)} of cardinality 1, given the agent ordering ha1,a2i, and
constructs the maximum Pareto optimal matching M2 = {(a1,h2),(a2,h1)} of cardinality
2 given the agent ordering ha2,a1i. It follows that the order in which the agents are
considered can have a consequence on the cardinality of the outcome. This is signiﬁcant
from a practical point of view, given that a prime objective in many matching applications
is to assign as many agents as possible.
We remark that a straightforward way to ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal match-
ing given a CHA instance I is by constructing a maximum cardinality minimum weight
matching as follows. For each edge (ai,hj) in the underlying graph G of I, we assign a
weight wt(ai,hj) to the edge by letting wt(ai,hj) = rankai(hj) where rankai(hj) denotes
the rank of hj in ai’s preference list. Call this weighted graph G0. We then construct a
maximum cardinality minimum weight matching in G0. The following lemma shows that
such a matching must be a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let M be a maximum cardinality minimum weight matching in G0. Then,
M is a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
Proof. Suppose not. Since M is a maximum matching, it follows that M is maximal.
Now, if M is not trade-in-free, then there exists a (agent,house) pair (ai,hj) such that
ai is assigned in M, hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers hj to M(ai). Consider
the matching M0 = (M\(ai,M(ai))) ∪ (ai,hj). It is clear that |M0| = |M| and so M0 is
another maximum cardinality matching of G0. However, since ai prefers hj to M(ai), the
weight of M0 must be smaller than the weight of M, a contradiction.
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Hence, suppose that M admits some cyclic coalition C = ha0,a1,...,ar−1i. Let M0 be
the matching obtained by satisfying C. Then, it is clear that |M0| = |M| again. Moreover,
since each ai prefers M(ai) to M0(ai) for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, the weight of M0 is again smaller
than the weight of M, a contradiction.
Note that the above lemma also indicates that a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in I has the same cardinality as a maximum matching in G and any maximum cardinality
minimum weight matching of G0 gives us a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I.
A well known transformation in matching theory (described in [42]) allows us to trans-
form the problem of ﬁnding a maximum cardinality minimum weight matching into the
Assignment problem. Recall from Section 1.2 that we can solve the Assignment problem
in the capacitated bipartite graph in O(C min(mlogn,n2)) time [15], so this allows us to
ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal matching in the same time complexity. However, since the
problem of ﬁnding a maximum matching in the capacitated bipartite graph takes O(
√
Cm)
time (as mentioned in Section 1.2), it is of interest to consider whether faster algorithms
for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in CHA exist.
2.4 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings
In this section, we describe a three-phase algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in CHA by satisfying the necessary and suﬃcient conditions in Lemma 2.3.1.
Let I be an instance of CHA and G be its underlying graph. The problem of ﬁnding a
maximum matching in G can be viewed as an instance of maximum cardinality DCS [15]
as described in Section 1.2 (the two problems are essentially the same, except that agents
have no explicit preferences in the DCS case; the deﬁnition of a matching is unchanged).
Hence, Phase 1 of the algorithm uses Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a maximum
matching M in G. This phase guarantees that M is maximal and takes O(
√
Cm) time.
The next two phases ensure that M is trade-in-free and cyclic-coalition-free respectively
as detailed below.
2.4.1 Phase 2 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transform M into a trade-in-free matching by conducting a repeated
search for (agent,house) pairs (ai,hj) such that hj is undersubscribed in M and ai prefers
hj to M(ai). Whenever such a pair is found, the algorithm breaks the existing assignment
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Algorithm 3 Phase 2 loop
1: while S 6= ∅ do
2: hj := S.pop();
3: (ai,r) := Lj.removeHead();
4: if r < currai then
5: h0
j := M(ai);
6: M := (M\

(ai,h0
j)
	
) ∪ {(ai,hj)};
7: currai := r;
8: if |M(hj)| < cj and Lj 6= ∅ then
9: S.push(hj);
10: hj := h0
j;
11: if Lj 6= ∅ and hj / ∈ S then
12: S.push(hj);
between ai and M(ai), and promotes ai to hj. It follows that a space in M(ai) becomes
freed in the process, which may consequently be assigned to some assigned agent ak who
prefers M(ai) to M(ak). Note that if hj remains undersubscribed after such a step, it
may also be assigned to some assigned agent al who prefers hj to M(al). We show how
to obtain a trade-in-free matching from M by using a slight modiﬁcation of the Phase 2
loop of the algorithm described by Abraham et al. [3] to ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in HA.
For each house hj, we maintain a linked list Lj of pairs (ai,r) where ai is an assigned
agent who prefers to be assigned to hj than M(ai) at the start of Phase 2, and r is the
rank of hj in ai’s preference list. Note that the pairs in Lj may subsequently contain an
agent ai who prefers M(ai) to hj if M(ai) is no longer the house that ai was assigned to at
the start of Phase 2 as a result of promotions executed over the course of the algorithm.
We will maintain a stack S of all undersubscribed houses hj where Lj is non-empty. Also,
for each house hj, we assume that we store a counter for |M(hj)|. For each assigned agent
ai, let currai be a variable which stores the rank of M(ai) in ai’s preference list.
Let us now consider the pseudocode of the Phase 2 loop as shown in Algorithm 3.
During each iteration of the main while loop, we pop an undersubscribed house hj from S
and remove the ﬁrst pair (ai,r) from Lj (which must be non-empty). Now, if r < currai,
it follows that ai prefers hj to M(ai) so we promote ai from h0
j = M(ai) to hj and we
update M and currai in the process. Now, if hj remains undersubscribed at the end of
this step, then we push hj back onto S if Lj is non-empty. We also push h0
j onto S if Lh0
j
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is non-empty and if h0
j is not already in S. Otherwise, if r ≥ currai, we push hj back onto
S if Lj is non-empty.
Now, the algorithm must terminate, for each iteration of the main while loop removes a
pair from a list Lj but no new pair is ever added to any list during a loop iteration. Hence,
the algorithm terminates when S is empty. It must be the case that when this happens no
assigned agent ai prefers an undersubscribed house to M(ai), so that M is trade-in-free
as a result. Moreover, since each agent assigned at the end of Phase 1 is also assigned
at the end of Phase 2, M remains a maximum matching. Let us then consider the time
complexity of Phase 2. We can initialise all variables used in the Phase 2 loop in O(m) time
using a single traversal of the agents’ preference lists. The number of iterations of the main
while loop is bounded above by the total length of preference lists. It is straightforward to
verify that each operation within the while loop takes constant time (with a suitable choice
of data structures such as those described later in Section 2.4.3). Hence, the algorithm
runs in O(m) time, giving us the following result.
Lemma 2.4.1. Given a maximum matching M in an instance of CHA, the Phase 2 loop
ensures that M is trade-in-free in O(m) time.
2.4.2 Phase 3 of the algorithm
In this phase, we transform M into a matching M0 that admits no cyclic coalition by using
a modiﬁcation of the linear-time extension [3] of Gale’s Top Trading Cycles Method [57].
This phase consists of a pre-processing step which we will describe in detail, and then the
main Phase 3 loop shown in Algorithm 5. Throughout Phase 3, we maintain a stack of
agents P which will help us to identify cyclic coalitions. The matching M0 and the stack
P are empty at the start of Phase 3. For each agent ai, we maintain a pointer p(ai) to the
ﬁrst house on ai’s preference list, and subsequently p(ai) traverses left to right over the
course of execution of Phase 3. We will also maintain a queue of agents Q, each of whom
is an agent ai waiting to be assigned to p(ai) in M0. In addition, for each house hj, we
will use M0(hj) to store those agents who are assigned to hj in M but who are unassigned
in M0 so far in the execution of Phase 3. Initially, M0(hj) will contain all those agents
assigned to hj in M. As we assign agents in M0(hj) to houses in M0, we will remove these
agents from M0(hj). Finally, we also maintain a linked list Lj for each house hj containing
agents such that if ai is an agent in Lj, then ai prefers hj to M(ai).
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Algorithm 4 Process (Q)
1: while Q 6= ∅ do
2: ai := Q.removeHead();
3: hj := p(ai);
4: hk := M(ai); {// possibly hj = hk}
5: M0 := M0 ∪ {(ai,hj)};
6: label ai;
7: if ai ∈ P then
8: remove ai from P;
9: M0(hk) := M0(hk)\{ai};
10: if |M0(hj)| = cj then
11: for each unlabelled a0
i ∈ Lj do
12: delete hj from the preference list of a0
i;
13: if p(a0
i) = M(a0
i) then
14: Q.add(a0
i);
2.4.2.1 Pre-processing step
Let us now introduce the pre-processing step which helps to reduce the number of
iterations of the Top Trading Cycles Method in the main Phase 3 loop. This step makes
use of the observation (as in [3]) that no agent ai assigned to his ﬁrst choice house hj in M
can be involved in a cyclic coalition. At the outset of Phase 3, we check if p(ai) = M(ai)
for each agent ai and add every such ai to Q.
If Q is non-empty, then we run the sub-routine Process(Q), shown in Algorithm 4, as
the pre-processing step. Note that this usage of Process(Q) is prior to the main Phase
3 loop starting, but it will be used again in general during the main Phase 3 loop. This
sub-routine considers each agent ai in Q in turn, by removing ai from Q and then adding
the edge (ai,hj) to M0. Every such ai is then labelled to diﬀerentiate ai from those agents
unassigned in M0 so far in the execution of the algorithm (all agents are initially unlabelled
at the outset of Phase 3). Now, P must be empty during pre-processing. However, this
may not be true during a subsequent execution of Process(Q) by the main Phase 3 loop.
Hence, Process(Q) checks if ai lies in P, and if so, removes ai from P so as to remove the
agent from further consideration by the main Phase 3 loop, since ai has just been assigned
in M0. Let p(ai) = hj. Now, if |M0(hj)| = cj after the assignment of ai to hj, then we
remove hj from the preference lists of the remaining agents since such a house that is full
in M0 could not subsequently be involved in a cyclic coalition. We refer to those preference
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lists in which houses have been removed as reduced preference lists. We then apply the
observation made at the start of this subsection recursively to the reduced preference lists
of the remaining agents until either (i) no agents remain unassigned in M0, or (ii) at least
one agent is not assigned to his reduced ﬁrst choice in M0 by Process(Q). In case (i), each
agent is assigned to his reduced ﬁrst choice (i.e. the ﬁrst choice on his reduced preference
list) in M0 and so cannot be involved in any cyclic coalition as Lemma 2.4.4 on page 31
will establish. The following lemma shows that when case (ii) happens at the end of the
pre-processing step, a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M.
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose that pre-processing terminates, and there exists an agent1 who is
unassigned in M0. Then a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M.
Proof. Let a0 be an agent who is not assigned in M0 to his reduced ﬁrst choice p(a0)
at the end of pre-processing. Hence, a0 is an unlabelled agent and p(a0) 6= M(a0). It
follows that p(a0) must be full in M for otherwise M is not trade-in-free, a contradiction.
However, p(a0) cannot be full in M0 for otherwise p(a0) would have been removed from
a0’s preference list by pre-processing and cannot be the reduced ﬁrst-choice house of a0.
Hence, there exists some agent a1 ∈ M(p(a0))\M0(p(a0)) because if an agent a is assigned
in M0 by Process(Q) in pre-processing, it must be the case that a must be assigned in
M0 to M(a). It follows immediately that a1 must be unassigned in M0. Furthermore,
p(a1) 6= M(a1) (or else a1 / ∈ M(p(a0))\M0(p(a0))) so that p(a0) 6= p(a1). By reusing the
same argument, it follows that we can trace a sequence of agents S = ha0,a1,...i such that
ai is assigned in M but unassigned in M0 and p(ai) = M(ai+1) for i ≥ 0. Since the number
of agents is ﬁnite, there must be some r such that ar = ax for some 0 ≤ x < r − 1, where
without loss of generality ax,ax+1,...,ar−1 are distinct agents. However, the substring
of agents C = hax,ax+1,...,ar−1i within S must then constitute a cyclic coalition with
respect to M.
Now, it is clear that an (unlabelled) agent ai can only be added to Q when the last
house that ai prefers to M(ai) gets removed from his preference list so that p(ai) becomes
equal to M(ai), and this happens only once in pre-processing. Since no agent is added to Q
twice, the while loop of process(Q) is bound to terminate. As a result, the pre-processing
step must also terminate.
1in fact, if there exists one such agent, then this lemma proves that there will be at least two such
agents
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Algorithm 5 Main Phase 3 loop
1: for each unlabelled agent ai do
2: P := {ai}; {// P is a stack of agents}
3: c(ai) := 1; {// counter record the number of times an agent is in P}
4: while P 6= ∅ do
5: a0
i := P.pop();
6: if c(a0
i) = 2 then
7: a00
i := a0
i;
8: repeat
9: Q.add(a00
i );
10: a00
i := P.pop();
11: until a00
i = a0
i
12: call Process(Q);
13: else
14: P.push(a0
i);
15: choose any a00
i ∈ M0(p(a0
i));
16: c(a00
i ) := c(a00
i ) + 1;
17: P.push(a00
i );
2.4.2.2 Phase 3 loop
We then make use of the algorithm in the main Phase 3 loop, as shown in Algorithm 5 to
construct the envy graph in order to detect and satisfy cyclic coalitions. For each agent ai
who is not assigned to his reduced ﬁrst-choice in M, we repeatedly build a path of agents
(represented by P) starting from ai in the main while loop and check if P cycles. To do
so, we initialise a counter c(ai) to 0 for each agent ai.
Now, if c(a0
i) 6= 2 for some agent a0
i in P during an iteration of the while loop, then we
extend P by following the reduced ﬁrst-choice edge of a0
i in line 15. Let p(a0
i) = hj and let
a00
i be any member of M0(hj). Note that M0(hj) must be non-empty. For, suppose not.
Since a0
i prefers hj to M(a0
i), hj must be full in M (or else M is not trade-in-free). Each
agent ak assigned to hj in M either becomes assigned to hj again in M0 if p(ak) = M(ak),
or to some other house via the satisfaction of some cyclic coalition. In the latter case, this
causes some agent al to be assigned to hj in M0 in ak’s place. Since hj is not full in M0 by
deﬁnition of p(a0
i) = hj, it follows that there exists some agent belonging to M(hj) who is
currently unassigned in M0. Hence, M0(hj) must be non-empty.
Otherwise if c(a0
i) = 2, it follows that we have a cyclic coalition in P starting from a0
i.
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We satisfy C by popping each agent a00
i in C from P until we remove C, and add each a00
i
to Q. We then call Process(Q) to assign each a00
i to p(a00
i ) in M0, to label each a00
i in order
to remove the agent from further consideration by the algorithm, as well as to remove
M0(a00
i ) from the preference lists of the remaining unlabelled agents if the house becomes
full in M0.
2.4.2.3 Correctness of Phase 3 loop
If there are unlabelled agents at the start of the main Phase 3 loop, there must exist at
least one cyclic coalition with respect to M involving a subset of these agents by Lemma
2.4.2. The following lemma strengthens this result by showing that if there exist any
unlabelled agents at any point of time in the execution of Phase 3, then a cyclic coalition
must exist.
Lemma 2.4.3. Consider a given iteration of the for loop in Phase 3. If there exists an
agent who remains unlabelled, then a cyclic coalition must exist with respect to M.
Proof. Let a0 be an agent who is unlabelled during a given iteration of the for loop of Phase
3. Then, a0 is not assigned in M0 to his reduced ﬁrst choice p(a0). It follows that p(a0) 6=
M(a0). Now, p(a0) must be full in M for otherwise M is not trade-in-free, a contradiction.
However, p(a0) cannot be full in M0 for otherwise p(a0) would have been removed from
a0’s preference list by Process(Q) and cannot be the reduced ﬁrst-choice house of a0. Now,
each agent a0 ∈ A becomes assigned in M0 to either M(a0) when M(a0) = p(a0), or to p(a0)
when we satisfy a cyclic coalition involving a0. Since p(a0) is currently undersubscribed in
M0, it follows that there exists a non-empty subset of agents As such that each agent a
in As belongs to M(p(a0))\M0(p(a0)) and a is currently unassigned in M0. Let a1 ∈ As.
It must be the case that p(a1) 6= M(a1) and hence, p(a1) 6= p(a0). By reusing the same
argument, it follows that we can trace a sequence of agents S = ha0,a1,...i such that ai is
assigned in M but unassigned in M0 and p(ai) = M(ai+1) for i ≥ 0. Since the number of
agents is ﬁnite, there must be some r such that ax = ar for some 0 ≤ x < r − 1, where
without loss of generality ax,ax+1,...,ar−1 are distinct agents. However, the substring
of agents C = hax,ax+1,...,ar−1i within S must then constitute a cyclic coalition with
respect to M.
The next lemma shows that when all agents are assigned in M0, we then obtain a
cyclic-coalition-free matching.
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Lemma 2.4.4. If no unlabelled agents remain at any stage of Phase 3, then M0 is cyclic-
coalition-free.
Proof. If there does not exist any unlabelled agents, then every agent is assigned in M0.
Let a0 be an arbitrary agent. Suppose that there is a cyclic coalition C = ha0,a1,...,ar−1i
with respect to M0 involving a0. Let M0(a0) = hj and let M0(a1) = hk. By deﬁnition of
C, a0 must prefer hk to hj. Since a0 was assigned to hj instead of hk in M0, it follows
that hk must have been full in M0 at the time that a0 was assigned to hj in M0. It must
then be the case that a1 was considered by Phase 3 before a0 or else M0(a1) 6= hk. Now,
by applying the same argument to the remaining agents in C, we can establish that ar−1
must have been considered by Phase 3 before a0. Let M0(ar−1) = hl. It follows that ar−1
must prefer hj to hl. Now, it must be the case that at the time that ar−1 was assigned in
M0, hj must have been undersubscribed for otherwise a0 could not have been assigned to
hj later on. However, this gives a contradiction for ar−1 prefers hj to hl and should then
be assigned to hj by Phase 3 instead.
Suppose that the envy graph involves the sequence of agents S = ha0,a1,...,ar−1i and
suppose that only a substring of these agents C = hai,ai+1,...,ar−1i constitute a cyclic
coalition where 0 ≤ i < r − 1. Let us call the agents in the substring ha0,a1,...,ai−1i the
tail of C. Now, if certain houses become full in M0 as a result of satisfying C, thereby
causing M(ai−1) to become the reduced ﬁrst choice house for the agent ai−1, then ai−1
gets added to Q and assigned to M(ai−1) in M0 subsequently by Process(Q). Note that
this can cause an unwinding eﬀect in the tail in which each agent ak (0 ≤ k ≤ i − 2),
such that M(ak) lies immediately after p(ak) in ak’s reduced preference list, gets added
to Q and assigned to M(ak) in M0 by Process(Q) in descending agent subscript order
until either we reach an agent ak−1 such that there exists a house between p(ak−1) and
M(ak−1) in ak−1’s reduced preference list or the tail becomes empty as a result. In the
former case, the main Phase 3 loop then extends P by following the reduced ﬁrst-choice
edge of ak−1. In the latter case, the main Phase 3 loop tries to extend P by following the
reduced ﬁrst-choice edge of the next unlabelled agent, if one exists.
It is straightforward to see that the labelling of agents and the maintenance of c(ai)
for each agent ai ensures that no agent ai is added more than twice to P in Phase 3.
Clearly, if P is non-empty, P must cycle at some point of time in the execution of Phase
3 (as observed by Lemma 2.4.3). Since each agent ai that we add to P belongs to a cyclic
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coalition or to the tail of a cyclic coalition, we are bound to remove ai from P as a result.
It also follows by the labelling of agents that any agent added to Q by the for loop in the
main Phase 3 loop is not added to Q again by Process(Q) and vice versa. Hence, no agent
gets added to Q twice.
Hence, Phase 3 must terminate when no unlabelled agents remain. When this happens,
it follows by Lemma 2.4.4 that M0 must be a cyclic-coalition-free matching. We next show
that each agent ai assigned in M at the end of Phase 2 must also be assigned in M0 at
the end of Phase 3.
Lemma 2.4.5. Each agent ai assigned in M at the end of Phase 2 is also assigned in M0
at the end of Phase 3.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, let ai be an agent who is unassigned in M0. Let M(ai) = hj.
Then, ai ∈ M(hj)\M0(hj). It follows that hj cannot have been the ﬁrst house on ai’s
preference list, or else pre-processing would have assigned M0(ai) to be hj. Hence, there
exists at least one house that ai prefers to hj. Now, if ai is not assigned in M0 to any of
these houses, then the pointer p(ai) should move across ai’s preference list until it points at
hj. When this happens, ai should then be assigned to hj in M0. However, ai is unassigned
in M0 so that hj must have been removed from ai’s preference list prior to this as a result
of it becoming full in M0. Now, if hj is full in M0, then for every ak ∈ M0(hj), either
ak ∈ M(hj) or there exists a unique al ∈ M(hj)\M0(hj) such that ak and al belong to the
same cyclic coalition. However, this implies that cj + 1 agents were assigned to hj in M,
a contradiction.
Since M is a matching that is also maximum, it follows by Lemma 2.4.5 that M0 is
also a maximum matching.
2.4.3 Implementation and analysis
The time complexity of Phase 3 depends on how eﬃciently we can implement Process(Q)
and the main Phase 3 loop. Let us consider brieﬂy the data structures required.
First of all, let us assume that we represent the stack P as a doubly linked list emdedded
within an array. We let P contain n1 elements and we indicate the presence or absence
of an agent in P by a 1 or 0 respectively. We maintain a pointer to the top of the stack
in addition to previous and next pointers between agents in P at any point of time. We
implement Q as a straightforward linked list. We also represent the preference list prefai
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of each agent ai as a doubly linked list embedded within an array. Each element in position
j of prefai stores the house lying in the corresponding position in ai’s preference list. Also,
for each house h in prefai, we maintain a pointer each to the house preceding and following
h on ai’s preference list respectively. We let p(ai) point to the ﬁrst house in prefai, i.e. ai’s
(reduced) ﬁrst choice house. Note that as with any doubly linked list, p(ai) gets updated
as part of the deletion operation whenever the (reduced) ﬁrst choice house in prefai is to
be deleted from prefai. We then build a rank array rankai for each agent ai which stores
the position of each house hj on ai’s preference list, i.e. rankai[j] gives the position of hj
on prefai.
For each house hj, we represent M0(hj) also as a doubly linked list embedded within
an array. There are n1 entries in each M0(hj) indexed according to agent subscript, but
we maintain previous and next pointers for at most cj of these entries, i.e. previous and
next pointers exist between consecutive agents in M0(hj) only if these agents belong to
M(hj) but are currently unassigned in M0. It is straightforward to see that Lj for each hj
can be implemented as a linked list. We also maintain a counter |M0(hj)| for each house
hj to keep track of the number of agents assigned to it in M0 so far in the execution of
Phase 3.
Note that for each doubly linked list that we use, we let the previous pointer of the
ﬁrst element and the next pointer of the last element to each point to null. Now, if we
use virtual initialisation (described in [9, p.149]) for the initialisation of P, it is clear that
it takes only a single traversal of the agents’ preference lists in agent subscript order to
initialise the rest of the data structures.
To illustrate the use of these data structures, suppose ﬁrstly that we pop an agent
ai from Q. It is straightforward to see if ai belongs to P by checking if P[i] is 1 or 0.
To remove ai from P, we set P[i] = 0 and update the previous and next pointers of
P[i]’s predecessor and successor, as well as the pointer to the top of P if necessary. Let
hk = M(ai). To remove ai from M0(hk), we update the next and previous pointers of
M0(hk)[i]’s predecessor and successor respectively. Let p(ai) = hj. If hj becomes full in
M0 as a result of assigning ai to hj, i.e. |M0(hj)| = cj, we want to remove hj from the
preference lists of those unlabelled agents in Lj. It is clear that it takes only time linear
in the size of Lj to ﬁnd these agents. Let al be such an agent. Then, rankal[j] enables
us to look up the position of hj on al’s preference list in constant time. We then delete
hj from prefal by updating the pointers of hj’s predecessor and successor in prefal. In
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this way, p(al) always points to the head of al’s preference list (which must be currently
undersubscribed in M0).
Let us then consider the time complexity of Phase 3 by looking at the entire execution
of the main Phase 3 loop and Process(Q) taken over the algorithm’s execution. It has
already been observed that each agent can be added to P no more than twice and added
to Q at most once. Now, lines 8-11 of the main Phase 3 loop are executed at most once
for each agent in P. All other operations in the main Phase 3 loop are just O(1) stack
operations or simple manipulation of data structures. In Process(Q), all operations apart
from those in lines 11-14 can be implemented to run in O(1) time for each agent that is
added to or removed from Q. Finally, it is clear that lines 11-14 are executed at most once
for each house, and hence, the total number of iterations of the for loop is O(m), taken
over all calls to Process(Q). It follows that Phase 3 takes O(m) time overall, giving us the
following result.
Lemma 2.4.6. Given a maximal trade-in-free matching M in an instance of CHA, Phase
3 constructs a cyclic-coalition-free matching M0 from M in O(m) time.
Since Phase 1 dominates the overall complexity of the algorithm to ﬁnd a maximum
Pareto optimal matching in an instance of CHA, we have the following result.
Theorem 2.4.1. Given an instance I of CHA, we can ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in I in O(
√
Cm) time.
Recall that an alternative approach to ﬁnding a Pareto optimal matching given an
CHA instance I involves obtaining a weighted graph G0 of I and then ﬁnding a maximum
cardinality minimum weight matching of I. This takes Ω(C min(mlogn,n2)) time. If
mlogn ≤ n2, then it follows that our algorithm is faster by a factor of Ω(
√
C logn).
Otherwise, mlogn > n2 and our algorithm is faster by a factor of Ω(
√
Cn2/m).
2.5 Open problem
We conclude with the following open problem.
The problem model of CHA deﬁned in Section 2.2 can be generalized by permitting
agents to contain ties in their preference lists, i.e. CHAT. In this context, the deﬁnition
of the relation ≺ is the same as that given in Section 1.3.2.1, and hence the deﬁnition
of Pareto optimality remains unchanged. A maximum Pareto optimal matching can be
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found in O(C min(mlogn,n2)) time [15] by transformation to the Assignment problem as
described in Section 2.3. However, is the problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching also solvable in O(
√
Cm) time in the presence of ties?
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Pareto optimal matchings in HR
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our study of Pareto optimal matchings from Chapter 2 to
the bipartite model with two-sided preferences. We focus our attention on the Hospitals-
Residents problem without ties (HR), which was introduced in Section 1.4.2.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We give some
terminology and preliminary results on Pareto optimal matchings in HR in Section 3.2.
We then give a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in HR in Section 3.3, which
we subsequently use in Section 3.4 to construct an O(
√
Cm) time algorithm for ﬁnding
a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance I of HR, where C is the total
capacity of the hospitals and m is the total length of preference lists in I. Finally, in
Section 3.5, we show how to adapt our algorithm for HR to obtain a faster O(
√
nm) time
algorithm to solve the analogous problem given an instance of SMI, a special case of HR,
where n is the total number of men and women.
3.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
Let I be an instance of HR. We reuse the notations and terminology for HR as deﬁned in
Section 1.4.2, and also provide some additional deﬁnitions as follows.
Given a resident ri ∈ R and an acceptable hospital hj for ri, we deﬁne rankri(hj) to
be the number of hospitals that ri prefers to hj plus 1. If rankri(hj) = k, we say that hj
is the kth choice of ri. In a similar way, we deﬁne rankhj(ri) and the kth choice of hj.
We assume that no resident has an empty preference list and each hospital is acceptable
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to at least one resident so that m ≥ max{n1,n2}. Also, let M be a matching in I. We
deﬁne a vertex v in G to be exposed with respect to M if either (i) v is a resident vertex
that is unassigned in M, or (ii) v is a hospital vertex that is undersubscribed in M. An
augmenting path in G is an alternating path, both of whose end vertices are exposed.
Let M0 be another matching in I. Recall from Section 1.4.2 that a resident ri prefers
M to M0 if either (i) ri is assigned in M and unassigned in M0, or (ii) ri is assigned in
both M and M0 and prefers M(ri) to M0(ri). Furthermore, a hospital hj prefers M to
M0 if
• |M(hj)| > |M0(hj)|, or
• |M(hj)| = |M0(hj)| and hj prefers the worst resident assigned to it in M to the worst
resident assigned to it in M0.
Unlike the case for residents where it is necessary for ties to be present in the preference
lists in order for a resident to be indiﬀerent between any two matchings M and M0,
a hospital hj may be indiﬀerent between M and M0 if |M(hj)| = |M0(hj)|, the worst
resident assigned to hj is the same in both M and M0 but hj has diﬀerent sets of residents
assigned to it in M and M0.
Given these deﬁnitions, we may deﬁne a relation ≺ on the set of all matchings in I as
in Section 1.3.2.1: that is, M ≺ M0 if and only if no agent prefers M0 to M, and some
agent prefers M to M0. A matching M is deﬁned to be Pareto optimal if and only if it is
≺-minimal. In other words, a matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching
M0 such that M0 ≺ M.
3.3 Characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in HR
Let M be a matching in I. The following deﬁnes a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
M to be Pareto optimal in I.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. An improving coalition with respect to M is a sequence of agents C =
hr0,h0,r1,h1,...,rk−1,hk−1i, for some k ≥ 1, such that the residents are distinct and:
1. (ri,hi−1) ∈ M (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1),
2. Either
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(a) r0 is unassigned in M and ﬁnds h0 acceptable, and hk−1 is undersubscribed in
M and ﬁnds rk−1 acceptable, or
(b) k ≥ 2, and (r0,hk−1) ∈ M.
3. ri prefers hi to hi−1 for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k−1), and r0 prefers h0 to hk−1 if Condition
2(b) holds,
4. hi prefers M0 to M or is indiﬀerent between the matchings for each i (0 ≤ i ≤ k−1)
where M0 = M ⊕ C.
If M admits no improving coalition, we say that M is improving coalition-free.
If C satisﬁes Condition 2(a), we also refer to C as an augmenting coalition, otherwise we
also refer to C as a cyclic coalition. We deﬁne the size of C to be 2k, and henceforth, all
subscripts are taken modulo k when reasoning about improving coalitions. The matching
M0 obtained by M0 = M ⊕C is deﬁned to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying
C. Note that the hospitals may be repeated in C in view of their non-unitary capacities.
A matching M is maximal in G if M ∪{e} is not a matching for any e ∈ E\M where E is
the edge set in I. By Deﬁnition 3.3.1, M is maximal if and only if M admits no improving
coalition of size 2. The following lemma gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
matching in HR to be Pareto optimal.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance I of HR. Then M is Pareto
optimal if and only if M is improving coalition-free.
Proof. Let M be a Pareto optimal matching. If M admits some improving coalition C,
let M0 be the matching obtained by satisfying C. By Deﬁnition 3.3.1, each resident in C
prefers M0 to M and each hospital in C either prefers M0 to M or is indiﬀerent between
the two matchings. However, this implies that M0 ≺ M, a contradiction.
Conversely, let M be a matching that is improving coalition-free, and suppose for a
contradiction that M is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists some matching M0 such
that M0 ≺ M. Let X = M ⊕ M0 and let C be a connected component of X. We consider
three cases according to the form of C.
– Case (i): C is an alternating path with an even number of edges. However, this
implies that either there exists a resident ri who is assigned in M but who becomes
unassigned in M0, or there exists a hospital hj such that |M0(hj)| < |M(hj)|. Both
possibilities contradict the fact that M0 ≺ M.
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– Case (ii): C is an alternating path with an odd number of edges. Clearly, the end
edges of C cannot be in M for otherwise we can obtain a similar contradiction as in Case
(i). Hence, the end edges of C are in M0. Let ri be the exposed resident vertex in C.
Clearly, ri prefers M0 to M. For each resident rj 6= ri in C, it must be the case that
rj prefers M0(rj) to M(rj) since M0 ≺ M. Hence, every resident in C prefers M0 to
M. Let hx be the exposed hospital vertex in C. Clearly, |M0(hx)| > |M(hx)| so that hx
prefers M0 to M by Deﬁnition 1.4.1(i). For each hospital hy 6= hx in C, it is clear that
|M0(hy)| = |M(hy)|. Furthermore, hy must either prefer M0 to M or is indiﬀerent between
the matchings according to Deﬁnition 1.4.1(ii), or else it cannot be the case that M0 ≺ M.
However, C is then an augmenting coalition with respect to M.
– Case (iii): C is an alternating cycle. Clearly, each resident ri in C is assigned in
both M and M0. Since M0 ≺ M, it must be the case that each ri prefers M0(ri) to M(ri).
For each hospital hj in C, it is clear that |M0(hj)| = |M(hj)|. Furthermore, hj must either
prefer M0 to M or is indiﬀerent between the matchings according to Deﬁnition 1.4.1(ii),
or else it cannot be the case that M0 ≺ M. However, C is then a cyclic coalition with
respect to M, a contradiction.
Henceforth we will establish the Pareto optimality of a given matching M in an instance
I of HR by showing that M is improving coalition-free. We now show that Lemma 3.3.1
leads to an O(m) algorithm for testing a given matching in an HR instance for Pareto
optimality. Let M be a matching in an HR instance I and let G be the underlying graph
of I. We ﬁrst perform the following transformation to the preference lists of agents. That
is, for every resident ri ∈ R, we remove the hospital hj from the preference list of ri, and
remove ri from the preference list of hj if hj is a hospital that lies after M(ri) in ri’s
preference list, i.e. rankri(hj) > rankri(M(ri)). For each hospital hk, let rp be the worst
resident assigned to it in M. We then remove each resident rq from the preference list of
hk and remove hk from the preference list of rq whenever rankhj(rq) > rankhj(rp). The
eﬀect of these truncations is that each agent is assigned in M to a “worst choice” partner.
Let us call the instance with truncated preference lists I0, and its underlying graph G0, i.e.
G0 contain only those edges representing the truncated preference lists of the agents. It is
straightforward to see that it takes O(m) time to construct G0.
By Lemma 3.3.1, M is Pareto optimal if it admits no augmenting coalition or cyclic
coalition. We can check for the former structure by testing for an augmenting path in
G0. We use a similar form of restricted breadth-ﬁrst search as described in Section 1.2, in
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Resident Pref Hospital Pref Hospital Capacity
r1: h2 h1 h1: r1 h1 : 1
r2: h2 h2: r1 r2 h2 : 1
Figure 3.1: An instance I1 of HR
which only edges not in M are followed from vertices in R and edges of M are followed
from vertices in H. If an augmenting path P is found in G0, then by augmenting along
P, we obtain a new matching M0 such that each resident ri prefers M0(ri) to M(ri), and
each hospital hj either prefers M0 to M or is indiﬀerent between the two matchings as a
result of the preference list truncations. Hence, M is not Pareto optimal if G0 admits an
augmenting path. It is straightforward that this takes O(m) time.
To test for a cyclic coalition, we form a directed graph GC with respect to M by letting
GC consist of one vertex for each assigned resident in I0. We then construct an edge from
a resident ri to another resident rj in GC if ri prefers M(rj) to M(ri) in I0. By a similar
argument to the above, it follows that M is cyclic-coalition-free if and only if GC is acyclic.
Note that even though M is a matching of a HR instance, all vertices in GC have only
unitary capacity (being resident vertices). It follows that a depth-ﬁrst search suﬃces to
detect any cycles in O(m) time so that these observations lead us to the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let M be a matching in a given instance of HR. Then we may check
whether M is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
Figure 3.1 shows us an HR instance I1. Note that the unique stable matching M =
{(r1,h2)} has cardinality 1 here, but the maximum Pareto optimal matching M0 =
{(r1,h1),(r2,h2)} has cardinality 2. Hence, Pareto optimality is a criterion that can give
rise to larger matchings than stability. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that by
creating p copies of J, we may construct an HR instance Jp with 4p agents which admits
a stable matching Mp = {(r2i+1,h2i+2) : 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1} of size p and a Pareto optimal
matching M0
p = ({r2i+1,h2i+1),(r2i+2,h2i+2) : 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1} of size 2p. It follows that we
can have an inﬁnite family of HR instances for which the cardinality of a stable matching
is half the size of a maximum Pareto optimal matching.
Hence, given any HR instance I, we are also interested in considering the problem of
ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in I as an alternative optimality criterion.
The next section presents an eﬃcient algorithm for solving this.
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3.4 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings in HR
In this section, we describe a two-phase algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in an instance I of HR by satisfying the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
of Lemma 3.3.1. Phase 1 of the algorithm uses Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a
maximum matching M in the underlying graph G. This phase guarantees that M admits
no augmenting coalition and takes O(
√
Cm) time. Phase 2 transforms M into a matching
that admits no cyclic coalition in the following way.
Let us construct a graph G0 from G by repeating the truncation of preference lists
as described in the aforementioned methods for testing a given matching in I for Pareto
optimality. Hence, all agents are assigned to a worst-choice partner in G0. It thus follows
as a result that the residents always improve and the hospitals either improve or remain
indiﬀerent even if we satisfy any cyclic coalition with respect to M by considering pref-
erence lists on only one side. This allows us to obtain a cyclic-coalition-free matching
in G0 from M by considering the problem from only the point of view of the residents’
truncated preference lists, which eﬀectively transforms the problem in I to an instance of
the analogous problem for the Capacitated House Allocation problem.
Hence, this allows the Phase 3 algorithm, described in Chapter 2 for ﬁnding a maximum
Pareto optimal matching given a CHA instance, to be reused from the residents’ point of
view in order to obtain a matching M0 from M that is cyclic-coalition-free in G. We note
that M0 must be cyclic-coalition-free by the correctness proof presented in Section 2.4.2.3.
Furthermore, the correctness proof also shows that M0 remains a maximum matching since
each resident who was assigned at the end of Phase 1 remains assigned after the execution
of the Phase 3 algorithm. With the use of suitable data structures such as those described
in Section 2.4.3, the Phase 3 algorithm is guaranteed to run in O(m) time. Hence, it takes
O(m) time for Phase 2 of our algorithm to ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal matching given
a HR instance. It follows that Phase 1 dominates the overall complexity of our two-phase
algorithm for HR, giving us the following result.
Theorem 3.4.1. A maximum Pareto optimal matching in an instance I of HR can be
found in O(
√
Cm) time.
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3.5 Maximum Pareto optimal matchings in SMI
Since SMI is a special case of HR, it follows that Lemma 3.3.1 also gives a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a matching in an SMI instance J to be Pareto optimal.
We ﬁrst show how to test a given matching M in J for Pareto optimality. Let G0 be
the underlying graph of J and let m be the number of edges in G0. We form a subgraph
GM of G0 by letting GM contain only those edges in M ∪ bp(M) where bp(M) is the set
of blocking pairs with respect to M. It is clear that GM can be constructed in O(m) time
by considering the edges of G. By Lemma 3.3.1, M is Pareto optimal in J if and only
if M admits no augmenting path or alternating cycle in GM. Clearly, we can test for an
augmenting path in GM in O(m) time using restricted breadth-ﬁrst search as described in
Section 1.2. In order to test for an alternating cycle, we remove any unmatched vertices
and their incident edges from GM. Any cycle in GM that remains is an even-length
alternating cycle, so that a depth-ﬁrst search suﬃces to detect this. Hence, we can check
if a matching in J is Pareto optimal in O(m) time.
We next show how the algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching
in HR can be easily modiﬁed for the analogous problem in SMI. First of all, we use
the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum matching M in Phase 1 instead of
Gabow’s algorithm. Then, this step takes O(
√
nm) time where n is the total number of
men and women. Using a similar form of preference list truncation to that for HR as
described above, we can then transform the problem in J to the House Allocation problem
(HA).
Hence, this allows Phase 3 of the implementation of the Top Trading Cycles Method
in [3] to be reused from the men’s point of view in order to obtain a matching M0 from
M that is cyclic-coalition-free in G. We note that M0 must be cyclic-coalition-free by the
correctness of the Top Trading Cycles Method [57]. Furthermore M0 remains a maximum
matching since the algorithm in [3] ensures that each man and woman who is assigned at
the end of Phase 1 of our algorithm is also assigned when it completes execution. With
the use of suitable data structures such as doubly linked lists or arrays, we can ensure that
the initialisation and subsequent deletion of entries from the preference lists takes O(m)
time. Since the nested loops in Phase 3 of the implementation in [3] are guaranteed to
run in O(m) time, Phase 2 of our algorithm also runs in O(m) time. This gives us the
following result.
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Theorem 3.5.1. A maximum Pareto optimal matching in an instance J of SMI can be
found in O(
√
nm) time.
It follows that it is generally faster to ﬁnd a maximum Pareto optimal matching in an
SMI instance using the techniques described in this section as opposed to the algorithm
for HR described in Section 3.4.
3.6 Open problems
In this chapter, we presented eﬃcient algorithms for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching given an instance of HR or SMI. A number of open problems remain. For
example,
• The problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching given an instance
of HR or SMI can be generalised by permitting agents to contain ties in their
preference lists, i.e. HRT or SMTI respectively. As with CHA, the deﬁnition of the
relation ≺ remains unchanged in the context of ties. For SMTI, we remark that a
maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in O(nm + n2 logn) time [14] by
transformation to the Assignment problem in an analogous way to that described in
Section 2.2 for the case of CHA. However, it is open as to whether a similar form of
transformation exists to solve the problem in HRT. It is also open as to whether the
problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching, given an instance of HRT
or SMTI, is also solvable in the same time complexity as its counterpart in the case
of strict preferences?
• [7] shows that the problem of ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching in an
instance of SRI is solvable in O(
p
nα(m,n)mlog3/2 n) time. However, it remains to
consider whether a maximum Pareto optimal matching in SRI can be constructed
in O(
√
nm) time, which is the complexity of the fastest current algorithm for ﬁnding
a maximum matching in a general graph [44].
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Popular matchings in CHAT
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching given an
instance of CHA or CHAT. As noted in Section 1.3.2.2, many recent papers have focused
on popular matchings, given the importance of voting to many economic decisions, and also
given the viability of popular matchings as an optimality criterion for matching problems
with one-sided preferences. Here, we present the ﬁrst algorithmic results for computing
popular matchings in a capacitated bipartite graph. The main results of this chapter, and
their organisation are as follows.
In Section 4.2, we ﬁrst develop a characterisation of popular matchings in a CHA
instance I. We then use this characterisation to construct an O(
√
Cn1 +m) algorithm for
ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in I or reporting that none exists, where C is the
total capacity of the houses, n1 is the total number of agents and m is the total length of
the preference lists in I respectively. In Section 4.3, we provide the ﬁrst extension of the
Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition to the case of a capacitated bipartite graph. Using this,
we build a new characterisation of popular matchings in a CHAT instance J, and then
use it to construct an O(
√
Cm) algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in J
or reporting that none exists. We ﬁnally remark that a straightforward solution to each
of the problems of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching, given an instance I of CHA
or CHAT, may be to use “cloning”. Informally, this entails creating cj clones for each
house hj, to obtain an instance C(I) of HAT (i.e. each house has capacity 1), and then
applying the algorithms of [4] to C(I). However, we will show in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 that
this method in general leads to slower algorithms than the direct approach that we will
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be using in each case.
4.2 Popular matchings in CHA
4.2.1 Characterising popular matchings
Let I be an instance of CHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I, where
A = {a1,a2,...,an1} is the set of agents, H = {h1,h2,...,hn2} is the set of houses and E is
the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the agents. We assume all the
notations and terminology that have been deﬁned for CHA in Chapters 1 and 2. Recall
that, given two matchings M and M0 in I, we say that an agent ai prefers M0 to M if
either (i) ai is assigned in M0 and unassigned in M, or (ii) ai is assigned in both M0 and
M and prefers M0(ai) to M(ai). Let P(M0,M) denote the set of agents who prefer M0
to M. Then, M0 is more popular than M if |P(M0,M)| > |P(M,M0)|, i.e. the number of
agents who prefer M0 to M is greater than the number of agents who prefer M to M0.
Furthermore, a matching M in I is popular if there is no other matching M0 in I that is
more popular than M.
For each agent ai ∈ A, let f(ai) denote the ﬁrst-ranked house on ai’s preference list.
Any such house hj is called an f-house. For each hj ∈ H, let f(hj) = {ai ∈ A : f(ai) = hj}
and fj = |f(hj)| (possibly fj = 0). We create a unique last resort house l(ai) with capacity
1 for each agent ai ∈ A, and append l(ai) to ai’s preference list. We also henceforth assume
that G contains the vertex l(ai) and the edge (ai,l(ai)) for each ai ∈ A, and that H contains
the respective last resort houses. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
The following lemma is a vital ﬁrst step in characterising popular matchings in I.
Lemma 4.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then for every f-house hj, |M(hj) ∩
f(hj)| = min{cj,fj}.
Proof. We consider the following two cases.
– Case (i): Suppose fj ≤ cj. We will show that f(hj) ⊆ M(hj). For, suppose not.
Then choose any ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj). We consider the subcases that (a) hj is undersub-
scribed and (b) hj is full. In subcase (a), promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular
matching than M. In subcase (b), choose any as ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). Let hk = f(as). Then
hk 6= hj. If hk is undersubscribed, promote ar to hj and promote as to hk to obtain
a more popular matching than M. Otherwise, choose any at ∈ M(hk). If ar = at, we
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then promote ar to hj and promote as to hk to obtain a more popular matching than M.
Otherwise, we then promote ar to hj, promote as to hk and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a more popular matching than M.
– Case (ii): Suppose fj > cj. If hj is undersubscribed, then f(hj) 6⊆ M(hj) so
there exists some ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) that we can promote to hj to obtain a more popular
matching as in Case (i)(a). Hence, hj is full. Now, suppose for a contradiction that
M(hj) 6⊆ f(hj). Then there exists some as ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). As fj > cj, it follows that
f(hj) 6⊆ M(hj) so there exists some ar ∈ f(hj)\M(hj). The remainder of the argument
follows Case (i)(b).
Hence the following properties hold for the new matching. If fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆
M(hj). Otherwise, M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) and |M(hj)| = cj. Thus, the condition in the statement
of the lemma is now satisﬁed.
For each agent ai, we next deﬁne s(ai) to be the most-preferred house hj on ai’s
preference list such that either (i) hj is a not an f-house, or (ii) hj is an f-house such that
hj 6= f(ai) and fj < cj. Note that s(ai) must exist in view of l(ai). We refer to such a
house hj as an s-house. We remark that the set of f-houses need not be disjoint from the
set of s-houses. It may be shown that a popular matching M will only assign an agent ai
to either f(ai) or s(ai), as indicated by the next two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house between f(ai) and s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house hk between f(ai) and s(ai). Then hk is an f-
house and fk ≥ ck, for otherwise s(ai) = hk. As fk ≥ ck, by Lemma 4.2.1, M(hk) ⊆ f(hk).
However, f(ai) 6= hk, thus ai / ∈ f(hk). Hence, ai cannot be assigned to hk.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house worse than s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Let hj = s(ai). If hj is undersubscribed, then we can promote ai to hj, a contra-
diction. Hence, hj is full. We consider two cases.
– Case (i): hj is an f-house. By deﬁnition of an s-house, fj < cj, so there exists some
ar ∈ M(hj)\f(hj). Let hk = f(ar). Then hk 6= hj. As ck ≥ 1 and fk ≥ 1, it follows by
Lemma 4.2.1 that M(hk) 6= ∅. Let as ∈ M(hk). Now, if ai = as, we can then promote ai
to hj and promote ar to hk to obtain a more popular matching than M, a contradiction.
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Otherwise, we can then promote ai to hj, promote ar to hk, and demote as to l(as) to
obtain a more popular matching than M, a contradiction.
– Case (ii): hj is not an f-house. Let ar ∈ M(hj). Then ar / ∈ f(hj). The remainder
of the proof of this case proceeds as in Case (i).
Recall that G is the underlying graph of I. We form a subgraph G0 of G by letting G0
contain only two edges for each agent ai, that is, one to f(ai) and the other to s(ai). We
say that a matching M is agent-complete in a given graph if it assigns all agents in the
graph. It follows that, in view of last resort houses, all popular matchings must be agent-
complete in G0. However, G0 need not admit an agent-complete matching if s(ai) 6= l(ai)
for some agent ai. In conjunction with Lemmas 4.2.1-4.2.3, the graph G0 gives rise to the
following characterisation of popular matchings in I.
Theorem 4.2.1. A matching M is popular in I if and only if
1. for every f-house hj,
(a) if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆ M(hj);
(b) if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
2. M is an agent-complete matching in the reduced graph G0.
Proof. By Lemmas 4.2.1-4.2.3, any popular matching necessarily satisﬁes Conditions 1
and 2. We now show that these conditions are suﬃcient.
Let M by any matching satisfying Conditions 1 and 2 and suppose for a contradiction
that M0 is a matching that is more popular than M. Let ai be any agent that prefers
M0 to M and let hk = M0(ai). Since M is an agent-complete matching in G0, and since
G0 contains only edges from ai to f(ai) and s(ai), then M(ai) = s(ai). Hence either (i)
hk = f(ai) or (ii) hk is an f-house such that hk 6= f(ai) and fk ≥ ck, by deﬁnition of s(ai).
In Case (i), if fk < ck then by Condition 1(a), ai ∈ M(hk), a contradiction. Hence in
both Cases (i) and (ii), fk ≥ ck. In each of the cases that fk = ck and fk > ck, it follows
by Conditions 1(a) and 1(b) that |M(hk)| = ck and M(hk) ⊆ f(hk). Since hk is full in
M, it follows that |M(hk)\M0(hk)| ≥ |M0(hk)\M(hk)|. Hence for every ai who prefers
M0(ai) = hk to M(ai), there is a unique aj ∈ M(hk)\M0(hk). But as aj ∈ M(hk), it
follows that hk = f(aj). Hence aj prefers M(aj) to M0(aj). Therefore, M is popular in
I.
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Algorithm 6 Algorithm Popular-CHA
1: M := ∅;
2: for each f-house hj do
3: c0
j := cj;
4: if fj ≤ cj then
5: for each ai ∈ f(hj) do
6: M := M ∪ {(ai,hj)};
7: delete ai and its incident edges from G0;
8: c0
j := cj − fj;
9: remove all isolated and full houses, and their incident edges, from G0;
10: compute a maximum matching M0 in G0 using capacities c0
j;
11: if M0 is not agent-complete in G0 then
12: output “no popular matching exists”
13: else
14: M := M ∪ M0;
15: for each ai ∈ A do
16: hj := f(ai);
17: if fj > cj and |M(hj)| < cj and hj 6= M(ai) then
18: promote ai from M(ai) to hj in M;
4.2.2 Finding a popular matching
Theorem 4.2.1 leads to Algorithm Popular-CHA for ﬁnding a popular matching in a CHA
instance I, or reporting that none exists, as shown in Algorithm 6. The algorithm begins
by using a pre-processing step (lines 2-9) on G0 that assigns agents to their ﬁrst-choice
house hj whenever fj ≤ cj, so as to satisfy Condition 1(a) of Theorem 4.2.1.
Our next step computes a maximum matching M0 in G0, according to the adjusted
house capacities c0
j that are deﬁned following pre-processing. We use Gabow’s algorithm
[15] to compute M0 in G0 and then test whether M0 is agent-complete. The pre-allocations
are then added to M0 to give M. As a last step, we ensure that M also meets Condition
1(b) of Theorem 4.2.1. For, suppose that hj ∈ H is an f-house such that fj > cj. Then
by deﬁnition, hj cannot be an s-house. Thus if ak ∈ M(hj) prior to the third for loop,
it follows that ak ∈ f(hj). At this stage, if hj is undersubscribed in M, we repeatedly
promote any agent ai ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) from M(ai) (note that M(ai) must be s(ai) and
hence cannot be an f-house hl such that fl > cl) to hj until hj is full, ensuring that
M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
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It is clear that the reduced graph G0 of G can be constructed in O(m) time. The
graph G0 has O(n1) edges since each agent has degree 2 in G0. It is straightforward to see
that each of the pre- and post-processing steps involving the three for loop phases takes
O(n1 + n2) time. The complexity of Gabow’s algorithm [15] for computing M0 in G0 is
O(
√
Cn1). Hence we obtain the following result concerning the complexity of Algorithm
Popular-CHA.
Lemma 4.2.4. Given an instance of CHA, we can ﬁnd a popular matching, or determine
that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 + m) time.
4.2.3 Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in I. We
begin by dividing the set of all agents into disjoint sets. Let A1 be the set of all agents
such that if ai is an agent in A1, then s(ai) = l(ai). Also, let A2 = A − A1. We aim to
ﬁnd a matching M that satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 4.2.1, and that minimises the
number of A1-agents who are assigned to their last resort house.
We begin by constructing G0, and carrying out the pre-processing step in lines 2-9
of Algorithm Popular-CHA on all agents in A1 ∪ A2. We then try to ﬁnd a maximum
matching M0 in G0 that only involves the A2-agents that remain after pre-processing
and their incident edges. If M0 is not an agent-complete matching of the agents in A2
that remain after pre-processing, then G admits no popular matching by Theorem 4.2.1.
Otherwise, we remove all edges in G0 that are incident to a last resort house, and try to
assign A1-agents to their ﬁrst-choice houses. At each step, we try to assign an additional
A1-agent to his ﬁrst-choice house by ﬁnding an augmenting path with respect to M0 using
Gabow’s algorithm [15], so that we have a maximum matching of agents in A1 ∪ A2 in
G0 at the end of this process. If any A1-agent remains unassigned, we simply assign him
to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching in G0. We also ensure
that Condition 1(b) of Theorem 4.2.1 is met by executing the third for loop in Algorithm
Popular-CHA. It follows that the matching so obtained, together with the pre-assignments
from earlier, is a maximum popular matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2. Given an instance of CHA, we can ﬁnd a maximum popular matching,
or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 + m) time.
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4.2.4 “Cloning” verus our direct approach
An alternative approach to our algorithm may be to use cloning. Given an instance I
of CHA, we may obtain an instance J of HAT by creating cj clones h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each
occurrence of hj in a given agent’s preference list with the sequence h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j , the
elements of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears. We may then
apply the O(
√
nm) algorithm for HAT given by [4] to J in order to ﬁnd a maximum
popular matching in I.
We now compare the worst-case complexity of the above cloning approach with that
of our direct algorithm. The underlying graph GJ of J contains n0 = n1 + C vertices.
Let cmin = min{cj : hj ∈ H}, and for ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Then the number of edges in GJ is m0 =
P
ai∈A
P
hj∈Ai cj ≥ mcmin. Hence the
complexity of applying the algorithm given by [4] to J is Ω(
√
n1 + Cmcmin). Recall that
the complexity of Algorithm Popular-CHA is O(
√
Cn1 + m). It follows that the cloning
method is slower by a factor of Ω(
√
n1 + Ccmin) or Ω(mcmin/n1) (note that m ≥ n1 and
cmin ≥ 1) according as
√
Cn1 ≤ m or
√
Cn1 > m respectively.
4.3 Popular matchings in CHAT
In this section, we generalise the characterisation of popular matchings together with
Algorithm Popular-CHA as given in the previous section to the case where we are given
an instance of CHAT.
4.3.1 Characterising popular matchings
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of CHAT. For each agent ai ∈ A, let
f(ai) denote the set of ﬁrst-ranked houses on ai’s preference list (clearly it is possible that
|f(ai)| > 1 in view of ties in the preference lists). We refer to all such houses hj as f-houses
and we let f(hj) = {ai ∈ A : hj ∈ f(ai)}. Let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I.
Deﬁne E1 = {(ai,hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai)} to be the set of ﬁrst-choice edges. We deﬁne
the ﬁrst-choice graph of G as G1 = (A,H,E1).
Given a CHAT instance I, since it is possible for an agent to have greater than one
f-house, Lemma 4.2.1 no longer holds in general. For example, it is possible for an f-house
hj such that fj = cj to not be assigned to all the agents in f(hj) in a popular matching
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if there are more f-houses than agents in I. This makes hj eligible to be the s-house
of some agent not in f(hj) in I whereas this would not have been possible in any given
CHA instance. Hence, we will work towards a new deﬁnition of s-houses in the context of
CHAT in this subsection. For instances with strict preference lists, Lemma 4.2.1 implies
that M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1. As the next lemma indicates, this latter
condition also extends to the CHAT case.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching
in G1.
Proof. Let M1 = M∩E1. Suppose for a contradiction that M1 is not a maximum matching
in G1. Then M1 admits an augmenting path P = ha1,h1,...,ak,hki with respect to G1.
Now, in view of last resort houses, a1 must be assigned in M. It follows that M(a1) / ∈ f(a1),
for otherwise M(a1) ∈ P. We let M0 = M\{(a1,M(a1))}. We consider the following cases
for hk.
– Case (i): hk is undersubscribed in M0. As a1 is unassigned in M0, h1 ∈ f(a1), and
|M0(hk)| < ck, we can augment M0 with P to obtain a new matching M00. Then, a1 is
assigned with h1 in M00. Furthermore, as all edges in G0 are ﬁrst-choice edges, all other
agents in P become assigned in M00 to one of their other ﬁrst-choice houses. However, M00
is more popular than M, a contradiction.
– Case (ii): |M0(hk)| = ck. Choose any as ∈ M0(hk)\f(hk). Note that such an as
must exist, for hk is full in M0 but undersubscribed in M1. Clearly, as 6= ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Choose any ht ∈ f(as). Now, ht cannot be a house in P for suppose not. Without loss of
generality, let ht = hj where 1 ≤ j < k. Let C = hhj,aj+1,hj+1,...,ak,hk,asi. Let also
M00 = M0 ⊕ C. It follows that each agent ax 6= as in C becomes assigned in M00 to one of
their other ﬁrst-choice houses while as improves by becoming assigned in M00 to one of his
ﬁrst-choice house. However then, M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence,
ht does not belong to P. Now, if ht is undersubscribed in M0, we can then augment M0
with P so that a1 improves and the other agents in P are indiﬀerent, and promote as to
ht to obtain a more popular matching than M, a contradiction. Otherwise, choose any
au ∈ M0(ht). Since ht / ∈ P and a1 is unassigned in M0, au is a distinct agent from any
agent in P. However, we can then augment M0 with P so that a1 improves and the other
agents in P are indiﬀerent, promote as to ht and demote au to l(au) to obtain a more
popular matching than M, a contradiction.
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We now work towards a deﬁnition of s-houses by using the Edmonds-Gallai Decompo-
sition. Let M be a maximum matching in some bipartite graph G where all vertices have
capacity 1. According to Lemma 1.2.1, the vertices of G can be partitioned into three
disjoint sets: E, O and U. Vertices in E, O and U are called even, odd, and unreachable re-
spectively. A vertex v is even (odd) if there exists an alternating path of even (odd) length
from an unassigned vertex in G to v. If no such alternating path exists, v is unreachable.
As noted in Section 1.2, this vertex labelling is also known as the EOU labelling. Our aim
is to obtain an EOU labelling of G1 relative to a maximum matching M1 of G1 (as obtained
by Gabow’s algorithm [15], for example). However Lemma 1.2.1 applies directly only to
the case where each vertex in the given bipartite graph has capacity 1. We will show that
the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition also holds in the case of a capacitated bipartite graph
as follows.
Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph. Also, let M be a maximum
matching of G. Let C(G) be a cloned graph of G by replacing every vertex wj ∈ W with
the clones w1
j,w2
j,...,w
cj
j where cj is the capacity of wj. We then divide the capacity
of each vertex wj ∈ W among its clones by allowing each clone to have capacity 1. In
addition, if (ui,wj) belongs to G, then we add (ui,wk
j) to C(G) for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ cj).
We then adapt the maximum matching M in G to obtain a matching C(M) in C(G),
as follows. If a vertex wj ∈ W in G is assigned to xj vertices u1,...uxj in M, then we
add (uk,wk
j) to C(M) for 1 ≤ k ≤ xj, so that |C(M)| = |M| and C(M) is a maximum
matching in C(G). It follows that C(G) is a bipartite graph in which all of its vertices on
the right hand side have capacity 1.
Let us now clone C(G) to obtain a bipartite graph C(G)0 in which all of its vertices
have capacity 1 by repeating the above steps for the vertices in U. That is, we replace
every vertex ui ∈ U with the clones u1
i,u2
i,...,u
ci
i where ci is the capacity of ui. We then
divide the capacity of each vertex ui ∈ U among its clones by allowing each clone to have
capacity 1. In addition, if (ui,wk
j) belongs to C(G), then we add (ul
i,wk
j) to C(G) for all
l (1 ≤ l ≤ ci) where wk
j is a clone of wj ∈ W in C(G). We then adapt the maximum
matching C(M) in C(G) to obtain a matching C(M)0 in C(G)0 as follows. If a vertex
ui ∈ U in G is assigned to yi vertices w0
1,...w0
yi in C(M), then we add (uk
i ,w0
k) to C(M)0
for 1 ≤ k ≤ yi where without loss of generality, w0
k is a clone of the vertex wk ∈ W in
C(G). It follows that |C(M)0| = |M| and C(M)0 is a maximum matching in C(G)0. It
also follows that C(G)0 is a bipartite graph in which all of its vertices have capacity 1.
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Suppose that we are given an EOU labelling of the vertices in C(G)0 with respect to
C(M)0 based on Lemma 1.2.1. The next lemma shows that the clones corresponding to
each vertex vj ∈ U ∪ W in G have the same EOU label in C(G)0.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let G be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a maximum matching
in G. Deﬁne the cloned graph C(G)0 and its corresponding maximum matching C(M)0 as
above. Then, given any vertex vj ∈ U ∪ W, any two clones of vj in C(G)0 have the same
EOU label.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let vj be a vertex wj belonging to the vertex set W;
analogous results can be proven if vj ∈ U. Let wx
j and w
y
j be two clones corresponding to
wj. We consider the cases where (1) wx
j is even, (2) wx
j is odd, and (3) wx
j is unreachable.
Case (1): If wx
j is even, then we consider the subcases where (a) wx
j is assigned in
C(M)0, and (b) wx
j is unassigned in C(M)0. In subcase (a), if w
y
j is unassigned in C(M)0,
then it follows immediately that w
y
j is also even. Hence, suppose that w
y
j is also assigned
in C(M)0. As wx
j is even, there exists an even length alternating path P to wx
j in C(G)0
from an unassigned vertex clone belonging to W. Let u
p
i be the vertex that precedes wx
j
on P where u
p
i is a clone vertex of ui in C(G)0. It follows that (u
p
i,wx
j) ∈ C(M)0 from our
deﬁnition of the path P. As w
y
j is also assigned in C(M)0, let (u
q
k,w
y
j) ∈ C(M)0 where u
q
k
is a clone vertex of uk in C(G)0 and (uk,wj) ∈ M. Then, it follows that (u
q
k,wx
j) must be
an edge in C(G)0. As wx
j is even, u
q
k is odd. As a result, w
y
j is even. In subcase (b), if
w
y
j is also unassigned in C(M)0, then it is again immediate that w
y
j is also even. Hence,
suppose that w
y
j is assigned in C(M)0, to u
p
i say, where u
p
i is a clone vertex of ui in C(G)0
and (ui,wj) ∈ M. Now (u
p
i,wx
j) is also an edge in C(G)0. As wx
j is even, u
p
i is odd, and
hence w
y
j is even.
Case (2): If wx
j is odd, then there must exist an odd-length alternating path from an
unassigned vertex u
p
i to wx
j where u
p
i is a clone of ui ∈ U in C(G)0. It follows that wx
j
cannot be unassigned for otherwise C(M)0 admits an augmenting path, a contradiction.
Hence, wx
j is assigned in C(M)0 to u
q
k, say, where u
q
k is a clone of uk ∈ U in C(G)0 and
(uk,wj) ∈ M. Then, u
q
k is even. However, (u
q
k,w
y
j) is an edge in C(G)0, so it follows that
w
y
j is odd.
Case (3): Now, w
y
j must also be unreachable. For, suppose not. If w
y
j is even, then wx
j
is also even by Case (1), a contradiction. If w
y
j is odd, then wx
j is also odd by Case (2), a
contradiction.
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In view of Lemma 4.3.2, it follows that the clones corresponding to each vertex vj ∈
U∪W have the same EOU label in C(G)0, thereby giving us a well-deﬁned characterisation
of EOU labels of all vertices in G. That is, if the clones of the vertex vj are even, odd or
unreachable in C(G)0, we can correspondingly label vj as even, odd or unreachable in G.
Suppose that we now have an EOU labelling of the vertices in G as described above. The
next result is a consequence of Lemma 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a
maximum matching in G. Then every odd or unreachable vertex vj ∈ U ∪ W satisﬁes
|M(vj)| = cj.
Proof. Let vj ∈ U ∪W be any vertex that is odd (or unreachable) in G. By Lemma 4.3.2,
all clones of vj will also be odd (or unreachable) in C(G)0. It follows that vj must be full
in M, for otherwise, at least one of its clones vx
j will be unassigned in C(M)0. However,
vx
j will then be even, a contradiction.
Hence, Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3 give rise to the ﬁrst extension of the Edmonds-
Gallai Decomposition to the capacitated bipartite graph as follows.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let G = (U,W,E) be a capacitated bipartite graph and let M be a maxi-
mum matching in G. Deﬁne E, O and U to be the vertex sets corresponding to even, odd
and unreachable vertices in an EOU labelling of G with respect to M. Then:
(a) The sets E, O and U are pairwise disjoint. Every maximum matching in G partitions
the vertices into the same sets of even, odd and unreachable vertices.
(b) Every maximum matching M in G satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) every vertex in O and every vertex in U is full in M;
(ii) every vertex in O is assigned only to vertices in E in M;
(iii) every vertex in U is assigned only to vertices in U in M;
(iv) |M| =
P
ui∈OU ci +
P
wj∈OW cj +
P
ui∈UU ci where OU is the set of odd vertices
in U, OW is the set of odd vertices in W, and UU is the set of unreachable
vertices in U.
(c) No maximum matching in G contains an edge between two vertices in O or a vertex
in O with a vertex in U. There is no edge in G connecting a vertex in E with a
vertex in U, or between two vertices of E.
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It follows that Lemma 4.3.4 enables us to obtain an EOU labelling of G1 relative to a
maximum matching M1 of G1. The following corollary is a result of Lemma 4.3.4.
Corollary 4.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then every odd or unreachable
house hj ∈ H satisﬁes M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
Proof. Let G1 = (A,H,E1) be the ﬁrst-choice graph of I. Then, M1 = M ∩ E1 is a
maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 4.3.1. Let hj ∈ H be any house that is odd (or
unreachable) in G1. By Lemma 4.3.4, hj is full in M1. Since C(G1) contains only ﬁrst-
choice edges, it follows that M1(hj) ⊆ f(hj), and hence M(hj) ⊆ f(hj).
We are now in a position to deﬁne s(ai), the set of houses such that, in a popular
matching M, if ai ∈ A is assigned in M and M(ai) / ∈ f(ai), then M(ai) ∈ s(ai). We will
ensure that any odd or unreachable house hj is not a member of s(ai), since |M(hj)| = cj
and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) by Lemma 4.3.4 and Corollary 4.3.1. Hence, we deﬁne s(ai) to be the
set of highest-ranking houses in ai’s preference list that are even in G1. Any such house is
called an s-house. Clearly, it is possible that |s(ai)| > 1, however, ai is indiﬀerent between
all houses in s(ai). Furthermore, s(ai) 6= ∅ due to the existence of last resort houses which
are of degree 0 in G1 (and thus even). However, f(ai) and s(ai) need not be disjoint, i.e.
either f(ai) = s(ai) or ai prefers all members of f(ai) to s(ai). It turns out that Lemmas
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 also extend to CHAT as established by the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.3.5. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house between f(ai) and s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house hj strictly between f(ai) and s(ai). Then,
ai must prefer hj to all houses in s(ai). Hence, hj must be an odd or unreachable house
in G1, as s(ai) contains the highest-ranking even houses in G1 in ai’s preference list. By
Corollary 4.3.1, M(hj) ⊆ f(hj). However, this is a contradiction as hj / ∈ f(ai).
Lemma 4.3.6. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent ai ∈ A can be assigned
in M to a house worse than s(ai) on ai’s preference list.
Proof. Suppose that ai is assigned to a house worse than s(ai). Let hj be any house in
s(ai). Now, if |M(hj)| < cj, we can promote ai to hj to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, suppose that |M(hj)| = cj. Let ak ∈ M(hj). We consider two cases for hj.
– Case (i): hj / ∈ f(ak). We then choose any hl ∈ f(ak). If |M(hl)| < cl, we promote
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ai to hj and promote ak to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M. Otherwise,
|M(hl)| = cl so we let am ∈ M(hl). If am = ai, we can promote ai to hj and promote
ak to hl. If am 6= ai, we promote ai to hj, promote ak to hl and demote am to l(am) to
obtain a more popular matching than M.
– Case (ii): hj ∈ f(ak). As hj ∈ s(ai), hj must be an even vertex by our deﬁnition of an
s-house. Let G1 be the ﬁrst-choice graph of I as previously deﬁned. Let M1 = M ∩ E1.
Then M1 is a maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 4.3.1. Furthermore, there exists an
alternating path P of even length to hj in G1, with respect to M1, from some (even)
house hl, which is undersubscribed in M1. Let M0 = M\{(ai,M(ai))}. We consider the
subcases that (a) hl is undersubscribed in M0 or (b) hl is full in M0. In subcase (a), we can
reuse the proof of Case (i) in Lemma 4.3.1 to obtain a matching M00 by matching ai with
hj, and then matching all other agents in P with one of their other ﬁrst-choice houses in
P by augmenting along P. It follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In subcase (b), we can always ﬁnd an agent am ∈ M0(hl)\f(hl). The remainder of our
proof then follows a similar argument to that used in Case (ii) of Lemma 4.3.1 where we
can obtain a matching M00 that is more popular than M, a contradiction.
As was the case with CHA, we can also deﬁne a subgraph G0 for the CHAT instance
I by this time letting G0 contain only edges from each agent ai to houses in f(ai) ∪ s(ai).
Now, all popular matchings must be agent-complete in G0 in view of last resort houses.
However, an agent-complete matching need not exist if s(ai) 6= {l(ai)} for some agent
ai. Lemmas 4.3.1, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 give rise to the following characterisation of popular
matchings in I.
Theorem 4.3.1. A matching M is popular in I if and only if
1. M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, and
2. M is an agent-complete matching in the subgraph G0.
Proof. By Lemmas 4.3.1, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6, any popular matching necessarily satisﬁes Con-
ditions 1 and 2. We now show that these conditions are suﬃcient.
Let M be any matching satisfying Conditions 1 and 2. Suppose for a contradiction
that M0 is a matching that is more popular than M. Let ai be any agent that prefers M0
to M. Since ai prefers M0(ai) to M(ai), M is an agent-complete matching in G0, and G0
only contains edges from ai to f(ai) ∪ s(ai), it follows that M(ai) ∈ s(ai), and f(ai) and
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s(ai) are disjoint. Hence, M0(ai) must be an odd or unreachable house in G1, as M(ai) is
an even house of highest rank in ai’s preference list.
Let hj1 = M0(ai). Since hj1 is odd or unreachable, it follows by Condition 1 and Lemma
4.3.4(b) that |M(hj1)| = cj1 and M(hj1) ⊆ f(hj1). Now since ai ∈ M0(hj1)\M(hj1), there
exists a distinct agent ak1 ∈ M(hj1)\M0(hj1). If ak1 is unassigned in M0 or M0(ak1) / ∈
f(ak1), then ak1 prefers M to M0. Otherwise, suppose M0(ak1) ∈ f(ak1). Let hj2 =
M0(ak1). It follows that ak1 is even or unreachable so that hj2 must be odd or unreachable.
It then follows by Condition 1 and Lemma 4.3.4(b) that |M(hj2)| = cj2 and M(hj2) ⊆
f(hj2). Hence, there exists an agent ak2 6= ak1 such that ak2 ∈ M(hj2)\M0(hj2) and
hj2 ∈ f(ak2). If ak2 is unassigned in M0 or M0(ak2) / ∈ f(ak2), then ak2 prefers M to M0.
Otherwise, suppose that M0(ak2) ∈ f(ak2). Let hj3 = M0(ak2). Then there exists an
agent ak3 ∈ M(hj3)\M0(hj3) by a similar argument for ak2. Note that possibly hj3 = hj1,
but we must be able to choose ak3 6= ak1, for otherwise |M0(hj1)| > |M(hj1)|, which is a
contradiction since |M(hj1)| = cj1. Thus, ak3 is a distinct agent, so that we can repeat the
above argument to identify an alternating path P in which houses need not be distinct,
but agents are distinct. It follows that P must terminate at some agent akr as the number
of agents are ﬁnite. Furthermore, it must be the case that akr is unassigned in M0 or
M0(akr) / ∈ f(akr) so that for every ai that prefers M0 to M, there must exist a distinct
akr that prefers M to M0.
Finally, we note the uniqueness of akr. If there exists another agent a0
i who prefers M0
to M, then we can build another alternating path – it is possible that some of the houses
are those already used in previous alternating paths such as P. However, it must be the
case (from our argument that ak3 is a distinct agent) that we are always able to identify
distinct agents not already used in previous alternating paths, as each house on the path
is odd or unreachable, and thus full in M. Hence, M is popular in I.
4.3.2 Finding a popular matching
Theorem 4.3.1 leads to Algorithm Popular-CHAT for ﬁnding a popular matching in an
instance I of CHAT or reporting that none exists, as shown in Algorithm 7. The next
lemma is an important step in establishing the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.3.7. Algorithm Popular-CHAT constructs a matching M such that M ∩ E1 is
a maximum matching of G1.
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Algorithm 7 Algorithm Popular-CHAT
1: Build subgraph G1=(A,H,E1), where E1={(ai,hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai)}.
2: Compute a maximum matching M1 of ﬁrst-choice edges in G1.
3: Obtain an EOU labelling of G1.
4: Build subgraph G0=(A,H,E0), where E0={(ai,hj) : ai ∈ A ∧ hj ∈ f(ai) ∪ s(ai)}.
5: Delete all edges in G0 connecting two odd vertices, or connecting an odd vertex with an un-
reachable vertex. (This step does not delete an edge of M1.)
6: Find a maximum matching M in the reduced graph G0 by augmenting M1.
7: if M is not agent-complete in G0 then
8: output “No popular matching exists”;
9: else
10: return M as a popular matching in I;
Proof. We ﬁrstly claim that G0 does not contain any edges of rank greater than 1 incident
to odd vertices and unreachable houses. Now, it follows by our deﬁnition of s-houses, for
any odd or unreachable house hj ∈ H, hj / ∈ s(ai) for any agent ai ∈ A. Thus, there exist
only ﬁrst-choice edges incident to any such hj. By Lemma 4.3.4(b), every odd agent ai in
G1 can only be assigned in any maximum matching of G1 to some even house hk. Since
(ai,hk) is a ﬁrst-choice edge in G1 and s(ai) deﬁnes the highest-ranked even house in ai’s
preference list, it follows that s(ai) ⊆ f(ai). Hence, the claim is established.
Hence by the above claim, it follows that the edges removed from G0 during Step 5
of the algorithm, between two odd vertices or between an odd vertex and an unreachable
vertex, are ﬁrst-choice edges in G0. However by Lemma 4.3.4(c), no maximum matching
in G1 can contain these edges. Thus, no popular matching can contain these edges by
Lemma 4.3.1. In particular, no edge of M1 is deleted by Step 5.
It also follows by Lemma 4.3.4(c) that there cannot exist any (ﬁrst-choice) edges in G1
between two even vertices, or between an even and an unreachable vertex. As a result, the
only ﬁrst-choice edges that remain in G0 after the edge deletions are those edges between
(i) odd agents and even houses, (ii) even agents and odd houses, and (iii) unreachable
agents and unreachable houses. Deﬁne a second-choice edge as belonging to the edge
set {(ai,hj) ∈ E0 : hj ∈ s(ai) ∧ s(ai) 6⊆ f(ai)}. Then by the above claim, the only second-
choice edges that remain in G0 are those between even agents and even houses, and between
unreachable agents and even houses.
The matching M is obtained from M1 through successive augmentation in Gabow’s
algorithm. We claim that there does not exist any augmenting path P in which an un-
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reachable agent ai (who is assigned in M1 to some house in f(ai)) becomes worse oﬀ, for
suppose otherwise. We trace the path P from the undersubscribed house endpoint. Let ai
be the ﬁrst unreachable agent to become worse oﬀ after we augment along P. Let Mb be
the matching before we augmented along P and let Ma be the matching obtained from
satisfying P. Assume that ai is assigned to hj1 in Mb. Then, it follows that hj1 is unreach-
able. Furthermore, we can pick an agent ai1 6= ai assigned to hj1 in Ma but not in Mb.
It follows that ai1 must be unreachable because any unreachable house has only incident
edges from unreachable agents in G0 and since any unreachable house does not have any
edge of rank greater than 1 incident to it as established above. If ai1 is unassigned in Mb,
then we have ﬁnished tracing the path P. However, this gives a contradiction by Lemma
4.3.4(b). Hence, ai1 must be assigned to some ﬁrst-choice house hj2 in Mb or else ai cannot
be the ﬁrst unreachable agent to become worse oﬀ. It thus follows that hj2 must also be
unreachable. We can repeat the above argument to trace the path P until we terminate
at some agent air who is assigned to the unreachable house hjr in Ma. It is evident that
air must be unassigned in Mb. However, any such air must be unreachable, which is a
contradiction again by Lemma 4.3.4(b).
Now, since all odd agents have only ﬁrst-choice edges incident to them in G0, they must
remain assigned to ﬁrst-choice houses in M even if they participated in any augmenting
paths. Moreover, it must be the case that the odd houses, each of which is full in M1, must
be full in M and incident only to ﬁrst-choice edges in M (since odd houses are incident
only to such edges in G0). Finally, by the above paragraph, unreachable agents cannot
become worse oﬀ in M than in M1. Hence, only even agents may become worse oﬀ in
M than in M1, but this means that at least |OA| +
P
hj∈OH cj + |UA| ﬁrst-choice edges
assigned previously in M1 remain assigned in M. It thus follows by Lemma 4.3.4(b) that
M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching of G1.
Hence if Algorithm Popular-CHAT returns a matching M, then M is both an agent-
complete matching in G0 and M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching of G1 by Lemma 4.3.7.
Hence M is a popular matching in I by Theorem 4.3.1.
We now consider the complexity of Algorithm Popular-CHAT. Let F be the number
of ﬁrst-choice edges in G. It is straightforward to see that G1 can be constructed in
O(F + n2) time. We use Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a maximum matching M1
in G1 in O(
√
CF) time. We then obtain an EOU labelling of G1 as follows. We ﬁrst use
a pre-processing step to label each unassigned agent and each undersubscribed house as
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even. This step takes O(n) time. Next, restricted breadth-ﬁrst search may be used on
G1 to search for alternating paths with respect to M1, building up odd or even labels for
every vertex encountered. This step labels all odd and even (assigned) agents, and all
odd and even (full) houses and takes O(m) time. Any remaining unlabelled vertices must
be unreachable and we can directly label these vertices in G1 in O(n) time. Thus, the
total time complexity of this step is O(n + m). The EOU labelling of G1 is then used
to construct G0 and to delete certain edges from G0 at Steps 4 and 5 of the algorithm,
both of which take O(m) time overall. Finally, we then use Gabow’s algorithm again to
obtain the maximum matching M in G0 in O(
√
C(F + S)) time, where S is the number
of second-choice edges in G0. The following result gives the overall run-time of Algorithm
Popular-CHAT.
Lemma 4.3.8. Given an instance of CHAT, we can ﬁnd a popular matching, or determine
that none exists, in O(
√
Cm) time.
4.3.3 Finding a maximum popular matching
It now remains to consider the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in I.
The aim is to ﬁnd a matching that satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 4.3.1 and that
minimises the number of agents who are assigned to their last resort houses. We begin by
ﬁrstly using Algorithm Popular-CHAT to compute a popular matching M in I, assuming
such a matching exists. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching in G1. We remove all edges
in G0 (and thus from M) that are incident to a last resort house. It follows that M still
satisﬁes the property that M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, but M need not be
maximum in G0 if agents become unassigned as a result of the edge removals. Thus, we
obtain a new maximum matching M0 from M by using Gabow’s algorithm on G0 again.
If M0 is not agent-complete in G0, we simply assign any agent who remains unassigned in
M0 to their last resort house to obtain an agent-complete matching. Using an argument
similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, it follows that M0∩E1 is a maximum matching
of G1. Thus, M0 is a maximum popular matching in I. Now, it is straightforward to see
that the overall complexity of this approach is as for Algorithm Popular-CHAT, giving the
following result.
Theorem 4.3.2. Given an instance of CHAT, we can ﬁnd a maximum popular matching,
or report that no such matching exists, in O(
√
Cm) time.
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4.3.4 “Cloning versus our direct approach
We may compare the complexity of our direct approach for CHAT to that obtained using
cloning on I together with the algorithm of [4] on the cloned instance of I. As in Section
4.2, the latter approach takes Ω(
√
n1 + Cm0) time, where m0 =
P
ai∈A
P
hj∈Ai cj. It
follows that this is slower than our direct algorithm by a factor of Ω(m0/m).
4.4 Open problem
We conclude this chapter with the following open problem.
Let I be an extension of CHA in which each agent now has a capacity to be assigned to
more than one house simultaneously in any matching M of I, i.e. a many-many mapping is
sought in any matching of agents to houses in I. We remark that it may be appropriate to
redeﬁne an agent’s preference over matchings to Deﬁnition 1.4.1 in this setting. However,
the deﬁnition of a popular matching is unchanged. Is the problem of ﬁnding a popular
matching (or reporting that none exists) then solvable in polynomial time? It is not
immediately clear if cloning oﬀers a straightforward solution in this context, since both
agents and houses have capacities, so that it would be hard to avoid assigning the same
agent to the same house more than once in any cloning approach. Hence, a direct algorithm
using an approach of the kind in this chapter is likely to be required. This then raises the
question: if a polynomial-time algorithm exists for solving this problem in CHA, can we
extend this to solve the analogous problem in CHAT?
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our study of popular matchings from Chapter 4 to the Weighted
Capacitated House Allocation problem with no ties (WCHA), a generalisation of CHA
in which each agent has an associated weight that indicates his priority. The assignment
of weights to agents allow us to build up a spectrum of priority levels for agents in the
competition for houses in situations where the total capacity of the houses is less than
the number of agents. In turn, this gives some agents a better chance of “doing well”.
For instance, the assignment of weights can enable DVD rental companies like Amazon
to give priority to those members who have paid more for privileged status whenever a
certain title is limited in stock. Alternatively, weights may be assigned to candidates in job
markets based on objective criteria such as academic results or relevant work experience.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. In Section 5.2,
we ﬁrst develop necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in a WCHA instance
I. In Section 5.3, we identify a structure in the underlying graph of I that singles out
those edges that cannot belong to a popular matching. We then use these two results in
conjunction to construct a O(
√
Cn1 + m) time algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum popular
matching in I or reporting that none exists, where C is the total capacity of the houses,
n1 is the number of agents and m is the total length of preference lists in I. Finally, as for
the case of CHA, a straightforward solution to the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular
matching in I may be to use “cloning”. Informally, this entails creating cj clones for each
house hj to obtain an instance J of WHAT, and then applying the algorithm of [43] to
J. However, we will show in Section 5.3.6 that this approach leads to a slower algorithm
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than the direct approach that we will be using, as was the case for CHA.
5.2 Characterising a popular matching
We remark that all the notations and terminology that were deﬁned for CHA in Chapters
1, 2 and 4 carry over directly to WCHA. We also provide some additional deﬁnitions and
redeﬁne certain concepts that we need to adapt to WCHA as follows.
Let I be an instance of WCHA, and let G = (A,H,E) be the underlying graph of I,
where A = {a1,a2,...,an1} is the set of agents, H = {h1,h2,...,hn2} is the set of houses
and E is the set of edges in G representing the acceptable houses of the agents. As was the
case in CHA, we also create a unique last resort house l(a) for each agent a and append
l(a) to a’s preference list. We henceforth assume that G contains the vertex l(a) and the
edge (a,l(a)) for each a ∈ A. Again, we let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
Every agent a has a positive weight w(a) indicating the priority of the agent, and
we partition A into the sets P1, P2, ..., Pk, such that the weight of agents in Pz is wz,
and w1 > w2 > ... > wk > 0. For each agent a ∈ A, we say that a has priority z if
a ∈ Pz, and we use P(a) to denote the priority of a, that is P(a) = z. We assume that no
agent has an empty preference list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent, i.e.
m ≥ max{n1,n2}. We also assume that cj ≤ n1 for each hj ∈ H. Again, let C =
Pn2
j=1 cj
denote the sum of the capacities of the houses.
As with CHA, given two matchings M and M0 in I, we say that an agent a prefers
M0 to M if either (i) a is matched in M0 and unmatched in M, or (ii) a is matched in
both M0 and M and prefers M0(a) to M(a). Let P(M0,M) denote the set of agents who
prefer M0 to M. Then, in view of the weights assigned to agents, it is appropriate to deﬁne
a popular matching in the context of WCHA as follows. Firstly, let the satisfaction of
M0 with respect to M be deﬁned as sat(M0,M) =
P
a∈P(M0,M) w(a) −
P
a∈P(M,M0) w(a).
We then say that M0 is more popular than M if sat(M0,M) > 0. A matching M in I is
popular if there is no other matching in I that is more popular than M.
Let us now proceed to obtain a characterisation of popular matchings in I. For each
agent a ∈ A, we introduce the notion of a’s f-house and a’s s-house denoting these by
f(a) and s(a) respectively. Intuitively, f(a) is the most preferred house on a’s preference
list to which a could be assigned in a popular matching. We use Algorithm Label-f shown
in Algorithm 8 to deﬁne f(a) precisely.
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Algorithm 8 Algorithm Label-f
1: for each hj ∈ H do
2: for i in 1..k do
3: fi,j := 0;
4: for each a ∈ P1 do
5: f(a) := ﬁrst-ranked house hj on a’s preference list;
6: f1,j ++;
7: for z in 2..k do
8: for each a ∈ Pz do
9: q := 1;
10: hj := house at position q on a’s preference list;
11: while (
Pz−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj) do
12: q ++;
13: hj := house at position q on a’s preference list;
14: f(a) := hj;
15: fz,j ++;
Here, we will deﬁne the f-houses for all the agents in phases, with each phase corre-
sponding to a priority level Pz. Intuitively, during the course of the algorithm’s execution,
fi,j will denote the number of agents with priority i whose f-house is deﬁned and equal
to hj. Initially, fi,j = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2). We then deﬁne the
f-house for each agent as follows. For every agent a ∈ P1, we let f(a) be the ﬁrst-ranked
house hj on a’s preference list, and we call such a house an f1-house. Given 2 ≤ z ≤ k,
for every agent a ∈ Pz, we let f(a) be the most-preferred house hj on a’s preference list
such that
Pz−1
p=1 fp,j < cj – we call hj an fz-house. Clearly, the algorithm must terminate
due to the presence of a unique last resort house at the end of each agent’s preference
list. Once the algorithm has terminated, we let fi(hj) denote the set {a ∈ Pi : f(a) = hj}.
Then, fi,j = |fi(hj)| (possibly fi,j = 0). Here, and henceforth throughout this chapter,
any reference to fi,j refers to the value of this variable upon termination of Algorithm
Label-f.
It is straightforward to verify that Algorithm Label-f runs in O(m) time if we use
virtual initialisation (described in [9, p.149]) for the steps in lines 1-3. The example in
Figure 5.1 gives an illustration of the deﬁnition of f-houses. Here, the f-houses of the
agents are as follows: f(a1) = h1, f(a2) = h3, f(a3) = h3, f(a4) = h4, f(a5) = h4 and
f(a6) = h4.
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Agent Priority Weight Pref list House Capacity
a1: 1 7 h1 h2 h3 h1 1
a2: 2 4 h1 h3 h4 h2 2
a3: 2 4 h3 h5 h3 2
a4: 3 2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h4 2
a5: 3 2 h1 h4 h5 h5 1
a6: 3 2 h4 h1 h2
Figure 5.1: An instance I1 of WCHA
Now, for each hj ∈ H, let f(hj) = {a ∈ A : f(a) = hj} and fj = |f(hj)| (possibly
fj = 0), i.e. f(hj) =
Sk
p=1 fp(hj). Clearly each hj may be an fz-house for more than one
priority level z. For every such hj, let us deﬁne dj to denote the priority level such that
dj =



max{r : 0 ≤ r ≤ k ∧ fr,j 6= 0},if fj ≤ cj,
max{r : 0 ≤ r ≤ k ∧
Pr
i=1 fi,j < cj},if fj > cj.
Note that for every hj such that fj > cj, clearly
Sk
p=dj+1 fp(hj) 6= ∅. Hence, for every such
hj, we deﬁne gj to be the priority level such that gj = max{r : dj < r ≤ k ∧ fr,j 6= 0}. We
refer to Figure 5.1 for illustration. Here, d1 = 1, d3 = 2 and d4 = 2. Note that d2 and
d5 are not deﬁned, for h2 and h5 are not f-houses for any agent. Also, since f4 > c4, it
follows that g4 = 3; however, h4 is the only f-house hj such that fj > cj. We now work
towards obtaining a characterisation of popular matchings in WCHA. We begin with the
following technical lemma.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let M be a matching in any WCHA instance I. Let hj ∈ H be a house,
and let 1 ≤ i ≤ dj. Let a ∈ A be an agent such that a ∈ Pi and a ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj). If hj is
full in M and
Si−1
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj), then there exists some agent in M(hj)\
Si
p=1 fp(hj).
Proof. Let F =
Si
p=1 fp(hj). Then, it follows that F = (M(hj) ∩ F) ∪ (F\M(hj)) and
M(hj) = (M(hj) ∩ F) ∪ (M(hj)\F). Hence, we have that |F| =
Pi
p=1 fp,j = |M(hj) ∩
F| + |F\M(hj)| and |M(hj)| = |M(hj) ∩ F| + |M(hj)\F|. Clearly, |F| ≤
Pdj
p=1 fp,j ≤ cj.
Since a ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj), it follows that |F\M(hj)| > 0. Hence, |M(hj)\F| = |M(hj)| −
|F| + |F\M(hj)| > 0.
The next three lemmas contribute to the characterisation of popular matchings in
WCHA.
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Lemma 5.2.2. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I and let
a ∈ A be any agent. Then, a cannot be assigned to a house better than f(a) in M.
Proof. Let a be the agent with lowest priority (i.e. greatest weight) such that a is assigned
to house hj in M and suppose that a prefers hj to f(a) = hl. Let a ∈ Pi so that
Pi−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj by deﬁnition of f(a) as a’s f-house. Clearly, there must be no agent a0
such that a0 ∈ Pz where z ≥ i and f(a0) = hj, for otherwise
Pz−1
p=1 fp,j < cj, a contradiction.
Let a0 be any agent with priority level z < i such that a0 ∈ f(hj)\M(hj) – there must
exist such an agent since
Sk
p=i fp(hj) = ∅ and
Pi−1
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj and a ∈ M(hj). Then, by
choice of a, a0 is assigned in M to a house worse than f(a0). However, this means that we
can promote a0 to f(a0) and demote a to l(a) to obtain a matching whose improvement in
satisfaction is wz − wi > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for
each hj ∈ H,
Sdj
i=1 fi(hj) ⊆ M(hj).
Proof. Given 1 ≤ i ≤ dj, we will prove by induction on i that fi(hj) ⊆ M(hj).
For the base case, let i = 1. Suppose that f1(hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Then, there exists some
agent ar ∈ f1(hj)\M(hj). By deﬁnition of an f1-house, hj must be the ﬁrst house on
ar’s preference list. Hence, ar prefers to be assigned to hj than M(ar). Clearly, if hj is
undersubscribed in M, we can promote ar to hj to obtain a matching more popular than
M, a contradiction. Hence, hj is full in M. Choose any as ∈ M(hj)\f1(hj) (which must
exist by Lemma 5.2.1). Since as / ∈ f1(hj), either (i) as has priority > 1, or (ii) as has
priority 1 but f(as) = hl 6= hj. In subcase (i), we can promote ar to hj and demote as to
l(as) to obtain a more popular matching. In subcase (ii), since f(as) = hl, it follows by
Lemma 5.2.2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl than hj. Now, if hl is undersubscribed
in M, we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, hl is full in M. If hl = M(ar), then we can then promote ar to hj and promote
as to hl to obtain a more popular matching. Otherwise, choose any at ∈ M(hl). Clearly,
at 6= ar. We can then promote ar to hj, promote as to hl, and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0.
For the inductive case, assume that 2 ≤ i ≤ dj, and if q < i, then fq(hj) ⊆ M(hj)
for all hj ∈ H. Suppose for a contradiction that fi(hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Then, there exists
some ar ∈ fi(hj)\M(hj). Now, since f(ar) = hj, it follows by Lemma 5.2.2 that ar must
prefer to be assigned to hj than M(ar). Thus, if hj is undersubscribed in M, we can
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promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular matching than M, a contradiction. Hence,
hj is full in M. Choose any as ∈ M(hj)\
Si
p=1 fp(hj) which must exist by Lemma 5.2.1.
Since as / ∈
Si
p=1 fp(hj), either (i) as has priority > i, or (ii) as has priority ≤ i but
f(as) = hl 6= hj.
In subcase (i), we can promote ar to hj and demote as to l(as) to obtain a more
popular matching than M, a contradiction. In subcase (ii), suppose that as has priority
z < i. Then hl is an fz-house so that as ∈ fz(hl). However, this is a contradiction since
by the inductive hypothesis fz(hl) ⊆ M(hl), but M(as) 6= hl. Thus, as has priority i and
as ∈ fi(hl). Clearly, since f(as) = hl, it follows by Lemma 5.2.2 that as must prefer to
be assigned to hl than hj. Thus, if hl is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj and
promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M, a contradiction. Hence hl is
full. If hl = M(ar), then we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more
popular matching. Otherwise, hl 6= M(ar). We will show how to choose at ∈ M(hl). Since
f(as) = hl and 2 ≤ i ≤ k, by our deﬁnition of f-houses, hl must be the most preferred
house on as’s preference list such that
Pi−1
p=1 fp,l < cl.
Now, by the inductive hypothesis, it must be the case that
Si−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl).
Since
Pi−1
p=1 fp,l < cl and hl is full, it follows that
Si−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊂ M(hl). Hence, it must
be the case that M(hl)\
Si−1
p=1 fp(hl) 6= ∅. It follows that there exists some agent at ∈
M(hl)\
Si−1
p=1 fp(hl) and, either (i) at ∈
Sk
p=i fp(hl) or (ii) at / ∈ f(hl). Clearly, in case
(ii), at has priority ≥ i by a similar argument for as. For, if at has priority z < i, then
by the inductive hypothesis, since hm = f(at) is an fz-house and at ∈ fz(hm), it follows
that fz(hm) ⊆ M(hm). However, this gives a contradiction since M(at) 6= hm. Hence,
at has priority ≥ i in both cases (i) and (ii). We can then promote ar to hj, promote as
to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is
wi + wi − w(at) > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 5.2.4. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I. Then, for
each hj ∈ H, if fj > cj, then M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj).
Proof. Clearly, fgj,j > cj−
Pdj
p=1 fp,j. It follows by Lemma 5.2.3 that
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj)
so that no matter whether hj is full or undersubscribed, fgj(hj) 6⊆ M(hj). Hence, there
exists some agent ar such that ar ∈ fgj(hj)\M(hj). Note that ar has priority gj. Clearly,
since f(ar) = hj, ar must prefer to be assigned to hj than M(ar) by Lemma 5.2.2. Hence, if
hj is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj to obtain a more popular matching than M,
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a contradiction. It follows that hj is full. We will show that M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj)
for all values of dj.
If dj = 0, then it must be the case that f1,j > cj and ar ∈ f1(hj)\M(hj). If M(hj) ⊆
f1(hj), then the result is immediate. Hence, suppose that M(hj) 6⊆ f1(hj). Choose any
as ∈ M(hj)\f1(hj). Clearly, either (i) as has priority 1 but f(as) = hl 6= hj or (ii) as has
priority > 1. In case (i), since f(as) = hl, as must prefer to be assigned to hl than hj
by Lemma 5.2.2. Hence, if hl is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to hj and as to hl
to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Thus, hl is full. By Lemma 5.2.3,
Sdl
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl). Since as ∈ f1(hl)\M(hl), it follows that dl = 0, i.e. f1,l > cl. Now,
if M(ar) = hl, then we can promote ar to hj and promote as to hl to obtain a more
popular matching. Hence, M(ar) 6= hl. Choose any at ∈ M(hl). We then promote ar to
hj, promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in
satisfaction is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0. In case (ii), we can promote ar to hj and demote as
to l(as) to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, dj ≥ 1. Suppose for a contradiction that M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) 6⊆ fgj(hj). It
follows that there exists some agent as ∈ M(hj)\
Sgj
p=1 fp(hj). Recall that ar has priority
gj. Clearly, either (i) as has priority ≤ gj but f(as) = hl 6= hj, or (ii) as has priority
> gj. It is immediate in case (ii) that we can promote ar to hj and demote as to l(as) to
obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, case (i) applies. It follows by
Lemma 5.2.2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl than hj, and so, if hl is undersubscribed,
we can then obtain a more popular matching by promoting ar to hj and promoting as to
hl. Hence hl is full. Now, if M(ar) = hl, we can then promote ar to hj and promote as to
hl to obtain a more popular matching. Hence, M(ar) 6= hl.
Let as have priority z1 so that z1 ≤ gj. By our deﬁnition of f-houses, since hl = f(as),
if z1 = 1, then hl is the ﬁrst house on as’s preference list. Since hl is full, then choose
any at ∈ M(hl) and let at have priority z2. We obtain an improvement in satisfaction
of w(ar) + w(as) − w(at) = wgj + w1 − wz2 > 0 by promoting ar to hj, promoting as
to hl and demoting at to l(at). Hence, it follows that z1 > 1. Then, hl must be the
most preferred house on as’s preference list such that
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,l < cl. By deﬁnition of
f(as) = hl, z1 ≤ gl. Now, by Lemma 5.2.3,
Sdl
p=1 fp(hl) ⊆ M(hl). However, as / ∈ M(hl).
Hence, it follows that z1 > dl, i.e. z1 = gl. Since
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,l < cl and hl is full, it follows
that
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(hl) ⊂ M(hl). Hence, we have that M(hl)\
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(hl) 6= ∅. It follows that
there exists some agent at ∈ M(hl)\
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(hl). Clearly, either (i) at ∈
Sk
p=z1 fp(hl) or
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(ii) at / ∈ f(hl).
Note that since M(ar) 6= hl, at 6= ar. Now, in both case (i) and (ii), if at has priority
z2 ≥ z1, we can then promote ar to hj, promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a
matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w(ar)+w(as)−w(at) = wgj+wz1−w(at) >
0, a contradiction. Hence z2 < z1, and so only case (ii) applies. Let hm = f(at). It is
obvious, by Lemma 5.2.2, that at prefers to be assigned to hm than hl. Furthermore,
hm 6= hj, for suppose not. As z2 < z1 ≤ gj and f(at) is deﬁned, it follows that z2 ≤ dj.
By Lemma 5.2.3,
Sz2
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) so that at ∈ M(hj). However,
this gives a contradiction since at ∈ M(hl) and hj 6= hl. Clearly also, hm 6= M(ar) for
otherwise, we can promote ar to hj, promote as to hl and promote at to hm to obtain
a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, the houses hm, hl, hj and M(ar) are
distinct. Clearly too, the agents ar, as and at are distinct for z2 < z1 ≤ gj and ar 6= as.
We assume that hm is full, for otherwise we can obtain a contradiction by promoting
ar to hj, promoting as to hl and promoting at to hm. Let au ∈ M(hm). If z2 = 1, then
we can promote ar to hj, promote as to hl, promote at to hm and demote au to l(au) to
obtain a new matching with improvement in satisfaction w(ar)+w(as)+w(at)−w(au) =
wgj +wz1 +w1 −w(au) > 0. Hence, z2 > 1. If we let at and au take the roles of as and at
respectively, then it follows by the argument that we use to deﬁne at that we are able to
choose au such that au has priority < z2 and au / ∈ f(hm). It follows that au is an agent
distinct from ar, as and at since P(au) < z2.
By continuing this argument, it follows that we obtain a sequence of distinct agents
a0,a1,a2,a3,... where a0 = ar, a1 = as, a2 = at, and a3 = au. For i ≥ 4, the above
construction indicates that P(ai) < P(ai−1). If this sequence does not terminate as a
result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of the above cases, then we are bound to
ultimately generate an agent ax such that P(ax) < 1, which is impossible.
Lemmas 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 give rise to the following corollary concerning the relation of
f-houses to popular matchings.
Corollary 5.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I. Then, for
every f-house hj,
1. if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆ M(hj);
2. if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj,
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj), and
M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj).
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Proof. In Case 1, if fj ≤ cj, it follows by deﬁnition of dj that
Sk
p=dj+1 fp(hj) = ∅. Clearly
then, f(hj) =
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) by Lemma 5.2.3. In Case 2, it follows by Lemmas 5.2.3
and 5.2.4 that
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj), M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj) and |M(hj)| = cj.
We now deﬁne the concept of an s-house for each agent. Given a popular matching
M, if M(a) 6= f(a), then as we shall show, M(a) = s(a). Given 1 ≤ z ≤ k, for every agent
a ∈ Pz, we deﬁne s(a) to be the most preferred house hj on a’s preference list such that
hj 6= f(a) and
Pz
i=1 fi,j < cj. Note that s(a) may not exist if f(a) = l(a). However, all
such agents will be assigned to their f-houses in any matching since last resort houses are
unique to individual agents.
To illustrate the s-house deﬁnition, let us look at Instance I1 in Figure 5.1 again.
We may verify from the deﬁnition of s-houses that s(a1) = h2, s(a2) = h4, s(a3) = h5,
s(a4) = h5, s(a5) = h5 and s(a6) = h2. Clearly, the set of fi-houses need not be disjoint
from the set of sj-houses for i 6= j as seen from this example. Now, since the process of
deﬁning s-houses is analogous to the algorithm for deﬁning f-houses, the time complexity
for deﬁning s-houses is also O(m).
Now, it may be shown that a popular matching M will only assign an agent a to either
f(a) or s(a) as indicated by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.2.5. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I. Then, every
agent a ∈ A is assigned in M to either f(a) or s(a).
Proof. Let a ∈ Pi and let M(a) = hx. Suppose that the statement of this lemma is false.
By Lemma 5.2.2, a cannot be assigned to a house better than f(a). Then, besides f(a) or
s(a), hx can either be (i) a house between f(a) and s(a) or (ii) a house worse than s(a).
In case (i), it follows that hx is an f-house such that
Pi
p=1 fp,x ≥ cx, for otherwise
s(a) = hx. Hence, fx ≥ cx and M(hx) ⊆ f(hx) by Corollary 5.2.1. However, a ∈
M(hx)\f(hx), a contradiction.
In case (ii), let hj = s(a). It follows that a must prefer to be assigned to hj than
M(a) = hx. Clearly, hj is full, for otherwise we can promote a to hj, a contradiction.
It follows by our deﬁnition of s-houses that
Pi
p=1 fp,j < cj. Hence, by our deﬁnition
of dj, i ≤ dj. Since
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) (by Lemma 5.2.3) and hj is full, it follows
that
Si
p=1 fp(hj) ⊂ M(hj) so that M(hj)\
Si
p=1 fp(hj) 6= ∅. Hence, there exists some
as ∈ M(hj)\
Si
p=1 fp(hj). It is obvious that either (i) as ∈
Sk
p=i+1 fp(hj), or (ii) as / ∈ f(hj).
Clearly in case (i), as has priority > i, so we can promote a to hj and demote as to
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l(as) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is wi − w(as) > 0. In case
(ii), let as have priority z1. It follows that z1 ≤ i, for otherwise, we can promote a to hj
and demote as to l(as) to obtain a new matching whose improvement in satisfaction is
wi − wz1 > 0. Let f(as) = hl. Clearly, as must prefer to be assigned to hl than hj by
Lemma 5.2.2. If hl is undersubscribed, we can then promote a to hj and promote as to hl
to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, suppose that hl is full. Let
at ∈ M(hl).
If z1 = 1, then we can promote a to hj, promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain
a matching with improvement in satisfaction w(a)+w(as)−w(at) = wi +w1 −w(at) > 0.
Hence, suppose that z1 > 1. Clearly, hx 6= hl for suppose otherwise. By Corollary 5.2.1,
hl must be an f-house such that fl > cl by existence of as, for otherwise as ∈ M(hl).
It follows that M(hl) ⊆ f(hl). Now, if hl = hx, then this gives us a contradiction since
a ∈ M(hl) but hx 6= f(a) for a prefers s(a) to hx.
Hence, hl 6= hx. Then, at 6= a. It follows that we can reuse arguments from the proof
of Lemma 5.2.4 to obtain a sequence of distinct agents a0,a1,a2,... where a0 = a, a1 = as,
and a2 = at. For j ≥ 3, the construction of the sequence indicates that P(ai) < P(ai−1).
If this sequence does not terminate as a result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of
the cases outlined in Lemma 5.2.4, then we are bound to ultimately generate an agent ax
such that P(ax) < 1, which is impossible.
Corollary 5.2.1 and Lemma 5.2.5 give rise to the following result.
Theorem 5.2.1. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I.
1. For every f-house hj,
(a) if fj ≤ cj, then f(hj) ⊆ M(hj);
(b) if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj,
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj), and
M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj).
2. Every agent a is assigned to either f(a) or s(a).
5.3 Algorithm for ﬁnding a popular matching
Let us form a subgraph G0 of G by letting G0 contain only two edges for each agent a ∈ A,
that is, one to f(a) and the other to s(a). It follows that all popular matchings must
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be contained in G0 by Theorem 5.2.1. However, Theorem 5.2.1 only gives us necessary
conditions for a matching to be popular in an instance of WCHA, since not all matchings
in G0 satisfying these conditions are popular. For, let us consider the example WCHA
instance in Figure 5.1. We have at least two matchings which satisfy Conditions 1 and
2 of Theorem 5.2.1: M1 = {(a1,h1),(a2,h3),(a3,h3),(a4,h5),(a5,h4),(a6,h4)} and M2 =
{(a1,h1),(a2,h3),(a3,h3),(a4,h4),(a5,h5),(a6,h4)}. However, while M1 may be veriﬁed
to be a popular matching, M2 is not popular because there exists another matching M3 =
{(a2,h1),(a3,h3),(a4,h3),(a5,h4),(a6,h4)} which gives an improvement in satisfaction of
w(a2) + w(a4) + w(a5) − w(a1) = 4 + 2 + 2 − 7 > 0 over M2. Hence, we will “enforce”
the suﬃciency of the conditions by removing certain edges in G0 that cannot form part of
any popular matching in I. We show how to do this by ﬁrst introducing the notion of a
potential improvement path or PIP in short, which generalises the concept of a promotion
path from [43] to WCHA.
5.3.1 Potential improvement paths
Let us now deﬁne a matching M that satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.2.1 to be
well-formed. Then, a PIP leading out of some f-house h0 with respect to a well-formed
matching M is an alternating path Π = hh0,a0,h1,a1,...,hx,axi such that hi = f(ai) and
(ai,hi) ∈ M for 0 ≤ i ≤ x, and ai prefers hi+1 to hi for i < x. A PIP leading out of h0
always exists, which can be seen as follows. Since h0 is an f-house and c0 ≥ 1, there exists
some agent a0
0 ∈ f(h0) ∩ M(h0) by Theorem 5.2.1. Then, by deﬁnition, hh0,a0
0i is a PIP
leading out of h0. The next lemma shows that any PIP leading out of h0 must contain a
sequence of agents with strictly decreasing priorities. Hence, the sequence of agents in Π
must be distinct since the priority of agents is strictly decreasing.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let Π = hh0,a0,...,hx,axi be a PIP
with respect to M leading out of h0 as deﬁned above. Then, P(ai+1) < P(ai) for 0 ≤ i < x.
Proof. Let a0 have priority z1. If x = 0, then a0 is the last (only) agent in the path.
Otherwise, x > 0 and it follows by deﬁnition of Π that h0 is not the ﬁrst house on a0’s
preference list as h1 is a house that a0 prefers to h0. Hence, it must be that h1 is an
f-house such that
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,1 ≥ c1 by deﬁnition of f(a0) = h0.
Since M is well-formed and f1 ≥ c1, it follows by Theorem 5.2.1 that |M(h1)| = c1
and M(h1) ⊆ f(h1). Now, if
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,1 = c1, then by deﬁnition of an f-house, fp,1 = 0
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for z1 ≤ p ≤ k. Hence, d1 ≤ z1 − 1. Since f1 = c1, it follows that M(h1) ⊆
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(h1)
by Theorem 5.2.1. On the other hand, if
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,1 > c1, then f1 > c1 and g1 ≤ z1 −1. It
follows by Theorem 5.2.1 again that M(h1) ⊆
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(h1). Clearly as a result, M(h1) ⊆
Sz1−1
p=1 fp(h1) in all cases.
Since a1 ∈ M(h1), it follows that f(a1) = h1 and a1 has priority strictly less than z1.
Moreover, we can repeat the argument to deduce the priority of each agent ai in Π. It is
then straightforward to see that the priority of any agent in Π must be strictly less than
its predecessor so that P(ai+1) < P(ai) for each i ≥ 0.
Let us deﬁne the cost of Π to be cost(Π) = w(ax) − w(ax−1) − ... − w(a0) if x > 0. Note
that cost(Π) = w(a0) if x = 0. We now motivate the notion of a PIP as follows. Let us
suppose that there exists some agent ar who prefers h0 to M(ar). The next lemma shows
that any such agent cannot belong to Π. Now, if cost(Π) < w(ar), we can conclude that
the well-formed matching M is not popular because we can promote ar to hj, and use
the PIP to promote each ai to hi+1 for all i < x and demote ax to l(ax) to obtain a new
matching that is more popular than M.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let M be a well-formed matching. Let Π = hh0,a0,...,hx,axi be a PIP
with respect to M leading out of h0 as deﬁned above. Then, any agent a who prefers h0 to
M(a) does not belong to Π.
Proof. Let a have priority z. Since M is well-formed, either (i) M(a) = f(a) or (ii)
M(a) = s(a). It follows in case (i) that
Pz−1
p=1 fp,0 ≥ c0 by deﬁnition of f(a). In case
(ii), either (a) h0 = f(a) or (b) h0 is an f-house such that h0 6= f(a) and
Pz
p=1 fp,0 ≥
c0 by deﬁnition of s(a). Now, in subcase (a), if
Pz
p=1 fp,0 < c0, then z ≤ d0 so that
Sz
p=1 fp(h0) ⊆
Sd0
p=1 fp(h0) ⊆ M(h0) since M is a well-formed matching. However, this
implies that a ∈ M(h0), a contradiction. It follows in all cases that
Pz
p=1 fp,0 ≥ c0.
Using a similar argument as in Lemma 5.3.1, we can establish that |M(h0)| = c0 and
M(h0) ⊆
Sz
p=1 fp(h0). It follows that P(a) ≥ P(a0) and hence, the priority of a must be
greater than the priority of any other agent in Π by Lemma 5.3.1. Since a 6= a0, a cannot
be an agent in Π.
5.3.2 Pruning the graph
Let us now introduce Algorithm Prune-WCHA which will enable us to remove certain
edges in G0 that cannot be part of any popular matching. The algorithm is divided into two
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Algorithm 9 First stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
1: for each f-house h do
2: λ(h) := w1; {// a suitable upper bound}
3: for z in 1..k do
4: for each a ∈ Pz do
5: Let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f(a);
6: if S 6= ∅ then
7: λmin(a,f(a)) := min{λ(h) : h ∈ S};
8: else
9: λmin(a,f(a)) := ∞; {// a suitable default value}
10: if λmin(a,f(a)) < wz then
11: return “No popular matching exists”;
12: for each fz-house hj do
13: f0
z(hj) := fz(hj);
14: if z ≤ dj then
15: for each a ∈ f0
z(hj) do
16: Remove (a,s(a)) from G0;
17: else {// z = gj > dj}
18: for each a ∈ f0
z(hj) such that λmin(a,hj) < 2wz do
19: Remove (a,hj) from G0;
20: Remove a from f0
z(hj);
21: if f0
z(hj) = ∅ then { // |f0
z(hj)| < cj −
Pdj
p=1 fp,j}
22: return “No popular matching exists.”;
23: λz(hj) := min(wz,min{λmin(a,hj) − wz : a ∈ f0
z(hj)});{ // λmin(a,hj) ≥ wz}
24: λ(hj) := min(λ(hj),λz(hj));
25: if z > dj and λ(hj) < wz then
26: return “No popular matching exists.”;
stages, with the ﬁrst stage shown in Algorithm 9 and the second stage shown in Algorithm
10. The ﬁrst stage is carried out in phases, with each phase corresponding to a priority
level Pz.
Intuitively, in each phase in the ﬁrst stage, we compute the costs of PIPs and determine
the minimum of these for each f-house hj, and then use these values to identify and remove
certain edges incident to f-houses in G0 that cannot belong to any popular matching.
Based on the minimum values of PIPs calculated for f-houses in the ﬁrst stage, we then
identify and remove in the second stage edges incident to s-houses in G0 that cannot belong
to any popular matching. Let G00 denote the graph obtained from G0 once the algorithm
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Algorithm 10 Second stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
1: for each a ∈ A do
2: Let hl := s(a);
3: Let R contain the set of houses that a prefers to hl;
4: Let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f(a);
5: R := R − (S ∪ {f(a)});
6: if R 6= ∅ then
7: λmin(a,hl) := min{λ(h) : h ∈ R};
8: else
9: λmin(a,hl) := ∞; {// a suitable default value}
10: if λmin(a,hl) < w(a) or fl ≥ cl then
11: Remove (a,hl) from G0;
terminates (following these edge removals). The removal of these edges will ensure that any
well-formed matching in G00 is popular. Over the phases of execution, certain conditions
may arise which signal to the algorithm that no popular matching exists.
Recall that hj may be an f-house for more than one priority level, and hj may be
an f-house for more than one agent for each priority level. In the algorithm, we will use
λz(hj) as a variable and its value at the end of the algorithm equals the minimum cost
of a PIP leading out of hj taken over all well-formed matchings in G00 such that (ar,hj)
is the ﬁrst edge for some ar ∈ Pz. We will also use λ(hj) to compute the minimum cost
taken over all λz(hj). Note that we initialise λ(h) to w1 for every f-house h at the outset
of the ﬁrst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA, for if Π is any PIP leading out of h, then
cost(Π) ≤ w(ax), where ax is the ﬁnal agent on the path. However, w(ax) ≤ w1. Hence,
w1 is an upper bound for the ﬁnal computed value of λ(h). Let Πmin(hj) denote a PIP
with minimum cost leading out of hj taken over all well-formed matchings in G00. Let
cost(Πmin(hj)) denote the cost of this path. Then, as we shall show, the ﬁnal value of
λ(hj) in the execution of the algorithm gives us the value of cost(Πmin(hj)).
For any agent as ∈ A, let S contain the set of houses on as’s preference list that as
prefers to f(as). Note that S will be empty if f(as) is the ﬁrst house on as’s preference
list. If S 6= ∅, we will use λmin(as,f(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum
cost of a PIP out of hq, taken over all hq ∈ S, and over all well-formed matchings in G00;
otherwise, the algorithm sets λmin(as,f(as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value. Similarly,
let R contain the set of houses on as’s preference list after f(as) that as prefers to s(as). If
R 6= ∅, we will use λmin(as,s(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum cost of a
75Chapter 5. Popular matchings in WCHA
PIP out of hq, taken over all hq ∈ R, and over all well-formed matchings in G00; otherwise,
the algorithm sets λmin(as,s(as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value.
5.3.3 Proof of correctness
The following lemma gives us an important technical result regarding the correctness of
the algorithm.
Lemma 5.3.3. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not terminate during the exe-
cution of its ﬁrst stage by reporting that no popular matching exists. Let z be an iteration
of the for loop on line 3. Let hj ∈ H be any fz-house. Then, at the end of this iteration:
1. for each a ∈ Pz, if f(a) is not the ﬁrst ranked house in a’s preference list, then
λmin(a,f(a)) equals the minimum cost of all PIPs among all houses that a prefers
to f(a) taken over all well-formed matchings in G00; else, λmin(a,f(a)) = ∞.
2. λz(hj) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings
in G00 such that (a,hj) is the ﬁrst edge for some a ∈ Pz.
3. λ(hj) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings
in G00 such that (a,hj) is the ﬁrst edge for some a ∈ Pq where 1 ≤ q ≤ z.
4. if any edge has been removed from G0, then it cannot be part of any popular matching.
Proof. Given 1 ≤ z ≤ k, we will proceed by induction on z.
For the base case, let z = 1. If a ∈ P1, then clearly S = ∅ for a so that ∞ is assigned
to λmin(a,f(a)) as required in line 9. Now, any PIP leading out of hj and containing the
edge (a,hj) ends at a and has cost w1. Clearly, w1 is assigned to λz(hj) as required at line
23 since λmin(a0,hj) = ∞ for each a0 ∈ f0
1(hj). Also, w1 is assigned to λ(hj) at line 24 as
required, since this is the minimum of λz(hj) and the initialised value of λ(hj) which is
also w1. Finally, the only edges removed during this iteration are dealt with at lines 15-16
(as the condition in line 18 is not satisﬁed). For, clearly if a ∈ P1 and dj ≥ 1, a must
be assigned to f(a) = hj and not s(a) in any well-formed matching M by Condition 1 of
Theorem 5.2.1. Hence, the edge (a,s(a)) cannot belong to any popular matching.
For the inductive case, let us assume that 2 ≤ z ≤ k, and that the result is true for
z − 1. Let a ∈ Pz be any agent. Suppose that S 6= ∅. Choose any hl ∈ S. It follows
that
Pz−1
p=1 fp,l ≥ cl by deﬁnition of hj = f(a). Hence, it is impossible that hl can be
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an fp-house for any p ≥ z. By the inductive hypothesis, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost
among all PIPs leading out of hl where (a0,hl) is the ﬁrst edge for some a0 ∈ Pq where
1 ≤ q ≤ z − 1. Hence, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs leading out of hl at
the end of the iteration z − 1. Thus, if S 6= ∅, then when λmin(a,f(a)) is deﬁned during
iteration z in line 7, it contains the minimum cost of a PIP leading out of any house that
a prefers to f(a); otherwise, S = ∅ and λmin(a,f(a)) is assigned to be ∞ in line 9 as
required.
Now, it follows that the minimum cost of a PIP out of hj for which the ﬁrst edge
is (a,hj) such that a ∈ fz(hj) either stops at a and has cost wz, or it continues. If it
continues, it must do so with some edge (a,hl) such that a prefers hl to hj. Hence, the
minimum cost of a PIP out of hj for which the ﬁrst edge is (a,hj) is the minimum of wz
and λmin(a,hj) − wz. Clearly then, this is exactly the value assigned to λz(hj) on line
23 as required. Also, it follows by the inductive hypothesis that λ(hj) should be set at
iteration z to be the minimum of λz(hj) and the value of λ(hj) at the end of iteration
z − 1. This is precisely the value assigned to λ(hj) at line 24.
Finally, it remains to show that any edge removed during iteration z cannot belong
to part of any popular matching. Now, if z ≤ dj, then it follows by Theorem 5.2.1 that
a must be assigned to hj and not s(a) for any well-formed matching M. Hence, the edge
(a,s(a)) cannot belong to any well-formed matching and is deleted in line 16 as required.
Clearly, if fj ≤ cj, then it is bound to be the case that z ≤ dj.
On the other hand, if z > dj, then it follows that in any well-formed matching M,
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) but only a proper subset of fgj(hj) will be assigned to hj in M.
Now, suppose that a ∈ M(hj)∩fgj(hj). It follows that z = gj. Let hl be any house that a
prefers to hj, supposing that such a house exists. Clearly, if there exists a minimum cost
PIP Π out of hl such that cost(Πmin(hl)) − wz < wz, then Π can be used to promote a
to hl, and in the process, free up a space in hj which can thus be assigned to any agent
a0 in fgj(hj)\M(hj). Clearly, M(a0) = s(a0) since M is well-formed so that a0 improves
as result. It follows that M cannot be popular since we can promote a0 to hj, promote
a to hl and promote along Π to obtain a more popular matching than M. Hence, if
λmin(a,hj) < 2wz, then M is not popular. Since M is arbitrary, the edge (a,hj) cannot
belong to any popular matching so that we delete it in line 19.
Note that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M. For, let us
consider the ﬁrst edge (b,hl) in Πmin(hl). Note that fl ≥ cl and gl < z since hl is a house
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that a prefers to f(a) = hj.
Suppose ﬁrstly that b ∈ fgl(hl). Let λdl be the value of λ(hl) at the end of phase
gl − 1. Now, we have that the value of λ(hl) as computed in phase gl by lines 23-24
of the algorithm is equal to min(wgl,λdl,min

λmin(b0,hl) − wgl : b0 ∈ f0
gl(hl)
	
). Let us
suppose that min

λmin(b0,hl) − wgl : b0 ∈ f0
gl(hl)
	
< wgl. Then, there exists some agent
b0 ∈ f0
gl(hl) such that λmin(b0,hl) − wgl < wgl, i.e. λmin(b0,hl) < 2wgl. However, such a b0
would have been removed from f0
gl(hl) at line 20, a contradiction. Hence, λmin(b0,hl) −
wgl ≥ wgl for all b0 ∈ f0
gl(hl). It follows that any minimum cost PIP in G00 (with respect
to any well-formed matching) with (b0,hl) as its ﬁrst edge must have cost greater than
or equal to wgl, i.e. cost(Πmin(hl)) ≥ wgl. Now, suppose that λdl < wgl. Then, there
exists a PIP leading out of hl whose ﬁrst edge is (c,hl) where P(c) ≤ dl, with cost less
than wgl. However, this then contradicts the fact that the PIP with (b,hl) as its ﬁrst
edge has minimum cost for hl as we supposed. Hence, wgl is a lower bound for the ﬁnal
computed value of λ(hl). Clearly then, λ(hl) = wgl. Since (b,hl) is the ﬁrst edge of
Πmin(hl) where b ∈ fgl(hl), then as this path is deﬁned with respect to some well-formed
matching, it follows that (b0,hl) ∈ M for some b0 ∈ fgl(hl) (possibly b = b0), since M
is well-formed. Then, hhl,b0i is a PIP of cost wgl with respect to M. Moreover, since
wgl = cost(Πmin(hl)) < 2wz as established in the previous paragraph, it follows that we
can promote a to hl, promote a0 to hj and demote b0 from hl so that M is not popular as
shown above.
Hence, b ∈
Sdl
p=1 fp(hl). Clearly then, (b,hl) must belong to every well-formed matching
by Condition 1(a) of Theorem 5.2.1 so that (b,hl) must belong to M. It follows that we
can repeat the above argument to show that Πmin(hl) is a minimum cost PIP with respect
to M by considering the remaining alternate edges in Πmin(hl). If each alternate edge
(c,hx) satisﬁes the condition c ∈
Sdx
p=1 fp(hx), then the result is immediate. Otherwise, it
must be the case that we encounter some edge (c0,hx0) in Πmin(hl) such that c0 ∈ fgx0(hx0).
Clearly then, (c0,hx0) is the ﬁnal edge in Πmin(hl) so that we must be able to promote a
to hl, promote a0 to hj and promote along Πmin(hl) to obtain a more popular matching
than M by a similar argument to that in the previous paragraph.
The next three lemmas establish the correctness of the algorithm.
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Lemma 5.3.4. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not terminate during the ex-
ecution of its ﬁrst stage by reporting that no popular matching exists. Then, any edge
removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA over both stages cannot belong to a popular match-
ing.
Proof. By Lemma 5.3.3, any edges removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA in the ﬁrst stage
cannot belong to any popular matching. We now show that any edges removed by the
algorithm in the second stage also cannot belong to any popular matching.
Let M be any well-formed matching. Let a be any agent and let P(a) = z. Also, let
R contain the set of houses between f(a) and s(a) on a’s preference list that a prefers to
s(a) (not including f(a) and s(a)). Let s(a) = hl. Suppose that M(a) = hl. Let hj ∈ R
and suppose that cost(Πmin(hj)) < wz. Clearly, Πmin(hj) must be a minimum cost PIP
with respect to M by a similar argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 5.3.3. Then,
Πmin(hj) can be used to free up hj and promote a to hj to obtain a more popular matching
than M. Hence, M cannot be popular. It follows that an edge pruned due to the ﬁrst
condition in line 10 of the second stage of the algorithm cannot belong to any popular
matching.
Now, if fl ≥ cl and M(a) = hl, then M cannot be popular by Condition 1 of Theorem
5.2.1, since M(hl) 6⊆
Sgl
p=1 fp(hl). This shows that the edge (a,hl) pruned due to the
second condition in line 10 of the second stage of the algorithm also cannot belong to any
popular matching.
It thus follows that any edges removed by the algorithm cannot belong to a popular
matching.
Lemma 5.3.5. If Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular matching exists, then
there does not exist any well-formed matching in G0 that is popular.
Proof. Let us consider the cases where Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular
matchings exist as a result of some condition being satisﬁed: (i) lines 10-11 ,(ii) lines 21-22
and (iii) lines 25-26 of the ﬁrst stage respectively. Let a be any agent and let P(a) = z.
Also, let f(a) = hj.
In case (i), let us suppose that M(a) = hj for some well-formed matching M. Let hl be
a house that a prefers to hj such that λmin(a,hj) = cost(Πmin(hl)). It follows by a similar
argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 5.3.3 that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum
cost PIP with respect to M. Now, if λ(hl) < wz, then we can use Πmin(hl) to free hl and
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then promote a to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M. Hence, M cannot be
popular. Since M is arbitrary, it follows that no popular matching exists.
In case (ii), clearly fj > cj. Now, if f0
gj(hj) = ∅ after the removal of edges in lines
18-20, then it follows that no well-formed matching can exist in G00 since no matching can
satisfy Condition 1(b) of Theorem 5.2.1. Hence, no popular matching can exist.
In case (iii), let us suppose that z = gj. Clearly, only a proper subset of agents in
fgj(hj) can be assigned to hj in M since fj > cj. Let a ∈ fgj(hj)\M(hj). Note that
Πmin(hj) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M using a similar argument in the
proof of Lemma 5.3.3. Now, if λ(hj) < wgj, Πmin(hj) can be used to free up a place in hj
and then promote a (who must be assigned to s(a) in M) to hj to obtain a matching that
is more popular than M. Since M is arbitrary, no popular matching exists.
Lemma 5.3.6. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not state that no popular
matching exists. Let M be a well-formed matching in the pruned graph G00. Then, M is
popular.
Proof. Now, if M is not popular, it follows that there exists another matching M0 which
is more popular than M. Let us clone G00 to obtain a cloned graph C(G00) as follows. We
replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j . We then divide the capacity
of each house among its clones by allowing each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if
(a,hj) is an edge in G00, then we add (a,h
p
j) to the edge set of C(G00) for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj).
Let us then adapt the well-formed matching M in G00 to obtain its clone C(M) in C(G00)
as follows. If a house hj in G00 is assigned to xj agents a1,...axj in M, then we add (ap,h
p
j)
to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj, so that |C(M)| = |M|. We repeat a similar process for M0 to
obtain its clone C(M0) in C(G00).
Let us consider X = C(M) ⊕ C(M0). Since sat(M0,M) > 0, let a ∈ A be an agent
who prefers M0 to M. Let P(a) = z and let M0(a) = hj. We will show that there exists
a PIP Π leading out of hj with respect to M. Since M is well-formed, we can reuse a
similar argument to the proof of Lemma 5.3.2 to establish that hj is an f-house such that
Pz
p=1 fp,j ≥ cj. It follows that hj is full in M and M(hj) ⊆ f(hj) by Theorem 5.2.1.
Let ar ∈ M(hj)\M0(hj) (ar must exist since hj is full in M) and let P(ar) = z1. Then,
a 6= ar. Also, it follows that f(ar) = hj and z1 ≤ z. If ar does not prefer M0 to M,
then we ﬁnish tracing Π. Otherwise, we will extend Π to make sure that it ends with
some agent b who prefers M to M0. It follows by deﬁnition of f(ar) that M0(ar) = hl is
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an f-house that ar prefers to hj such that
Pz1−1
p=1 fp,l ≥ cl and hence by Theorem 5.2.1,
M(hl) ⊆ f(hl). Let as ∈ M(hl)\M0(hl) and let P(as) = z2. Clearly then, z2 < z1. It
follows by the same argument as for ar that if as does not prefer M0 to M, then we ﬁnish
tracing Π, i.e. Π = hhj,ar,hl,asi. Otherwise, we repeat the argument until we encounter
an agent at who does not prefer M0 to M so that Π terminates. Clearly, this will eventually
happen since all agents in Π are assigned in M to their f-house and the priority levels of
agents are strictly decreasing so that we must eventually reach some agent at ∈ P1 such
that M(at) = f(at). However, it is then impossible that at prefers M0 to M. Finally, by
construction of Π, it follows that Π belongs to X since Π (with appropriate superscripts
for house clones) consists of alternate edges in C(M)\C(M0) and C(M0)\C(M).
We have established that for every a ∈ P(M0,M), there exists a PIP Π(a) leading
out of hj, where hj = M0(a). Let Γ = {Π(a) : a ∈ P(M0,M)} and let Γ0 ⊆ Γ contain
only those maximal PIPs in Γ. We will show that there exists an agent d ∈ A such
that Π(d) ∈ Γ0 and cost(Π(d)) < w(d). For, suppose that cost(Π(a)) ≥ w(a) for every
Π(a) ∈ Γ0. Let Π(a) ∈ Γ0 and let Π(a) = hh0,a0,h1,a1,...,hx,axi. We deﬁne l(Π(a)) = ax.
Also, cost(Π(a)) = w(ax)−w(ax−1)−...−w(a0) ≥ w(a), i.e. w(a)+w(a0)+...+w(ax−1) ≤
w(ax). Now, {a,a0,...,ax−1} ⊆ P(M0,M) whilst ax ∈ P(M,M0). Let D be the connected
component of X containing Π(a) (with appropriate superscripts for house clones). It
follows that D must be a path or cycle whose edges alternate between C(M) and C(M0).
Clearly, D cannot be an even-length alternating path with more agents than houses, or
an odd-length alternating path whose end edges belong to C(M0), for otherwise we have
an agent who is unassigned in C(M) and hence in M, a contradiction to the deﬁnition
of a well-formed matching. Hence, D is either an (i) even-length alternating path with
more houses than agents, or (ii) an odd-length alternating path whose end edges belong
to C(M), or (iii) a cycle. It is obvious that D contains distinct agents and so we cannot
have overlapping maximal PIPs. Hence, by construction of Γ0, the agents in Π(a), together
with a, but not including l(Π(a)), taken over all Π(a) ∈ Γ0, form a partition of P(M0,M).
Moreover, for every such a, we have established the existence of some l(Π(a)) ∈ P(M,M0).
Hence,
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X
a∈P(M0,M)
w(a) =
X
Π(a)∈Γ0
w(a) +
X
Π(a)∈Γ0
X
w(a0) : a0 ∈ Π(a) ∧ a0 6= l(Π(a)
	
≤
X
Π(a)∈Γ0

w(a0) : a0 = l(Π(a))
	
≤
X
a∈P(M,M0)
w(a)
It follows that sat(M0,M) ≤ 0, a contradiction. As a result, cost(Π(d)) < w(d) for
some Π(d) ∈ Γ0. Let hj = M0(d). Now, if M(d) = f(d), then lines 10-11 of the ﬁrst stage
of the algorithm would report that no popular matching exists since λmin(d,f(d)) < w(d),
a contradiction. Hence, M(d) = s(d) and hj is (i) better than f(d), or (ii) equal to f(d),
or (iii) between f(d) and s(d) on a’s preference list. In case (i), we obtain the same
contradiction as when M(d) = f(d) since λmin(d,f(d)) < w(d). In case (ii), f(d) = hj.
Since M(d) = s(d), it must be the case that d ∈ fgj(hj) for otherwise (d,s(d)) would have
been deleted by line 16 of the algorithm. Clearly though, lines 25-26 of the ﬁrst stage of
the algorithm would report that no popular matching exists, a contradiction. In case (iii),
(d,s(d)) would have been deleted by lines 10-11 of the second stage of the algorithm since
λmin(d,s(d)) < w(d), a contradiction. It follows that we obtain a contradiction in all cases
so that M0 is not more popular than M.
Finally, the next lemma shows that if there is no well-formed matching in the graph
G00, then no popular matching exists.
Lemma 5.3.7. Let G00 be the reduced graph of a given WCHA instance I. If there is no
well-formed matching in G00, then no popular matching exists in I.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a popular matching M in I. Now, by Theorem 5.2.1, M
is a well-formed matching in G0. Moreover, all edges of M must belong to G00 by Lemma
5.3.4. However, this implies that M is a well-formed matching in G00, a contradiction.
We now use the example in Figure 5.1 to illustrate our algorithm. After the ﬁrst
stage, we have λ(h1) = 7, λ(h3) = 3 and λ(h4) = 2. We remove the edges (a1,h2) in
phase 1, and (a2,h4) and (a3,h5) in phase 2 of the ﬁrst stage (in line 16 of the ﬁrst
stage) since a1 belongs to fd1(h1), and a2 and a3 belong to fd3(h3) respectively. We also
remove the edge (a4,h4) in phase 3 of the ﬁrst stage (in lines 19-20 of the ﬁrst stage) since
λmin(a4,h4) = 3 < 2w(a4). No further edges are removed in the second stage.
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5.3.4 Finding a popular matching
We are now left with the task of ﬁnding a well-formed matching M in G00 in order to ﬁnd
a popular matching if one exists. Note that the removal of edges from G0 by Algorithm
Prune-WCHA eﬀectively reduces the problem to that of ﬁnding a popular matching in
an instance of CHA. For let us consider the problem of trying to assign agents to each
f-house hj so that hj satisﬁes Condition 1 of a well-formed matching.
Now, if fj ≤ cj, then ensuring that
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ M(hj) is equivalent to ensuring
Condition 1(a) of Theorem 4.2.1 on page 47. This work is done by lines 2-8 of Algorithm
Popular-CHA. On the other hand, if fj > cj, we need to ensure that those agents with
the correct priorities are assigned to hj in M, i.e. there does not exist any agent a ∈
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj)\M(hj). Now, since line 16 in the ﬁrst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA
ensures the removal of the edge (a,s(a)) of every such a where a ∈
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj), a must
be assigned to f(a) if an agent-complete matching (i.e. a matching in which all agents
are assigned) is to exist. This is equivalent to the work done by lines 10-12 of Algorithm
Popular-CHA on page 48, which tries to ﬁnd an agent-complete matching and reports that
no popular matching exists if unsuccessful. Furthermore, lines 15-18 of Algorithm Popular-
CHA also ensures that if fj > cj, then |M(hj)| = cj and M(hj)\
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) ⊆ fgj(hj).
Lastly, we need to ensure that each agent is assigned to either f(a) or s(a) and it is evident
that running Algorithm Popular-CHA on G00 does this. Hence, we can ﬁnd a popular
matching in WCHA, if one exists, by running Algorithm Popular-CHA on the reduced
graph G00. As illustration, if we run Algorithm Popular-CHA on the example in Figure 5.1
after edge removals through Algorithm Prune-WCHA, then Algorithm Popular-CHA will
return the following matching M = {(a1,h1),(a2,h3),(a3,h3),(a4,h5),(a5,h4),(a6,h4)}
which may be veriﬁed to be popular.
Let us now consider the time taken to ﬁnd a popular matching in an instance of
WCHA, or to report that no such matching exists. First of all, it takes O(m) time to
deﬁne the f- and s-houses. Let us then consider the time complexity of Algorithm Prune-
WCHA. It is clear that the subgraph G0 can be constructed in O(m) time and has O(n1)
edges since each agent has degree 2 in G0. Clearly, in the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm,
initialising λ(hj) for each f-house takes O(n2) time. Next, we iterate over every agent a
to deﬁne λmin(a,f(a)). In order to do so, we traverse the preference list of a to ﬁnd the
minimum cost of all PIPs among all houses that a prefers to f(a), if such houses exist.
Even though this occurs in phases, with the total number of phases equal to the number of
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priority levels, the computation time for this takes O(m) time overall by the total length of
preference lists. Hence, deﬁning λmin(a,f(a)) for every agent a takes O(m) time overall.
In order to deﬁne λz(hj) (and hence λ(hj)) for each f-house hj, we need to iterate over
every agent a such that a ∈ fz(hj). Again, the time complexity for this is bounded by the
total length of preference lists so that it takes O(m) time overall to deﬁne λz(hj) (and hence
λ(hj)) for each f-house and to remove those edges which cannot belong to any popular
matching (in lines 16 and 19-20 of the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm). By a similar argument,
the second stage of the algorithm also takes O(m) time so that Algorithm Prune-WCHA
takes O(m) time overall. Now, it takes O(
√
Cn1+m) time, using Algorithm Popular-CHA,
to ﬁnd a well-formed matching (if one exists) in G00, where C is the total capacity of the
houses. It follows that we obtain the following results for the time complexity of ﬁnding a
popular matching in WCHA.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let I be an instance of WCHA. Then, we can ﬁnd a popular matching
in I, or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 + m) time.
5.3.5 Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in WCHA.
Let us run Algorithm Label-f and Algorithm Prune-WCHA as before to deﬁne f- and s-
houses and to delete certain edges which cannot belong to any popular matching. We then
adopt a similar algorithm to that in Section 4.2.3 on page 49 for the analogous problem
in CHA as follows.
That is, let A1 be the set of all agents a with s(a) = l(a), and let A2 = A\A1.
Our objective is to ﬁnd a well-formed matching in G00 which minimises the number
of A1-agents who are assigned to their last resort house. We let A0 denote the set
n
a ∈
Sdj
p=1 fp(hj) : hj ∈ H
o
. We begin by carrying out a pre-processing step on G00 to
compute a matching M0 that assigns each agent in A0 to his f-house. We then try to ﬁnd
a maximum matching M0 in G00 that only involves the A2\A0 agents and their incident
edges. If M0 is not an agent-complete matching of A2\A0 agents, then clearly I admits
no popular matching. Otherwise, we remove all edges in G00 that are incident to a last
resort house, and try to assign additional A1\A0-agents to their f-houses by repeatedly
ﬁnding an augmenting path with respect to M0 using Gabow’s algorithm [15] in a similar
approach to that for CHA in Section 4.2.3. Let M00 be the matching obtained by aug-
menting M0. If any A1-agent remains unassigned at the end of this step, we simply assign
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him to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching of A\A0 agents in G00.
Let M = M0 ∪ M00. If any agent a belonging to A\A0 is not assigned to his f-house hj
but hj is undersubscribed in M, we promote a from M(a) to hj. Then, clearly M will be
a well-formed matching in G00, and hence popular by Lemma 5.3.6. It follows that M is a
maximum popular matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.2. Given an instance of WCHA, we can ﬁnd a maximum popular matching,
or determine that none exists, in O(
√
Cn1 + m) time.
5.3.6 “Cloning” versus our direct approach
A straightforward solution to ﬁnding a popular matching, given an instance I of WCHA,
may be to use “cloning” to create an instance J of WHAT, and then to apply the
O(min(k
√
n,n)m) algorithm of [43] to J. Firstly, we create cj clones h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each
occurrence of hj in a given agent’s preference list with the sequence h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j , the
elements of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears. Let GJ denote
the underlying graph of J. Then, GJ contains n0 = n1 + C nodes. For each ai ∈ A, let
Ai denote the set of acceptable houses for ai, and let cmin = min{cj : hj ∈ H}. Then the
number of edges in GJ is m0 =
P
ai∈A
P
hj∈Ai cj ≥ mcmin. Hence, the complexity of ap-
plying the algorithm of [43] to J is Ω(min(k
√
n1 + C,n1+C)mcmin). Now, the complexity
of our algorithm may be rewritten as O(
√
Cn1) or O(m) depending on which component
dominates the running time. If n1 + C ≥ k
√
n1 + C, then the cloning approach takes
Ω(k
√
n1 + Cmcmin)) time which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of Ω(kcmin).
Otherwise, if n1 + C < k
√
n1 + C, then the cloning approach takes Ω(mcmin(n1 + C))
time which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of Ω(
√
n1 + Ccmin). It follows that
the cloning method is slower than our direct approach for all possible cases.
5.4 Open problem
We conclude with the following open problem. Suppose that we are presented with an
instance J of WCHA in which the preference lists of agents are allowed to contain ties,
i.e. an instance of WCHAT. Is the problem of ﬁnding a popular matching (or reporting
that none exists) in J then solvable in polynomial time?
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Popular matchings in SMTI-SYM
6.1 Chapter overview
The classical Stable Marriage problem and its variants involving ties and incomplete pref-
erence lists were introduced in Section 1.4.1. In this chapter, we study popular matchings
in a special case of SMTI in which preference lists are symmetric (SMTI-SYM). An in-
stance I of SMTI is said to have symmetric preferences when the rank (to be deﬁned
formally later) of each man u on a woman w’s preference list is equal to that of w on u’s
preference list for any (man,woman) pair (u,w). Little is known about how to ﬁnd max-
imum popular matchings in matching problems where all participants have preferences
(i.e. all participants are agents). This chapter presents the ﬁrst known characterisation
of popular matchings in the bipartite setting with preferences on both sides. We remark
that our characterisation could form the basis of a polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding
a maximum popular matching in the context of SMTI-SYM as well as other matching
problems in which all the participating agents involved have preferences, e.g. SMTI and
SRTI.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. We give some
terminology and preliminary results on popular matchings in SMTI-SYM in Section 6.2.
We next present necessary conditions for a matching to be popular given a SMTI-SYM
instance I in Section 6.3. We then develop an insight into the underlying structure of
the problem in Section 6.4 where we introduce what are known as mutually exclusive
edge pairs. Together with the results of Section 6.3, we obtain necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for a matching to be popular in a given SMTI-SYM instance. Finally, we
show how to use this characterisation to provide an eﬃcient means of testing if a given
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matching is popular in O(
√
nm) time where n is the total number of men and women and
m is the total length of preference lists in I.
6.2 Basic terminology and preliminary results
An instance I of SMTI-SYM comprises two disjoint sets U and W, where U = {u1,...,un1}
is the set of men and W = {w1,...,wn2} is the set of women. Each man u ∈ U ranks
(strictly or with ties) a subset of W (the acceptable women for u) represented by his
preference list and vice versa. Let a ∈ U ∪ W be any agent. If a’s preference list contains
the agent a0, then we say that a0 is an acceptable partner for a. Let the bipartite graph
G = (U,W,E) be the underlying graph of I, where we let the edge set E of G represent
the acceptable partners of the agents.
Given a man u ∈ U and an acceptable woman w ∈ W for u, we deﬁne ranku(w) to be
the number of agents that u prefers to w plus 1, and vice versa. If ranku(w) = k, we say
that w is a kth choice of u. Moreover, if ranku(w) = k, then rankw(u) = k, and we say
that the preference lists are symmetric.
We create a unique last resort partner l(a) for each a and append l(a) to a’s preference
list. We let every last resort agent l(a) have a preference list that contains only a. We also
let z be the maximum length taken over all preference lists, including last resorts. Note
that to enforce the symmetry of the preference lists with the introduction of last resort
partners, we let rankl(a)(a) = ranka(l(a)) for each agent a even though the preference list
of l(a) has only size one. We also henceforth assume that G contains the vertex l(a) and
the edge (a,l(a)) for each a ∈ U ∪W, and that U and W contain the respective last resort
men and women. We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|.
We assume the deﬁnition of a matching in I as deﬁned for a given instance of SM in
Section 1.4.1. Given two matchings M and M0 in I, we say that an agent a prefers M
to M0 if either (i) a is assigned in M and unassigned in M0, or (ii) a is assigned in both
M and M0 and prefers M(a) to M0(a). Let P(M,M0) denote the set of non last-resort
agents1 who prefer M to M0. Then, the satisfaction of M with respect to M0 is deﬁned as
sat(M,M0) = P(M,M0) − P(M0,M). We say that M is more popular than M0, denoted
by M  M0, if sat(M,M0) > 0. Furthermore, a matching M in I is popular if there is no
other matching in I that is more popular than M.
1We do not allow last resort agents to contribute to P(M,M
0) for any two matchings M and M
0.
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w2 w3 w1: (u1 u2 u3)
u2: w1 w2 w3 w2: u4 (u1 u2 u3)
u3: w1 w2 w3 w3: u4 u5 (u1 u2 u3)
u4: (w2 w3 w4) w4: u4
u5: w5 w3 w5: u5
Figure 6.1: An instance I1 of SMTI-SYM
For the remainder of this section, we make several preliminary observations concerning
popular matchings in SMTI-SYM.
First of all, an instance of SMTI-SYM need not admit a popular matching. For,
consider instance I1 in Figure 6.1. In any popular matching M in I1, it must be the case
that (u5,w5) ∈M. For, suppose not. Then, we can promote u5 and w5 to each other (and
demote M(u5) to l(M(u5)) if M(u5) 6= l(M(u5))) to obtain a more popular matching than
M, a contradiction. It must also be the case that (u4,w4) ∈ M. For, otherwise suppose
that (u4,w3) ∈ M. Then, it follows that (ui,l(ui)) ∈ M for some i(1 ≤ i ≤ 3). However,
we can then unassign u4 from w3 and promote ui to w3, and promote w4 to u4 to obtain
a more popular matching than M, a contradiction. Note that a similar contradiction is
obtained if (u4,w2) ∈ M instead. Hence, it must be the case that (u5,w5) and (u4,w4)
belong to M. It follows that M can only be one of the following matchings:
M1 = {(u1,w1),(u2,w2),(u3,w3),(u4,w4),(u5,w5)}
M2 = {(u1,w2),(u2,w3),(u3,w1),(u4,w4),(u5,w5)}
M3 = {(u1,w3),(u2,w1),(u3,w2),(u4,w4),(u5,w5)}
However, it is straightforward to verify that none of these matchings is popular since
M1  M2  M3  M1, the problem being that the more popular than relation is not
acyclic. We next note that popular matchings in SMTI-SYM can have diﬀerent car-
dinalities, as seen in instance I2 in Figure 6.2. Here, M4 = {(u2,w1),(u3,w2)} is a
popular matching of cardinality 2. However, the unique maximum popular matching
is M5 = {(u1,w1),(u2,w2),(u3,w3)} which has cardinality 3.
We also observe that the cardinality of a maximum popular matching can be smaller
than that of a maximum matching. For, consider instance I3 in Figure 6.3. Here, M6 =
{(u1,w1),(u2,w2),(u3,w3),(u4,w4)} is the unique maximum matching in I3 which has
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: w1 w2 w2: u3 u2
u3: (w2 w3) w3: u3
Figure 6.2: An instance I2 of SMTI-SYM
cardinality 4. However, M6 is not popular because M7 = {(u1,w2),(u2,w3),(u3,w4)} is a
matching that is more popular than M6.
Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: (w1 w2) w1: u1
u2: w3 w2 w2: u1 u2
u3: w4 w3 w3: u2 u3
u4: w4 w4: (u3 u4)
Figure 6.3: An instance I3 of SMTI-SYM
Finally, we remark that in the context of SMI, it may be shown that a stable matching
is also popular [31]. Recall from Section 1.4.1.1 that the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm
always ﬁnds a stable matching in any given SMI instance. Hence, the algorithm also
provides a way for ﬁnding a popular matching in any given SMI instance I. However,
this is not true in the case of SMTI. First of all, recall from Section 1.4.1.3 that only
weakly stable matchings are guaranteed to exist in any given SMTI instance (as opposed
to strongly stable or super-stable matchings). However, weak stability need not imply
popularity in the context of SMTI. For, consider instance I4 in Figure 6.4. Then, it
may be veriﬁed that the matching M8 = {(u1,w2),(u2,w1)} is a weakly stable matching.
However, M8 is not popular because M9 = {(u1,w1),(u2,w2)} is more popular than M8.
Furthermore, weakly stable matchings can have diﬀerent cardinalities, and a given weakly
stable matching could be smaller than the size of a maximum popular matching. Indeed, as
mentioned in Section 1.4.1.3, the problem of ﬁnding a maximum weakly stable matching
given an SMTI instance is NP-hard. These two issues motivate the need to ﬁnd an
alternative algorithm if we want to ﬁnd a popular matching of maximum cardinality given
any SMTI instance.
This chapter provides the ﬁrst step towards ﬁnding an algorithm that will construct
a maximum popular matching given an SMTI instance, if one exists, by providing a
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w2 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: (w1 w2) w2: u2 u1
Figure 6.4: An instance I4 of SMTI-SYM
characterisation of popular matchings that could be used by any approach to solve the
problem in the restricted case of SMTI-SYM.
6.3 Characterising popular matchings
For each agent a ∈ U ∪ W, let f(a) denote the highest ranking set of agents on a’s
preference list. We call any agent belonging to f(a) an f-partner of a. Deﬁne E1 =
{(u,w) : u ∈ U ∧ w ∈ f(u)} to be the set of ﬁrst-choice edges of G. Deﬁne also the ﬁrst-
choice graph of G as G1 = (U,W,E1). Note that it is trivial to ﬁnd the unique popular
matching given any instance of the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists and
Symmetric Preferences with no ties (SMI-SYM), as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3.1. Let J be an instance of SMI-SYM. Let M be the matching obtained by
assigning each man u to the ﬁrst woman on his preference list. Then, M is the unique
popular matching in J.
Proof. By symmetry of the preference lists, it is straightforward to see that each woman
also obtains her ﬁrst-choice man in M. Hence, M is popular.
We now show that M is unique. For, suppose not. Then, let M0 be another popular
matching. Clearly, there exists some man ui such that M(ui) 6= M0(ui). Let M0(ui) = wj
and let M(ui) = wk. It is straightforward to see that wj 6= f(ui) and ui 6= f(wj). Now,
if wj = l(ui), then the matching obtained by (M0\{(ui,wj),(M0(wk),wk)}) ∪ {(ui,wk)}
is more popular than M0. Hence, wj 6= l(ui). Let M0(wk) = ux. Now, it must be
the case that either ux 6= l(wk) and ux / ∈ f(wk) or ux = l(wk). Let M(wj) = ul and
let M0(ul) = wy. Similarly, it must be the case that either wy 6= l(ul) and wy / ∈ f(ul) or
wy = l(ul). Suppose that ux and wy are both last resort agents. Then, it is straightforward
to verify that the matching obtained by
(M0\{(ui,wj),(ux,wk),(ul,wy)}) ∪ {(ui,wk),(ul,wj)}
is more popular than M0. Suppose that a ∈ {ux,wy} is not a last resort agent. Then, it
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is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
(M0\{(ui,wj),(ux,wk),(ul,wy)}) ∪ {(ui,wk),(ul,wj),(a,l(a))}
is more popular than M0. Otherwise, suppose that ux and wy are not last resort agents.
Then, it is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
(M0\{(ui,wj),(ux,wk),(ul,wy)}) ∪ {(ui,wk),(ul,wj),(ux,l(ux)),(l(wy),wy)}
is more popular than M0. In all cases, we obtain a contradiction.
The following lemma is a vital ﬁrst step in characterising popular matchings in any
given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Lemma 6.3.2. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then M ∩E1 is a maximum matching
in G1.
Proof. Let M1 = M∩E1. Suppose for a contradiction that M1 is not a maximum matching
in G1. Then M1 admits an augmenting path P = hu1,w1,...,uk,wki with respect to G1.
Clearly, in view of last resort agents, u1 and wk must be assigned in M. Let w0 = M(u1)
and let uk+1 = M(wk). Now, if both of w0 and uk+1 are last resort agents, then it follows
that M ⊕ P gives us a new matching that is more popular than M, a contradiction. On
the other hand, if only one of w0 and uk+1 is not a last resort agent, then we can demote
this agent to his/her last resort partner and use M ⊕ P again to obtain a new matching
that is more popular than M, a contradiction.
Hence, w0 and uk+1 are not the last resort partners of u1 and wk respectively. Further-
more, since w0 / ∈ f(u1) and uk+1 / ∈ f(wk), it follows that u1 / ∈ f(w0) and wk / ∈ f(uk+1)
respectively. It is clear to see that w0 6= wi (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) since each wi is as-
signed in M to a ﬁrst-choice man but (u1,w0) ∈ M\E1. Furthermore, w0 6= wk, or
else M0 = (M\{(u1,wk)})⊕P gives us a more popular matching than M, a contradiction.
By symmetry of the above argument, it is easy to see that uk+1 6= ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
Let wk+1 be any woman in f(uk+1). Then, uk+1 ∈ f(wk+1). Suppose ﬁrstly that
wk+1 = w0. Then, it is straightforward to verify that the matching obtained by
((M\{(u1,w0),(uk+1,wk)}) ⊕ P) ∪ {(uk+1,w0)}
is more popular than M, a contradiction. On the other hand, if wk+1 = wi (1 ≤ i ≤ k−1),
let C = hwi,ui+1,wi+1,...,uk,wk,uk+1i. It is straightforward to verify that the matching
M0 = M ⊕ C is more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence, wk+1 6= wi (0 ≤ i ≤ k).
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Now, let u0 ∈ f(w0). Then, w0 ∈ f(u0). By symmetry of the above argument, it is
straightforward to show that u0 6= ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1).
Now, let u0 = M(wk+1). If u0 = u0, it is straightforward to verify that the matching
obtained by
((M\{(u1,w0),(uk+1,wk),(u0,wk+1)}) ⊕ P) ∪ {(u0,w0),(uk+1,wk+1)}
is more popular than M, a contradiction. On the other hand, if u0 = ui (1 ≤ i ≤ k),
then (ui,wk+1) ∈ M but since (ui,wi−1) ∈ M, this implies that wk+1 = wi−1, which
contradicts the fact that wk+1 6= wj (0 ≤ j ≤ k) as established above. Hence, the men
vertices u0,u1,...,uk+1,u0 are all distinct. Let w0 = M(u0). Again, we can reuse the
symmetry of the argument to establish that the women vertices w0,w0,w1,...,wk+1 are all
distinct. However, it is straightforward to verify that the matching M0 obtained by
((M\

(u0,w0),(u1,w0),(uk+1,wk),(u0,wk+1)
	
) ⊕ P) ∪ {(u0,w0),(uk+1,wk+1)}
is more popular than M which is a contradiction. (Note that either one of or both w0
and u0 could possibly be non last resort agents but we can reuse arguments from above to
establish that M0 is more popular than M.)
Let I be an instance of SMTI-SYM. Clearly, the underlying bipartite graph is un-
capacitated. Recall the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition for the case of an uncapacitated
bipartite graph (i.e. Lemma 1.2.1 in Section 1.2). It follows that we can obtain the
following corollary by using the Decomposition in conjunction with Lemma 6.3.2.
Corollary 6.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then,
every odd or unreachable agent a ∈ U ∪ W satisﬁes M(a) ∈ f(a).
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then, M1 = M ∩E1 is
a maximum matching in G1 by Lemma 6.3.2. Suppose that we are given an EOU labelling
of the vertices in G1 using M1. Note that all last resort agents must be even. Now, if
an agent a is not assigned to an agent from f(a) in a popular matching M, then we will
show that a can only be assigned to an agent from his/her set of s-partner(s) denoted by
s(a), which is a set of agents on a’s preference list that is disjoint from f(a). Note that it
is easy to see from Corollary 6.3.1 that only even agents should have s-partners. We use
Algorithm Label-s as shown in Algorithm 11 to deﬁne s(a) precisely for every even agent
a.
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Algorithm 11 Algorithm Label-s
1: U0 := {u ∈ U : u is even} and W0 := {w ∈ W : w is even};
2: E0
i := {(u,w) ∈ E : u ∈ U0 ∧ w ∈ W0 ∧ ranku(w) = i};
3: for each a ∈ U0 ∪ W0 do
4: s(a) := ∅;
5: for i in 2..z do
6: for each edge (u,w) ∈ E0
i do
7: s(u) := s(u) ∪ {w};
8: s(w) := s(w) ∪ {u};
9: for each agent a ∈ {u,w} do
10: for each agent b after s(a) from a’s preference list do
11: k := ranka(b);
12: delete (a,b) from E0
k;
The algorithm begins by deﬁning U0 and W0 to be the respective subsets of U and
W containing only even agents. Then, subsets of E are deﬁned, where each subset E0
i
contains only EE edges2 such that if (u,w) ∈ E0
i, then u and w are both even agents and
ranku(w) = i. For each even agent a, s(a) is initialised to be the emptyset. The algorithm
then iterates over each i in turn from 2 to z and for each value of i, the algorithm iterates
over the edges in E0
i. Now, if (u,w) is an edge belonging to E0
i, then w is added to s(u)
and vice versa. As with f-partner(s), all s-partner(s) of each agent a are tied with the
same rank in a’s preference list. Hence, when deﬁning s(a), whenever the algorithm has
identiﬁed a member c of s(a), it will only consider other candidate agents in a’s preference
list with the same rank as c. As a result, if lines 7-8 are executed in iteration i, the
algorithm removes from consideration certain agents that cannot be a s-partner of a in
lines 9-12. It does this by deleting (a,b) from E0
k where ranka(b) = k and k > i. Note that
lines 9-12 can be executed only once for each edge e ∈ E. Since the number of edges in G
are ﬁnite, it is clear that the algorithm terminates. When this happens, the s-partner(s)
of each even agent is deﬁned. Note that s(a) can never become empty for any agent a
because of l(a), and in view of the fact that if a0 is added to s(a), then this agent cannot
be deleted from s(a) subsequently.
Instance I5 in Figure 6.5 gives an illustration of the deﬁnition of f- and s-partners.
It is straightforward to verify the f-partners for each man and woman. The agents
u1,u2,u3,u8,w2,w5,w9 and w10 can be veriﬁed to be even agents in G1 and their s-partners
2Recall that these are edges between any two even vertices
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w6 w5 w1: (u1 u2)
u2: w1 w7 w10 w2 w2: u9 u6 u7 u2 u3
u3: w8 w3 w6 w7 w2 w3: u4 (u3 u8)
u4: (w3 w4) w4: (u4 u5)
u5: w4 (w5 w9) w5: u10 u5 u1
u6: w6 w2 w9 w6: u6 u1 u3 u8
u7: w7 w10 w2 w9 w7: u7 u2 u8 u3
u8: w8 w3 w7 w6 w8: (u3 u8)
u9: (w2 w9) w9: u9 u5 u6 u7
u10: (w5 w10) w10: u10 u7 u2
Figure 6.5: An instance I5 of SMTI-SYM.
are deﬁned by Algorithm Label-s as follows. In iteration 2, E0
2 = ∅ so no s-partners are
deﬁned. In iteration 3, E0
3 contains the edges (u1,w5) and (u2,w10) so that s(u1) = w5
and s(w5) = u1, and s(u2) = w10 and s(w10) = u2. Note that the edges (u1,l(u1)),
(w5,l(w5)), (u2,w2) and (w10,l(w10)) are deleted from E0
4 by lines 10-12 of the algorithm
in this iteration so that E0
4 = ∅ and no s-partners are deﬁned in iteration 4. The edge
(u2,l(u2)) is also deleted from E0
5 in iteration 3. In iteration 5, E0
5 contains the edges
(u3,w2), (u8,l(u8)) and (w9,l(w9)). Hence, s(u3) = w2 and s(w2) = u3, s(u8) = l(u8) and
s(w9) = l(w9). The edges (u3,l(u3)) and (w2,l(w2)) are deleted from E0
6 by lines 10-12 of
the algorithm so that E0
6 = ∅ and no s-partners are deﬁned in the ﬁnal iteration.
Let M be a popular matching in an instance I of SMTI-SYM. Then, the next two
lemmas show that each agent a can only be assigned to a partner from f(a) ∪ s(a).
Lemma 6.3.3. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent a ∈ U ∪ W can be
assigned in M to a partner between f(a) and s(a) on a’s preference list.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that the agent a is a man u; similar
results for the women can be obtained by reversing the roles of the sexes in the following
proof. Now, suppose that u is assigned to a woman w strictly between f(u) and s(u). If w
is odd or unreachable, then by Corollary 6.3.1, w must be assigned to a member of f(w)
in M, a contradiction. Hence, w is even. By the same argument, u is even. Furthermore,
u must be strictly lower than any member of s(w) in w’s preference list. For, suppose
not. Choose any u0 ∈ s(w). Then, u either (a) precedes u0 or (b) is tied with u0 in w’s
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preference list. Let ranku(w) = i = rankw(u), and let rankw(u0) = k. Now, if case (a)
holds, then we have an immediate contradiction since this implies that i < k. For, by
deﬁnition of s(w) according to Algorithm Label-s, there cannot have existed an EE edge
(u00,w) such that rankw(u00) = i < k, or else all members of s(w) would have been deleted
from consideration by lines 9-12 of the algorithm in iteration i of the for loop in line 5.
On the other hand, if case (b) holds, then i = k so that (u,w) is an edge belonging to E0
k,
and hence lines 7-8 of Algorithm Label-s would have resulted in u ∈ s(w) and w ∈ s(u),
a contradiction. Hence, w lies strictly between f(u) and s(u) in u’s preference list, and u
lies after s(w) in w’s preference list. Let us form a new matching M0 from M by letting
M0 = M\{(u,w)}.
Let w0 ∈ f(u). Since u is even, it follows that w0 is odd and hence, it follows by
Corollary 6.3.1 that w0 is assigned in M0 ∩ E1 to some u0. Clearly, u0 ∈ f(w0) and vice
versa. Let us now consider w and let u0 ∈ s(w). Since w prefers u0 to u, it follows
that u0 cannot be a last resort agent. Clearly, u0 cannot be u0 or else the matching
obtained by (M0\{(u0,w0)}) ∪ {(u,w0),(u0,w)} is more popular than M, a contradiction.
Let M0(u0) = w0. It follows that w0 6= w0, for if so then u0 = u0, a contradiction.
Furthermore, w0 cannot be worse than s(u0) in u0’s preference list, or else let M00 =
(M0\{(u0,w0),(u0,w0)})∪{(u,w0),(u0,w),(u0,l(u0))} where we demote w0 to l(w0) in M00
if w0 6= l(u0) (or unassign w0 from u0 otherwise). It follows that M00 is more popular than
M, a contradiction. Hence, it follows that either (i) w0 has the same rank as any member
of s(u0) in u0’s preference list, (ii) w0 ∈ f(u0), or (iii) w0 lies strictly between f(u0) and
s(u0) in u0’s preference list.
In case (i), let u1 ∈ f(w0). It follows that w0 prefers u1 to u0 since u0 / ∈ f(w0). It
is straightforward to verify that u1 cannot be u nor u0 or else M cannot be a popular
matching. Let M0(u1) = w1. Then, let M00 be the matching obtained by
(M0\

(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(u1,w1)
	
) ∪

(u,w0),(u0,w),(u1,w0),(u0,l(u0))
	
where we demote w1 to l(w1) in M00 if w1 6= l(u1) (or unassign w1 from u1 otherwise). It
follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In case (ii), since u0 ∈ s(w), it is clear that u0 is even and hence, since w0 ∈ f(u0),
it follows that w0 is odd. Thus, there exists an odd length alternating path P0 =
huj,wj−1,uj−1,...,w1,u1,w0i in G1 to w0 from a man uj who is unassigned in M0 ∩ E1.
Clearly, uj 6= u0 and uj 6= u0 since these men are assigned to their ﬁrst-choice women in
M0. Now, if uj = u, then let M00 = ((M0\{(u0,w0)}) ∪ {(u0,w)}) ⊕ P0. It is straightfor-
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ward to verify that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence, uj is distinct
from all the men agents considered so far. Let M0(uj) = wj. It follows that wj is also
distinct from all the women agents. Clearly, wj is worse than any member of f(uj) in uj’s
preference list. Now, if wj = l(uj), then the matching obtained by
((M0\

(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(uj,wj)
	
) ∪

(u,w0),(u0,w),(u0,l(u0))
	
) ⊕ P0
can be veriﬁed to be more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence, wj 6= l(uj) and by
symmetry, uj / ∈ f(wj). Let uj+1 ∈ f(wj) instead. Let also M0(uj+1) = wj+1. Now,
if uj+1 is not distinct from any of the above men agents, then we have a cycle C. Let
M00 = M0⊕C. Then, M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence, uj+1 (and thus
wj+1) are distinct agents from those considered so far. However, let M00 be the matching
obtained by
((M0\{(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(uj,wj),(uj+1,wj+1)}) ⊕ P0)
∪{(u,w0),(u0,w),(uj+1,wj),(u0,l(u0))}
where we demote wj+1 to l(wj+1) in M00 if wj+1 6= l(uj+1) (or unassign wj+1 from uj+1
otherwise). It follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In case (iii), by analogy with u and w, it follows that w0 lies strictly between f(u0) and
s(u0) in u0’s preference list, and u0 lies after s(w0) in w0’s preference list. Let u1 ∈ s(w0).
It follows by a similar argument to the above that u1 6= u0, or else M cannot be a popular
matching. Furthermore, u1 6= u. For, suppose otherwise. Then, we have the following
chain of inequalities:
rankw(u) > rankw(u0) = ranku0(w)
> ranku0(w0) = rankw0(u0)
> rankw0(u) = ranku(w0)
> ranku(w) = rankw(u)
which is a contradiction. It follows that we can reuse arguments from the previous cases to
build a path P = hw,u0,w0,...,uy,wyi starting from w. If case (iii) continues to apply, then
P will not terminate, a contradiction to the ﬁniteness of the number of agents. Otherwise,
either case (i) or (ii) apply and we can obtain a similar contradiction as shown above.
Lemma 6.3.4. Let M be a popular matching in I. Then no agent a ∈ U ∪ W can be
assigned in M to a partner worse than s(a) on a’s preference list.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that a man u is assigned to a woman w strictly
worse than s(u). Clearly, u / ∈ f(w). By Lemma 6.3.3, u cannot be between f(w) and s(w)
on w’s preference list. Hence, either (i) u has the same rank as any member of s(w) in w’s
preference list, or (ii) u is also worse than s(w) on w’s preference list. Let us form a new
matching M0 from M by letting M0 = M\{(u,w)}.
In case (i), let us consider w ﬁrst. Let u0 ∈ f(w). Clearly, w must be even in G1, for
if w is odd or unreachable, then M(w) ∈ f(w), a contradiction. It follows that u0 must
be odd in G1, and hence, by Corollary 6.3.1, u0 must be assigned in M0 to some woman
w0 ∈ f(u0).
Let w0 ∈ s(u). Since u prefers any member of s(u) to w, it follows that w0 6= l(u).
Clearly, w0 6= w0, for otherwise the matching obtained by (M0\{(u0,w0)})∪{(u,w0),(u0,w)}
is more popular than M, a contradiction. Let u0 = M0(w0). It follows that u0 6= u0. Now,
it must be the case that either (a) u0 is worse that any member of s(w0) in w0’s preference
list, or (b) u0 has the same rank as any member of s(w0) in w0’s preference list, or (c)
u0 ∈ f(w0).
In subcase (a), let M00 = (M0\{(u0,w0),(u0,w0)})∪{(u0,w),(u,w0),(l(w0),w0)} where
we demote u0 to l(u0) in M00 if u0 6= l(w0) (or unassign u0 from w0 otherwise). It follows
that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In subcase (b), let w1 ∈ f(u0). It is straightforward to verify through similar arguments
to those used in Lemma 6.3.3 that w1 / ∈ {w,w0}, for otherwise M is not popular. By
Corollary 6.3.1, it follows that u0 must be even or otherwise w0 ∈ f(u0), a contradiction.
Hence, w1 is odd and M0(w1) ∈ f(w1). Let M0(w1) = u1. Also, let M00 be the matching
obtained by
(M0\

(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(u1,w1)
	
) ∪

(u0,w),(u,w0),(u0,w1),(u1,l(u1)),(l(w0),w0)
	
It follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In subcase (c), clearly w0 must be even (as w0 ∈ s(u)) so that u0 must be odd. Hence,
there exists an odd length alternating path P = hwj,...,u0i in G1 from some woman wj
who is unassigned in M0∩E1 to u0. We can reuse arguments from case (ii) of Lemma 6.3.3
to show that wj must be a distinct woman from those considered so far. Let uj = M0(wj).
Now, if uj = l(wj), then let M00 be the matching obtained by
((M0\

(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(uj,wj)
	
) ∪

(u0,w),(u,w0),(l(w0),w0)
	
) ⊕ P
It follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction. Hence, uj 6= l(wj) and clearly,
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wj / ∈ f(uj). Hence, let wj+1 ∈ f(uj) and let M0(wj+1) = uj+1. It again follows that we
can reuse arguments from case (ii) of Lemma 6.3.3 to show that these agents are distinct
from all agents considered so far. However, this implies that we can then obtain a new
matching M00 by
((M0\{(u0,w0),(u0,w0),(uj,wj),(uj+1,wj+1}) ⊕ P)
∪{(u0,w),(u,w0),(uj,wj+1),(l(w0),w0)})
where we demote uj+1 to l(uj+1) in M00 if uj+1 6= l(wj+1) (or unassign uj+1 from wj+1
otherwise). It follows that M00 is more popular than M, a contradiction.
In case (ii), it is straightforward to verify that we can reuse the proof for case (i) to
show that M must be a popular matching.
Lemmas 6.3.2-6.3.4 give rise to the following characterisation of popular matchings in
any instance I of SMTI-SYM.
Theorem 6.3.1. Let M be a popular matching in any given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Then,
1. M ∩ E1 is a maximum matching in G1, and
2. Every non last-resort agent a is assigned in M to a partner either from f(a) or s(a).
6.4 Structure of popular matchings
Let G = (U,W,E) be the underlying graph of an instance I of SMTI-SYM. We form a
subgraph G0 of G by letting G0 contain only edges from each agent a ∈ U ∪ W to those
agents in f(a) ∪ s(a). We say that a matching M is agent-complete in G0 if all those
agents that are not last resort agents are assigned in M. Clearly, G0 need not admit an
agent-complete matching if s(a) 6= {l(a)} for some agent a. It follows by Theorem 6.3.1
that all popular matchings must be contained in G0 . However, Theorem 6.3.1 only gives
us necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in I, since not all matchings in G0
satisfying these conditions are popular. For, let us consider the instance I5 in Figure 6.5.
Then, we can ﬁnd at least two matchings which satisfy Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem
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6.3.1, namely
M =



(u1,w1),(u2,w10),(u3,w8),(u4,w3),(u5,w4),
(u6,w6),(u7,w7),(u9,w2),(u10,w5)



and
M0 =



(u1,w5),(u2,w1),(u3,w2),(u4,w3),(u5,w4),
(u6,w6),(u7,w7),(u8,w8),(u9,w9),(u10,w10)



However, while M may be veriﬁed to be a popular matching as we shall show, M0 is
not popular because of the cycle C = hu1,w1,u2,w2,u3,w3,u4,w4,u5,w5i. It is straight-
forward to check that M0 ⊕C gives a more popular matching than M0. We work towards
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a matching in SMTI-SYM to be popular in the
following subsection.
6.4.1 Mutually exclusive edge pairs
Let us deﬁne any matching that satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 6.3.1 to be well-
formed. Clearly, all well-formed matchings must be contained in G0. Let a be any even
agent in I, and let b be any even agent that precedes the members of s(a) in a’s preference
list. Clearly, b / ∈ f(a) for otherwise we have an EE edge in G1, a contradiction by Lemma
1.2.1(c). Then, we deﬁne the edge pair {(b,b0),(a0,a)} to be a mutually exclusive edge
pair, or mutex edge pair for short, if b0 ∈ f(b) and a0 ∈ s(a). The next theorem gives us an
important characterisation of popular matchings in SMTI-SYM with respect to mutex
edge pairs.
Theorem 6.4.1. Let M be a well-formed matching in any given SMTI-SYM instance I.
Then, M is popular if and only if M does not contain any mutex edge pairs.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that if M is popular, then M contains no mutex edge pairs. Suppose
for a contradiction that M contains the mutex edge pair {(ul,wj),(ui,wp)} such that ui is
an even agent, wp ∈ s(ui) and wj is an even agent preceding wp in ui’s preference list and
ul ∈ f(wj). We have that ui prefers wj to wp but wj prefers ul to ui. Since wj is an even
agent and wj is assigned in M, it follows by the deﬁnitions of a well-formed matching and
an even vertex that there exists an even length alternating path P in G1 to wj from an
even agent wk who must be unassigned in M ∩E1, i.e. M(wk) ∈ s(wk). Now, if wp = wk,
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it follows that the sequence of agents hui,wj,...,wki then forms a cycle C such that M ⊕C
gives us a more popular matching than M, a contradiction.
Hence, suppose that wk 6= wp. Let M(wk) = ua. Now, if wp = l(ui) and ua = l(wk),
then we can unassign ui and wk from their last resort partners, and use (M⊕P)∪{(ui,wj)}
to give us a more popular matching than M. Let us thus suppose that wp = l(ui) and
ua 6= l(wk). Let wb ∈ f(ua) and let M(wb) = uc. Now, if wb ∈ P, then the sequence of
agents hwb,M(wb),...,wk,uai form a cycle C such that M ⊕ C gives us a more popular
matching than M. Hence, wb / ∈ P. Since wk ∈ s(ua), it follows that ua is an even agent
so that wb is odd. By Corollary 6.3.1, it must then be the case that uc 6= l(wb). Let M0
be the matching obtained by
((M\{(ui,wp),(ua,wk),(uc,wb)}) ⊕ P) ∪ {(ui,wj),(ua,wb),(uc,l(uc))}
It follows that M0 is more popular than M. On the other hand, if wp 6= l(ui) and
ua = l(wk), then let uq ∈ f(wp) and let M(uq) = wr. Now, if uq ∈ P, then the sequence of
agents hwp,ui,wj,...,uqi form a cycle C such that M⊕C gives us a more popular matching
than M, a contradiction. Hence, uq / ∈ P. Reusing a similar argument to the above, we
have that wr 6= l(uq). However, let M0 be the matching obtained by
((M\{(uq,wr),(ui,wp),(ua,wk)}) ⊕ P) ∪ {(uq,wp),(ui,wj),(l(wr),wr)}
It follows that M0 is more popular than M. Hence, suppose that neither wp nor ua
is a last resort agent. Then, let uq, wr, wb and uc be deﬁned as before. Let P0 =
hl(wr),wr,uq,wp,ui,wj,...,wk,ua,wb,uc,l(uc)i. Then, M ⊕ P0 gives us a more popular
matching than M. It follows that we obtain a contradiction in all cases so that if M
contains a mutex edge pair, then M cannot be popular.
Conversely, let M be a well-formed matching that contains no mutex edge pairs. Sup-
pose for a contradiction that there exists another matching M0 = {(u1,w1),...,(ur,wr)}
such that M0 is more popular than M. We ﬁrstly observe that if, for every agent ai who
prefers M0 to M (1 ≤ i ≤ r), his partner in M0 prefers M to M0, then M0 cannot be more
popular than M. Hence, there exists at least one ai who prefers M0 to M and his partner
in M0 either (i) also prefers M0 to M or (ii) is indiﬀerent between the two matchings.
Without loss of generality, let ai be a man whom we denote by ui and hence, M0(ui) = wi
by deﬁnition of M0. By Theorem 6.3.1 and the deﬁnition of a well-formed matching, we
can partition the set of agents who are assigned in M into the disjoint sets F and S, where
agents in F are assigned to their f-partners in M, and agents in S are assigned to their
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s-partners in M respectively. It is clear to see that agents in F cannot improve in M0
relative to M but can either become worse oﬀ or remain indiﬀerent. On the other hand,
agents in S can either improve, become worse oﬀ in M0 relative to M or remain indiﬀerent.
In case (i), it must be the case that each of ui and wi can only belong to S. It follows
that ui and wi are both even agents because only even agents have s-partners deﬁned.
However, this gives a contradiction since Algorithm Label-s would have deﬁned ui and wi
to be one of each other’s s-partners because (ui,wi) is then an EE edge such that ui prefers
wi to any member of s(ui) and vice versa.
Hence, it remains to consider case (ii). It is clear that ui ∈ S. Now, if wi ∈ S and
wi is indiﬀerent between ui and M(wi), we obtain a contradiction as in case (i). Hence,
wi ∈ F. Consider H0 = (M0 ⊕ M) ∩ E1. It follows that the only connected components
of H0 where an agent in S can become assigned to an agent in F who remains indiﬀerent
between M and M0 are even length alternating paths. Let ui and wi belong to such a
component P. Since ui improves to wi ∈ F, and wi is indiﬀerent between ui and M(wi),
it follows that ui is the end vertex of the end edge of P that is in M0. It also follows that
we have a uj who is the end vertex of the end edge of P that is in M. Clearly, uj becomes
worse oﬀ in M0 relative to M. Now, suppose that wj, who is uj’s partner in M0, prefers
M0 to M. By the structure of P, wj / ∈ f(uj). Now, if wj also improves in M0 by becoming
assigned to uj, it follows that wj ∈ S and uj is an even agent who lies between f(wj)
and s(wj) in wj’s preference list. However then, it follows that {(uj,M(uj)),(M(wj),wj)}
constitutes a mutex edge pair in M, a contradiction. Hence, wj either becomes worse oﬀ
in M0 relative to M or is indiﬀerent between the two matchings. However, it then follows
that for every edge (ui,wi) where one of the agents improves in M0 relative to M, exactly
one of these agents prefer M0 relative to M and the other remains indiﬀerent. Moreover,
we have a unique corresponding edge (uj,wj) in which at least one of the agents prefers
M relative to M0 and neither agents prefers M0 to M. It cannot then be the case that M0
is more popular than M.
What Theorem 6.4.1 thus implies is that a well-formed matching M in G0 is popular if
and only if M contains only one or none of the edges in any mutex edge pair. To illustrate
this concept, let us return to instance I5 in Figure 6.5. Let G0
I5 be the underlying graph
of I5 which contain edges incident to only f- and s-partners. Then, it may be veriﬁed
that G0
I5 contains one mutex edge pair, namely {(u2,w1),(u3,w2)}. Here, w2 and u2 are
even agents, u2 precedes s(w2) = u3 in w2’s preference list, and w1 = f(u2). It is thus
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straightforward to see that the matching M is popular in I5 because it contains no edges
of this mutex edge pair, while M0 is not popular because it contains both edges of the
mutex edge pair.
6.4.2 Testing a matching for popularity
We remark that Theorem 6.4.1 gives us an O(
√
nm) time algorithm for testing if a given
matching M in an SMTI-SYM instance I is popular by checking whether M is a well-
formed matching that admits no mutex edge pairs as follows.
First of all, we construct the ﬁrst-choice graph G1 of I containing only edges incident
to f-partners in O(m) time. We then ﬁnd a maximum matching M1 in G1 using the
Hopcroft-Karp algorithm in O(
√
nm) time. We next use M1 to obtain an EOU labelling
of the vertices in G in O(m) time through a similar approach outlined in Chapter 4 for
the same task in the context of CHAT. It follows that we are then able to identify E, the
set of even agents in I. Now, the f-partners are straightforward to identify. We can then
use Algorithm Label-s, as given on page 93, to identify the s-partners of each agent in
O(m) time (with a suitable choice of data structures such as those described in Section
2.4.3). The search for mutex edge pairs in M can then be done by checking whether the
preference list of each even agent a ∈ E contains an even agent b preceding any member
of s(a) such that M(b) ∈ f(b) whenever M(a) ∈ s(a). Clearly, the complexity of this step
is bounded by the time required for a traversal of all the preference lists. Hence, we have
the following result.
Lemma 6.4.1. Let M be a matching in a given instance of SMTI-SYM. Then we may
test whether M is popular in O(
√
nm) time.
6.4.3 Concluding remarks
We conclude with the following observations on mutex edge pairs with respect to popular
matchings.
Let I be an instance of SMTI-SYM and let G0 be the subgraph of G containing only
edges incident to f- and s-partners constructed as above. Then, it follows by Theorems
6.3.1 and 6.4.1 that the problem of ﬁnding a popular matching in I, or reporting that
none exists, becomes the equivalent problem of ﬁnding a well-formed matching in G0 that
contains no mutex edge pairs, or reporting that none exists.
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Men’s pref list Women’s pref list
u1: w1 w1: u1 u2 u5
u2: w2 (w1 w4 w5) w2: u2 u5
u3: w3 w3: (u3 u5)
u4: (w4 w5) w4: u4 u2 u6
u5: w3 w2 w1 w5 w5: u4 u2 u6 u5
u6: w6 w7 (w4 w5) w6: (u6 u7)
u7: w6 w7: u8 u6
u8: (w7 w8) w8: u8
Figure 6.6: An instance I6 of SMTI-SYM.
Now, a straightforward approach that identiﬁes and deletes all mutex edge pairs from
G0, and then proceeds to ﬁnd a well-formed matching in the reduced G0 would not work
as may be seen from Instance I6 as shown in Figure 6.6. Here, as with instance I5, it
is straightforward to identify the f-partners. Using Algorithm Label-s, the s-partners,
where deﬁned, are as follows: s(u3) = l(u3), s(u5) = w5, s(u6) = w7, s(u7) = l(u7),
s(w4) = l(w4), s(w5) = u5, s(w7) = u6, and s(w8) = l(w8). It is straightforward to verify
that we have two mutex edge pairs as follows:
{(u6,w6),(l(w4),w4)} and {(u6,w6),(u5,w5)}
Let us assume that we delete the above edges from G0. Observe that the only edges
incident to w4 and w5 in the reduced G0 are then (u4,w4) and (u4,w5). It follows then
that no agent-complete matching can exist in the reduced G0, causing any such approach
to report that no popular matching exists in I6. However, it may be veriﬁed that the
following is a well-formed matching in G0 that contains no mutex edge pairs, and hence is
popular in I6 by Theorem 6.4.1:
M =



(u1,w1),(u2,w2),(u3,w3),(u4,w4),(u5,w5),
(u6,w7),(u7,w6),(u8,w8)



Another possible solution may be to use a similar approach to that for ﬁnding a popular
matching in the context of CHA as follows. First, form the subgraph G1 and ﬁnd a
maximum matching M1 of G1. Then, add the edges that are incident to s-partners in
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G1 to form G0, and augment M1 to ﬁnd an agent-complete matching M of G0, if such a
matching exists. The objective of these steps are to ensure that M is well-formed. Note
that it is straightforward to identify any mutex edge pair(s) once the f- and s-partners
are deﬁned for all agents as described in Section 6.4.2. Let Mi be the matching that is
obtained from M1 during a particular iteration i of the augmenting step. We could then
try to ensure that M does not contain any mutex edge pair {e1,e2} by forbidding Mi to
be augmented with e2 during iteration i + 1 of the augmenting step if e1 already belongs
to Mi. However, it is unlikely that such a strategy could be successful in general. In fact,
the problem of deciding whether there exists an agent-complete matching in a bipartite
graph G0 without forbidden edge pairs is known to be NP-complete [32].
It therefore remains open as to whether a polynomial-time algorithm can be found to
determine whether an instance of SMTI-SYM admits a popular matching. In particular,
can we ﬁnd an eﬃcient way of constructing a well-formed matching without mutex edge
pairs, if such a matching exists? If such an algorithm can be found, then it could form
the basis of an approach to solve the analogous problem in the general SMTI and SRTI
cases.
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Proﬁle-based optimal matchings in
CHAT
7.1 Introduction
As discussed in Section 1.3.2, given any matching M in a bipartite matching problem,
various optimality criteria based on the proﬁle of M may be used to determine the quality
of M with respect to other matchings in the same problem instance. In this chapter, we
study several optimality concepts for bipartite matching problems based on the proﬁle
of matchings in the context of CHAT. The three optimality criteria that we study in
this chapter are the notions of a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal matching,
and a generous maximum matching, as introduced in Section 1.3.2. We remark that
these concepts are particularly useful in many practical matching applications where the
foremost goal of the matching scheme is to maximise the number of participating agents
who are assigned, and then subject to this constraint, to optimise the satisfaction of the
agents with respect to their preferences.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. First of all,
Section 7.2 introduces the terminology and notations that will be used for the rest of this
chapter. Next, Section 7.3 presents an O(C2mz) time algorithm (based on a variant of
the Bellman-Ford algorithm [28]) to ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching given an CHAT
instance, where C is the total capacity of houses, m is the total length of preference lists
and z is the maximum rank respectively in the problem instance. Section 7.4 presents
an O(min(z∗√
C,C +z∗)m) time algorithm that uses the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
to ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching given an CHAT instance, where z∗ is the maximal
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rank in an optimal solution. In that section, we also present a number of straightforward
alternative algorithms to solve the problem and show how our direct approach based on
the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition is faster than each of these. Finally, Section 7.5 shows
how the algorithms for ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching for a given CHAT instance
can be adapted for ﬁnding a generous maximum matching in the same problem instance.
7.2 Basic terminology
Let I be an instance of CHAT as deﬁned in Chapters 1, 2 and 4. Let z be the maximum
rank of a house taken over all agents’ preference lists in I. Let M be the set of all matchings
of A to H. The following deﬁnition gives a property of matchings given an instance of
CHAT.
Deﬁnition 7.2.1. The proﬁle ρ(M) of a matching M ∈ M is deﬁned to be the z-tuple
(x1,x2,...,xz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), xi is the number of agents who are assigned
in M with one of their ith choice houses.
For a given CHAT instance I, a feasible s-proﬁle is a proﬁle X = (x1,...,xz) such
that there is a matching M for I with proﬁle X where |M| = s. It is immediate that
P
xi = s. To simplify matters, we abbreviate a proﬁle (x1,...,xz) by (x1,...,xd) if xd > 0
and xi = 0 for i = d+1,...,z. We let the empty matching have proﬁle (0). We may deﬁne
a total order L on proﬁles as follows: let Y = (y1,...,yz) and X = (x1,...,xz) be any two
proﬁles. Then, Y L X if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < k
and yk > xk. We say that y left-dominates x. Let O = (o1,...,oz) be the z-tuple such
that oi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z. It follows that the proﬁle of any non-empty matching must
left-dominate O.
Alternatively, we may deﬁne a second total order ≺R on proﬁles as follows: X ≺R Y
if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for k < i ≤ z and xk < yk. We
say that the proﬁle X right-dominates proﬁle Y . Let O0 = (o0
1,...,o0
z) be the z-tuple such
that o0
i = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1 and o0
z = C + 1. Then, it follows that the proﬁle of any
non-empty matching must right-dominate O0. It is straightforward to see that each of L
and ≺R is transitive. Let G be the underlying graph of I. Then, we deﬁne the proﬁle
of a connected component C in G with respect to a matching M in G to be the z-tuple
ρC(M) = (α1,...,αz) where for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ z), αi is the number of agents in C who
obtain their ith-choice house (in I) in M. Given any two proﬁles ρ1 = (β1,...,βz) and
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Algorithm 12 Algorithm Greedy-Max
1: M := ∅;
2: s := 0; {// s is the cardinality of M}
3: loop
4: P := a maximum proﬁle augmenting path for M;
5: if P exists then
6: M := M ⊕ P;
7: else
8: exit;
9: s := s + 1;
10: return M; {// a greedy maximum matching}
ρ2 = (γ1,...γz), we deﬁne the sum of ρ1 + ρ2 to be (β1 + γ1,...,βz + γz). Furthermore,
ρ1 = ρ2 if βi = γi for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ z).
7.3 Greedy maximum matchings
For a given instance I of CHAT, we say that a feasible s-proﬁle X is s-left-maximal if
there is no other s-proﬁle that left-dominates X. We deﬁne a matching M whose proﬁle
is s-left-maximal to be a greedy s-matching. When s is the cardinality of a maximum
matching, we say that a greedy s-matching is a greedy maximum matching. Note that
there may be more than one greedy s-matching for any value of s, but it must be the case
that all greedy s-matchings have the same proﬁle, and we call this the greedy s-proﬁle for
the problem instance. When s is the cardinality of a maximum matching, we call this the
greedy maximum proﬁle. Let M+ denote the set of maximum matchings in M. Then,
we may formalise the deﬁnition of a greedy maximum matching in a CHAT instance as
follows.
Deﬁnition 7.3.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a greedy maximum matching is a maxi-
mum matching that has maximum proﬁle under the order L taken over all matchings in
M+.
7.3.1 Finding a greedy maximum matching
We now introduce our algorithm to ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching in any given
CHAT instance I. Our algorithm extends an existing approach for ﬁnding a greedy
maximum matching, given an instance of the House Allocation problem with Ties, and is
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Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 h2 : 1
a3: h4 h3 h3 : 1
a4: h4 h4 : 1
Figure 7.1: An instance I1 of CHAT
based on a variant of the Bellman-Ford algorithm [28]. A pseudocode description of the
main loop of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 12. This adapts the classical augmenting
path algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum matching in a graph. That is, we start from the
empty matching, and then repeatedly increase the cardinality of the current matching via
an augmenting path until no such path can be found. In our algorithm, however, we aim to
satisfy the greedy maximum condition by looking for greedy s-matchings, and augmenting
the current (greedy) matching at any stage of the algorithm by using only an augmenting
path which leads to a greedy (s + 1) matching, provided s is not the cardinality of a
maximum matching.
We would like to show that it always suﬃces to use a single augmenting path at
each stage s of the algorithm to obtain a greedy (s + 1)-matching from a greedy s-
matching. For instance, consider the CHAT example in Figure 7.1. Then, the matching
M1 = {(a1,h1),(a2,h2),(a3,h4)} is a greedy 3-matching. Now, the matchings M2 =
{(a1,h2),(a2,h1),(a3,h3),(a4,h4)} and M3 = {(a1,h1),(a2,h2),(a3,h3),(a4,h4)} are two
possible greedy 4-matchings that could be obtained from M1. However, while it takes an
augmenting path and an alternating cycle to move from M1 to M2, it takes only an aug-
menting path to move from M1 to M3. The next lemma proves that a single augmenting
path always suﬃces to obtain a greedy (s + 1)-matching from a greedy s-matching.
Lemma 7.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching in I. Then either M is a greedy maximum
matching or there is a greedy (s + 1)-matching M0 that can be obtained from M via an
augmenting path.
Proof. Let G be the underlying bipartite graph of I. Suppose that M is not a greedy
maximum matching. Hence, there exists a greedy (s + 1)-matching M1. We clone G to
obtain a cloned graph C(G) as follows. We replace every house hj ∈ H with the clones
h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j . We then divide the capacity of each house among its clones by allowing
each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if (ai,hj) ∈ E, then we add (ai,h
p
j) to the
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edge set of C(G) for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Furthermore, if rankai(hj) = k, then we let
rankai(h
p
j) = k for all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj), so that h
p
j is a kth-choice house for ai in C(G) for
all p (1 ≤ p ≤ cj). Let us then adapt the matching M in G to obtain its clone C(M) in
C(G) as follows. If a house hj in G is assigned to xj agents a1,...axj in M, then we add
(ap,h
p
j) to C(M) for 1 ≤ p ≤ xj, so that |C(M)| = |M|. We use a similar process for M1
to obtain its clone C(M1) in C(G). Hence, C(M) is a greedy s-matching and C(M1) is a
greedy (s + 1)-matching in C(G).
Let us consider X = C(M)⊕C(M1). Then, it follows that each connected component
of X is either (i) an alternating cycle, (ii) an even length alternating path, or (iii) an odd
length alternating path. We will show that there exists a greedy (s+1)-matching M0 such
that we require only a connected component of type (iii) in order to obtain M0 from M.
Let D be a connected component of X that is either (i) or (ii). Let ρD(C(M)) =
(a1,...,az), and let ρD(C(M1)) = (b1,...,bz). Suppose that ρD(C(M1)) L ρD(C(M)).
Then, we can create a new matching C1 of cardinality s in C(G) by replacing the C(M)-
edges in D by the C(M1)-edges in D, giving ρ(C1) L ρ(C(M)), which is a contradiction
since C(M) is a greedy s-matching in C(G). A similar contradiction arises if ρD(C(M)) L
ρD(C(M1)). Hence, ρD(C(M)) = ρD(C(M1)).
Now, let us form another greedy (s+1)-matching C2 in C(G) from C(M1) by replacing
every C(M1)-edge by the corresponding C(M)-edge in each connected component. Con-
sider each connected component F of Y = C(M)⊕C2. Then, it follows that F can only be
an odd length alternating path. By the existence of C2, there must exist an odd number
of such paths in Y in order for us to be able to augment C(M) to C2. Now, if only one
such path P0 exists, then it follows that P0 is an augmenting path and C(M) ⊕ P0 gives
us the greedy (s + 1)-matching C2.
Otherwise, there is more than one such path. Let P1 and P2 be any two such paths
which together have the same number of C(M)- and C2-edges; it must be possible to ﬁnd
such a pair of paths. Let ρP1(C(M))+ρP2(C(M)) = (α1,...,αz) and ρP1(C2)+ρP2(C2) =
(β1,...,βz). Suppose that (β1,...,βz) L (α1,...,αz). Then, we can create a new matching
C3 of cardinality s in C(G) by replacing the C(M)-edges by the C2-edges in P1 and P2
respectively, giving ρ(C3) L ρ(C(M)), which contradicts the fact that C(M) is a greedy s-
matching in C(G). We obtain a similar contradiction if (α1,...,αz) L (β1,...,βz). Hence,
ρP1(C(M))+ρP2(C(M)) = ρP1(C2)+ρP2(C2). Let us form another greedy (s+1)-matching
C4 in C(G) from C2 by replacing every C2-edge by the corresponding C(M)-edge in every
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such pair of odd length alternating paths. Then, it follows that C(M) ⊕ C4 contains
only a single alternating path P0 of odd length. Moreover, P0 is an augmenting path and
C(M) ⊕ P0 gives us the greedy (s + 1)-matching C4.
Consider the path P0. Let C0 = C(M) ⊕ P0. Replace each cloned edge (ai,h
p
j) in
P0 by the original edge (ai,hj) in G from which it was derived, where 1 ≤ p ≤ cj. It
follows that P0 becomes an augmenting path P with respect to M. Perform the same edge
replacements for C0 to obtain a matching M0 in G. It follows that M ⊕ P = M0. Since
ρ(M0) = ρ(C0), it must be the case that M0 is a greedy (s+1)-matching in G. Hence, the
result follows.
Given any greedy s-matching M in I that is not a greedy maximum matching, the task
at hand now is to be able to identify an augmenting path which will lead us to a greedy
(s + 1)-matching. To do so, let us introduce the notion of a maximum proﬁle augmenting
path. Let α be an integer such that 1 ≤ α ≤ z. We deﬁne X + α to be
X + α = (x1,...,xα−1,xα + 1,xα+1,...,xz)
and we deﬁne X − α to be
X − α = (x1,...,xα−1,xα − 1,xα+1,...,xz)
Let P = ha0,h0,a1,h1,...,ax,hxi be an alternating path from an exposed agent vertex
a0 to a house vertex hx, such that (ai,hi−1) ∈ M for 1 ≤ i ≤ x. We then deﬁne the proﬁle
of P to be
ρ(P) = O + r(a0,h0) + r(a1,h1) + ... + r(ax,hx)
– r(a1,h0) − r(a2,h1) − ... − r(ax,hx−1)
It follows that if P is an augmenting path, then ρ(P) corresponds to the net change in
the proﬁle of M if we augment M along P. For every house vertex hj ∈ H, we deﬁne the
L-value of hj relative to M, denoted by L(hj), to be the maximum proﬁle taken over all
alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex ending at hj, where a vertex is deﬁned to be
exposed if it is unmatched in M. We say that an alternating path P is a maximum proﬁle
augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and ρ(P) = max{L(hj) : hj ∈ H}
where max is with respect to the L order on proﬁles.
The following lemma shows that we can use the notion of a maximum proﬁle aug-
menting path in tandem with the classical augmenting path algorithm to ﬁnd a greedy
maximum matching in CHAT.
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Algorithm 13 Algorithm Max-Aug
1: Initialise l(hj) and pred(hj) for each house vertex hj;
2: for p in 1..s do
3: for each agent vertex ai assigned in M do { // M is the current greedy s-matching}
4: for each edge (ai,hj) / ∈ M do
5: σ := l(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai));
6: if σ L l(hj) then
7: l(hj) := σ;
8: pred(hj) := ai;
Lemma 7.3.2. Suppose that M is a greedy s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a maximum proﬁle augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a greedy
(s + 1)-matching.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that M0 = M ⊕ P does not give us a greedy (s + 1)-
matching. Now, by Lemma 7.3.1, there exists a matching M00 of cardinality s + 1 such
that M00 L M0 and M00 = M ⊕ P0 for an augmenting path P0. Since M00 L M0, it
follows that M ⊕P0 L M ⊕P, i.e. P0 L P. However, this gives a contradiction since P
is an augmenting path of maximum proﬁle for M.
Let M be any greedy s-matching that is not a greedy maximum matching for a given
CHAT instance I. It now remains to show how to ﬁnd a maximum proﬁle augmenting
path with respect to M. We do this using the algorithm shown in Algorithm 13, which is a
variant of the Bellman-Ford algorithm for ﬁnding shortest paths. In the algorithm, we will
use l(hj) as described below to compute L(hj) for each house vertex hj. We will also use a
predecessor value pred(hj) to store the agent vertex preceding hj in the alternating path
which has maximum proﬁle among all alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex to
hj found so far by the algorithm. At the start of the algorithm, we initialise l(hj) and
pred(hj) for each house vertex hj as follows. If there is an edge (ai,hj) incident to hj such
that ai is currently exposed, let t be the minimum value of r(ai,hj) taken over all such
edges, where recall that r(ai,hj) = rankai(hj). We then initialise l(hj) to be the t-tuple
(x1,...,xt) where xp = 0 (1 ≤ p < t) and xt = 1. Furthermore, we initialise pred(hj)
to be ai. If no such edge exists, we initialise l(hj) to be (0) and pred(hj) is undeﬁned.
Intuitively, l(hj) gives the maximum proﬁle of any alternating path of length 1 from an
exposed agent vertex ai to hj at the start of the algorithm, and so pred(hj) is set to be
ai, if such a path exists.
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The algorithm runs in s iterations, where s is the cardinality of the current matching
as constructed by Algorithm Greedy-Max (see Algorithm 12). It uses an edge relaxation
operation similar to that of the Bellman-Ford algorithm, but bases this operation in terms
of the order L on L-values. The edge relaxation operation is deﬁned in line 5 of the
algorithm. Let ai be any agent vertex assigned in the current greedy s-matching M
with (ai,hj) / ∈ M. Also, let P = hv,...,M(ai)i be an alternating path, starting from an
exposed agent vertex v and ending at M(ai), whose proﬁle is equal to l(M(ai)). The
essence of the edge relaxation operation is the following: if the proﬁle of the alternating
path P0 = hv,...,M(ai),ai,hji left-dominates l(hj), i.e. P0 gives a “better proﬁle” than
the alternating path whose proﬁle is equal to l(hj), then we update l(hj) to be the proﬁle
of P0 and similarly update the predecessor of hj to be ai.
Now, if l(h) = (0) for every house vertex h after execution of Algorithm Max-Aug,
then there is no augmenting path, and M is a greedy maximum matching. Otherwise, we
ﬁnd an exposed house vertex hj such that l(hj) left-dominates the L-values of all exposed
house vertices. The correctness proof in the next section shows that we can obtain the
maximum proﬁle augmenting path P by alternately tracing the predecessor values and
matched edges starting from pred(hj).
7.3.2 Proof of correctness
Let Y = (y1,...,yz) and X = (x1,...,xz) be any two proﬁles. We introduce a new notation
as follows, that is, Y L X if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that xi = yi for
1 ≤ i < k and yk ≥ xk. Intuitively, this implies that either Y = X or Y L X. The
following lemma shows us that Algorithm Max-Aug correctly computes the L-value of each
house vertex.
Lemma 7.3.3. When Algorithm Max-Aug terminates, l(hj) = L(hj) for each house vertex
hj ∈ H.
Proof. Let hj be an arbitrary house vertex in G. Let also L2p+1(hj) denote the maximum
proﬁle of any alternating path of length ≤ 2p + 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj.
We will prove the following loop invariant: after iteration p of the main for loop, l(hj) is
equal to or left-dominates the maximum proﬁle taken over all alternating paths of length
≤ 2p + 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj, i.e. l(hj) L L2p+1(hj).
For the base case, let p = 0. Now, L1(hj) is the maximum proﬁle of any alternating
path of length ≤ 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj. This is precisely the value that
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l(hj) is initialised to in line 1 of the algorithm as discussed on the previous page. Hence,
the base case holds.
For the induction step, we assume that 1 ≤ p ≤ s and that the loop invariant is true
for p−1, i.e. lprev(h) L L2p−1(h) after the (p−1)th iteration for all h ∈ H, where lprev(h)
denotes the value of l(h) as computed after the (p−1)th iteration. We will show that the
loop invariant holds after iteration p, that is l(hj) L L2p+1(hj) where l(hj) is computed
after the pth iteration. Let A0
j = {ai ∈ A : (ai,hj) ∈ E\M and ai is assigned in M} where
E is the edge set in G. During each iteration, we perform a relaxation step for every edge
(ai,hj) such that ai ∈ A0
j.
By deﬁnition, L2p+1(hj) denotes the maximum proﬁle of any alternating path of length
≤ 2p+1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj. Now, if (i) there does not exist any alternating
path from an exposed agent vertex of length ≤ 2p + 1 which gives a better proﬁle than
L2p−1(hj), then it follows that L2p+1(hj) = L2p−1(hj). Otherwise, it must be the case
that (ii) an alternating path of length ≤ 2p + 1 from an exposed agent vertex to hj with
proﬁle L2p+1(hj) must contain an alternating path from an exposed agent vertex to h0
j
with proﬁle L2p−1(h0
j) for some house vertex h0
j, together with the edges (M(h0
j),hj) and
(M(h0
j),h0
j). In such a case, it follows that
L2p+1(hj) = max

L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
	
Now, by inspection of the algorithm, we have that
l(hj) = max

lprev(hj),

l0(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
		
where l0(M(ai)) is the most recent L-value of M(ai) when l(hj) is updated by the algo-
rithm; it must be the case that lprev(M(ai)) L l0(M(ai)). By deﬁnition of L2p+1(hj), it
follows that
L2p+1(hj)
= max

L2p−1(hj),max

L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
		
L max

lprev(hj),max

L2p−1(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
		
(by the inductive hypothesis)
L max

lprev(hj),max

lprev(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
		
(by the inductive hypothesis)
L max

lprev(hj),max

l0(M(ai)) + r(ai,hj) − r(ai,M(ai)) : ai ∈ A0
j
		
= l(hj)
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completing the inductive step.
Thus, after iteration s, we have that l(hj) L L2s+1(hj). However, any alternating
path from an exposed agent vertex to hj with respect to the greedy s-matching can have
length at most 2s + 1. Hence, we have that l(hj) = L(hj) after iteration s, i.e. l(hj)
is equal to the maximum proﬁle taken over all alternating paths from an exposed agent
vertex to hj as required.
Let M be a greedy s-matching that is not a maximum matching. Let hr be an exposed
house vertex whose L-value left-dominates the L−values of all exposed house vertices after
execution of Algorithm Max-Aug. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained
by alternately tracing the predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from hr.
The next lemma shows that P must terminate at some exposed agent vertex.
Lemma 7.3.4. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained by alternately tracing
the predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from hr where hr is deﬁned as
above. Then, P terminates at some exposed agent vertex.
Proof. We wish to show that P cannot cycle, so let us suppose the contrary for a contra-
diction, i.e. P contains some cycle C. Hence, there must have been some point during the
execution of Algorithm Max-Aug when C appeared for the ﬁrst time. Call this step X.
Suppose that this happened when some house hj ∈ P had its predecessor assigned to the
agent ai ∈ P.
We ﬁrstly observe that hj must itself be in C, for otherwise, since none of the other
house vertices had its predecessor changed at step X, and none of the agents had his
assigned house changed at step X, C must have existed before step X, a contradiction to
the fact that C appears for the ﬁrst time. It follows that we can trace an alternating path
from each of the other house vertices h in C to hj by following the predecessor values and
matched edges in M from pred(h). Hence, immediately prior to step X, hj must itself
have had a deﬁned predecessor, and an existing value for l(hj).
Since pred(hj) was assigned to ai, it must have been the case that σ L l(hj), where
l(hj) was the existing L-value for hj and σ = l(M(ai))+r(ai,hj)−r(ai,M(ai)). However,
it is also the case that σ = l(hj) − ρC(M) + ρC(M0) where we let M0 = M ⊕ C. Hence,
we have that ρC(M0) L ρC(M). However, this implies that M0 is a matching such that
|M0| = |M| and M0 L M, a contradiction.
By Lemma 7.3.4, it follows that we can use the predecessor values to successfully trace
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an augmenting path P with respect to M where P ends at the house vertex hr. By Lemma
7.3.3 and the deﬁnition of L(hr), P must be a maximum proﬁle augmenting path with
respect to M if l(hr) left-dominates the L-values over all exposed house vertices. This
gives us the following result.
Theorem 7.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching that is not greedy maximum. Then,
executing Algorithm Max-Aug ﬁnds a maximum proﬁle augmenting path with respect to
M.
7.3.3 Time complexity analysis
The time complexity for ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching in an instance I of CHAT
may be derived as follows.
Algorithm Greedy-Max performs S calls to Algorithm Max-Aug to ﬁnd maximum
proﬁle augmenting paths where S is the cardinality of a maximum matching in I. The main
for loop of Algorithm Max-Aug itself is performed O(s) times, where s is the cardinality of
the current matching. Each iteration of the innermost for loop in line 6 makes a comparison
of l-values which takes O(z) time. There can be O(m) such iterations altogether during
a single execution of Algorithm Max-Aug. At the end of Algorithm Max-Aug, O(n2)
comparisons of L-values, each of which takes O(z) time, are made to identify a maximum
proﬁle augmenting path. Hence, each execution of Algorithm Max-Aug takes O(smz +
n2z) = O(smz) time. It follows that the overall time complexity of Algorithm Greedy-
Max is O(C2mz) since the maximum cardinality of a matching in an instance of CHAT
is O(C). In practice, the actual runtime of Algorithm Greedy-Max can be speeded up
through the observation that if no house h that is assigned in the current matching had
l(h) updated in the last iteration of Algorithm Max-Aug, then no further improvement to
an l(h0) for all h0 ∈ H can happen. Hence, we may choose to halt Algorithm Max-Aug at
that point.
7.4 Rank-maximal matchings
Let I be a given instance of CHAT. We formalise the deﬁnition of a rank-maximal match-
ing in I as follows.
Deﬁnition 7.4.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a rank-maximal matching is a matching
that has maximum proﬁle under the order L, taken over all matchings in M.
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Agent Pref list House Capacity
a1: h1 h2 h1 : 1
a2: h1 h2 : 2
Figure 7.2: An instance I2 of CHAT
For a given CHAT instance, there may be more than one rank-maximal matching, but
all rank-maximal matchings must have the same proﬁle, and hence the same cardinality.
Now, it is straightforward to see that a simple greedy algorithm in which we assign the
maximum number of agents to their ﬁrst choice house, then the maximum number to their
second choice house, and so on, does not guarantee to ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching. For
example, Figure 7.2 shows a given CHAT instance I2 in which the greedy algorithm
may either return matching M1 = {(a1,h1)} given the agent ordering ha1,a2i, or M2 =
{(a1,h2),(a2,h1)} given the agent ordering ha2,a1i, each of which maximises the number
of agents assigned to their ﬁrst choice house. However, M2 is rank-maximal but M1 is not,
since ρ(M1) = (1), but ρ(M2) = (1,1).
7.4.1 Finding a rank-maximal matching
For the special case where every house has unitary capacity, i.e. the House Allocation
problem with Ties (HAT), Irving et al. [29] give an O(min(z∗√
n,n + z∗)m) (direct)
combinatorial algorithm for solving the analogous problem, where z∗ ≤ z is the maximal
rank of an edge used in a rank-maximal matching. We will show how to extend this
algorithm to the CHAT case.
Let G be the underlying graph of I. Let Ei denote the set of edges having rank i for
any i (1 ≤ i ≤ z). Then, the edge set of G may be expressed as E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ Ez.
Our algorithm works in phases. In each phase i (1 ≤ i < z), it constructs a rank-maximal
matching Mi+1 of the subgraph Gi+1 = (A ∪ H,E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ Ei ∪ Ei+1) so that when it
terminates at the end of phase z − 1, a rank-maximal matching Mz of the subgraph Gz
is a rank-maximal matching for I. Our algorithm begins at the outset by constructing a
maximum matching M1 in G1 = (A ∪ H,E1). Note that M1 is a rank-maximal matching
of G1 since it is a maximum matching of E1 edges. For each phase i where i ≥ 1, our
algorithm then constructs a modiﬁed subgraph G0
i+1 of Gi+1, which reduces the problem
of ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching in Gi+1 to the problem of computing a maximum
matching of G0
i+1. The modiﬁed subgraph G0
i+1 is constructed from G0
i by adding only
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Algorithm 14 Algorithm Rank-Max
1: Start with G0
1 = G1 and let M1 be a maximum matching in G0
1.
2: for i = 1 to z − 1 do
3: Obtain an EOU labelling of G0
i.
4: Delete all edges in G0
i connecting two odd vertices, or connecting an odd vertex with an
unreachable vertex (this step does not delete any edge of Mi).
5: Delete from Ej, for all j > i, all edges incident to an odd or unreachable vertex in G0
i.
6: Build subgraph G0
i+1 by adding the edges in Ei+1 to G0
i.
7: Find a maximum matching Mi+1 in G0
i+1 by augmenting Mi.
8: return Mz as a rank-maximal matching.
those edges from Ei+1 that can potentially belong to a rank-maximal matching of I.
To help us identify those edges that can potentially belong to a rank-maximal matching
of I, we make use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition as extended to the capacitated
bipartite graph in Chapter 4. Recall that Lemma 4.3.4 shows that fundamental properties
of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition, as introduced by Lemma 1.2.1 in Section 1.2, also
hold in the capacitated bipartite graph case. Hence, we can reuse Lemma 4.3.4 here for
each subgraph Gi of G, which is essentially a CHAT instance. A pseudocode description
of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 14.
7.4.2 Proof of correctness
Recall that Algorithm Rank-Max constructs a maximum matching Mi for each subgraph
G0
i. In order to show the correctness of our algorithm, we require the following technical
results.
Lemma 7.4.1. Suppose that every rank-maximal matching of Gi is a maximum matching
of G0
i. Then every rank-maximal matching of Gi+1 is contained in G0
i+1.
Lemma 7.4.2. For every phase i and j where j > i, the number of edges of rank at most
i is the same in Mi and Mj.
Note that the proofs of the lemmas have been omitted since they may be established
by straightforward extension of the corresponding results for HAT (i.e. Lemmas 2.2 and
2.3 of [29] respectively). What Lemmas 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 show are the following:
(i) suppose that the hypothesis of Lemma 7.4.1 is true. Then, any edge deleted during
phase i of the algorithm does not belong to any rank-maximal matching of Gi+1 so
that every rank-maximal matching in Gi+1 has all of its edges in G0
i+1;
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(ii) the algorithm maintains the same number of edges of rank i in each matching Mj
for all i < j.
The above results lead us to the following correctness result for our algorithm, for
which we again omit the proof since it is a straightforward extension of the corresponding
result for HAT (i.e. Theorem 2.4 of [29]).
Theorem 7.4.1. For every 1 ≤ k ≤ z, the following statements hold:
(i) Every rank-maximal matching in Gk is a maximum matching in G0
k;
(ii) Every maximum matching Mk in G0
k is a rank-maximal matching in Gk.
7.4.3 Time complexity analysis
The following theorem gives us the time complexity of our algorithm.
Theorem 7.4.2. Given a CHAT instance I, a rank-maximal matching can be computed
in O(min(z∗√
C,C + z∗)m) time, where z∗ is the maximal rank of an edge in an optimal
solution and C is the total capacity of the houses in I.
Proof. Consider phase i of the algorithm. It is straightforward to see that each subgraph
Gi can be constructed in O(m) time. We use Gabow’s algorithm [15] to compute a
maximum matching Mi in Gi in O(
√
Cm) time. Now, Gabow’s algorithm uses successive
augmentation steps to ﬁnd a maximum matching for each Gi. It must be the case that
the number of augmentation steps cannot exceed |Mi|−|Mi−1|+1, since each step either
increases the cardinality of the matching by at least 1, or establishes that no further
steps are needed. Hence, the time complexity for Gabow’s algorithm is also bounded by
O((|Mi| − |Mi−1| + 1)m), giving an overall bound of O(min(
√
C,|Mi| − |Mi−1| + 1)m).
After ﬁnding the maximum matching Mi, it follows that we can obtain an EOU la-
belling by using a similar approach to that described in Section 4.3.2 for CHAT. We ﬁrst
use a pre-processing step to label each unassigned agent and each undersubscribed house
as even. Clearly, this step takes O(n) time. Next, restricted breadth-ﬁrst search may be
used on Gi to search for alternating paths with respect to Mi, building up odd or even
labels for every vertex encountered. This step labels all odd and even (assigned) agents,
and all odd and even (full) houses and takes O(m) time. Any remaining unlabelled vertices
must be unreachable and we can directly label these vertices in Gi in O(n) time. Thus,
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the total time complexity of EOU labelling of Gi is O(n + m). The EOU labelling of Gi
is then used to delete certain edges from Ej where j > i which takes O(m) time.
Hence, the time complexity for each phase is O((min(
√
C,|Mi| − |Mi−1| + 1)m). By
summing, we see that the overall running time is O(min(z
√
C,C + z)m).
Now, we show how to replace z by z∗. At the beginning of each phase i, we ﬁrst check
if Mi is already a maximum matching in G0 which consists of all edges (of all ranks) that
have not been deleted at the start of phase i. This takes O(m) time. If Mi is a maximum
matching in G0, then we stop. Otherwise, we continue as described above. This ensures
that only z∗ phases are executed.
7.4.4 Alternative approaches to ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching
Given any CHAT instance I, we give here several alternative approaches for computing
a rank-maximal matching in I. However, we will show that Algorithm Rank-Max, based
on using the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition, oﬀers the fastest algorithm for all cases.
7.4.4.1 Reduction to the Assignment problem
One method for ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching in I would be by reduction to the
Assignment problem through the allocation of a suitably steeply decreasing sequence of
weights to the edges of G as follows. For each (agent,house) edge (ai,hj) in the underlying
graph of I, let wt(ai,hj) = (n + 1)z−k where n is the total number of agents and houses,
z is the maximum length of an agent’s preference list, and rankai(hj) = k. We then ﬁnd
a maximum weight matching in this weighted graph G0. The following lemma shows that
such a maximum weight matching must be a rank-maximal matching in I.
Lemma 7.4.3. Let M be a maximum weight matching in G0. Then, M is a rank-maximal
matching of I.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists some matching M0 such that M0 L M. Let
ρM = (x1,...,,xz) and ρM0 = (y1,...,yz). It follows that for some s(1 ≤ s ≤ z), xi = yi for
each i (1 ≤ i < s) and ys > xs. Now, let wt(M∗) denote the weight of any matching M∗.
Then, it follows that the weight of M is
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wt(M) =
z X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i
=
s X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i +
z X
i=s+1
xi(n + 1)z−i
≤
s X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i + (xs+1 + xs+2 + ... + xz)(n + 1)z−s−1
<
s X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i + n · (n + 1)z−s−1
<
s X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i + (n + 1)z−s
However, we may derive the following inequality relation for the weight of M0:
wt(M0) ≥
s−1 X
i=1
yi(n + 1)z−i + ys(n + 1)z−s
≥
s−1 X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i + (xs + 1)(n + 1)z−s
(since ys ≥ xs + 1)
=
s X
i=1
xi(n + 1)z−i + (n + 1)z−s
> wt(M)
which contradicts the fact that M is a maximum weight matching in G0.
Hence, Lemma 7.4.3 shows that we can ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching in I by reduc-
tion to the Assignment problem in the manner described above. Recall (from Section 1.2)
that Gabow’s algorithm for maximum weight DCS [15] solves the Assignment problem
in the capacitated graph in O(C min(mlogn,n2)) time. In view of the time required to
perform arithmetic operations on steeply decreasing weights [42], the resulting running
time of the algorithm is O(zC min(mlogn,n2)). Recall also that Algorithm Rank-Max
takes O(min(z∗√
C,z∗ + C)m) time. Now, if mlogn ≤ n2, then ﬁnding a rank-maximal
matching via reduction to the Assignment problem takes (i) Ω(zCmlogn) time. Other-
wise, this takes (ii) Ω(zCn2) time. In case (i), Algorithm Rank-Max is faster by a factor
of Ω(min(
√
C logn,(zC logn)/(z∗ +C))). In case (ii), Algorithm Rank-Max is faster by a
factor of Ω(min(
√
C,(zC)/(z∗ +C))) under the standard assumption that m ≤ n2 [46]. It
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follows in all cases that Algorithm Rank-Max is faster than by reduction to the Assignment
problem.
We remark that a similar reduction to the Assignment problem can also be used to ﬁnd
greedy maximum matchings. Here, it is required to adjust the edge weights to ensure that
a maximum weight matching in the weighted graph G0 described above also has maximum
cardinality. In order to do so, we modify the previous reduction by adding a suﬃciently
large constant C to each edge weight. This is to ensure that every matching of size s has
weight greater than every matching of size s − 1. Since the largest edge weight we might
have is (n + 1)z−1, adding a constant of C = (n + 1)z is suﬃcient. Hence, we assign the
weight of each edge (ai,hj) to be wt(ai,hj) = (n+1)z−k +(n+1)z. Let M be a maximum
weight matching in the revised weighted graph G0. Then, the second component of the
edge weights (as created by adding C to the weight of every edge) ensures that M will
have maximum cardinality. Among all such matchings, the ﬁrst component will ensure
that a matching with maximum weight is a greedy maximum matching using a similar
proof to Lemma 7.4.3.
It follows that such an approach would also take O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time. Recall
that Algorithm Greedy-Max takes O(C2mz) time to ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching
given a CHAT instance. For most practical applications, it is reasonable to assume that
C/logn ≥ 1. For example, from the 2006-07 Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme
(SFAS) data [38], there were 781 students, 53 hospitals and the total capacity of the
hospitals was 789, i.e. n = 781 + 53 = 834 and C = 789 so that C/logn ≈ 117 ≥ 1.
By comparing the time complexities of both approaches, it is straightforward to see that
the reduction method is faster by a factor of Ω(C max(1/logn,m/n2)) for most practical
cases.
7.4.4.2 Adapting Algorithm Greedy-Max
Note that a rank-maximal matching and a greedy maximum matching are conceptually
similar except that the former need not be of maximum cardinality. Now, a rank-maximal
matching M0 must be a greedy |M0|-matching. The next lemma shows how to extend the
results of Lemmas 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 to yield an alternative method for ﬁnding a rank-maximal
matching in any instance of CHAT.
Lemma 7.4.4. For each i, let Mi be a greedy i-matching with proﬁle ρi. If ρi+1 L ρi
for i = 1,2,...,k − 1 and ρk L ρk+1, then Mk is a rank-maximal matching, and ρk is the
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Algorithm 15 Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max
1: M := ∅;
2: M0 := ∅;
3: s := 0;
4: loop
5: P := a maximum proﬁle augmenting path for M;
6: if P exists then
7: M := M ⊕ P;
8: if ρ(M) L ρ(M0) then
9: M0 := M;
10: else {//ρ(M) ≺L ρ(M0) must hold}
11: break;
12: else
13: break;
14: s := s + 1;
15: M0 is a rank-maximal matching;
rank-maximal proﬁle.
Proof. Let ρk = (x1,...,xz) and suppose that Mk is not rank-maximal. Then, there is a
matching M such that M L Mk and M has proﬁle ρ = (x1,...,xi−1,yi,...,yz) for some i
wih yi > xi. It follows that M contains a matching M0 with proﬁle ρ0 = (x1,...,xi−1,xi+1).
Clearly, M0 L Mk. Since ρk = (x1,...,xz), it follows that x1 + ... + xz = k, so that
x1 + ... + xi ≤ k. We then have that |M0| = x1 + ... + xi + 1 ≤ k + 1. This implies
that we have a matching of cardinality at most k + 1 whose proﬁle left-dominates ρ(Mk).
However, this gives a contradiction since ρk must left-dominate the proﬁles of all matchings
of cardinality up to k + 1 by the statement of the lemma.
We now introduce Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max which oﬀers an alternative approach
to ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching in any given CHAT instance J. A pseudocode de-
scription of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 15. Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max basically
repeats the approach used by Algorithm Greedy-Max. However, the algorithm halts when
it obtains a greedy s-matching that is also rank-maximal. That is, it does so when it ﬁnds
a greedy s-matching M which satisﬁes the condition in the statement of Lemma 7.4.4. It is
straightforward to verify that Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max has the same time complexity
as Algorithm Greedy-Max, i.e. O(C2mz).
Lemma 7.4.4 shows that we can obtain a rank-maximal matching as a by-product
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of ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching in I, and Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max gives an
algorithm for doing this. Let us compare the time complexities of Algorithm Rank-Max
and Algorithm Greedy-Rank-Max. Recall Algorithm Rank-Max takes O(min(z∗√
C,C +
z∗)m) time. It follows that Algorithm Rank-Max is faster than Algorithm Greedy-Rank-
Max by a factor of Ω(min(C3/2,C2z/(C + z∗)).
7.4.4.3 “Cloning”
Another straightforward solution to ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching for a CHAT in-
stance I may be to use “cloning” to create an instance J of HAT, and then to apply the
O(min(z∗√
n,n+z∗)m) algorithm of [29] to J. Firstly, we create cj clones h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j of
each house hj in I, where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each oc-
currence of hj in a given agent’s preference list by the sequence h1
j,h2
j,...,h
cj
j , the elements
of which are listed in a single tie at the point where hj appears.
Let us now compare the complexity of our direct approach using Algorithm Rank-Max
to that of the cloning approach. Let GJ denote the underlying graph of J. Then, GJ
contains n0 = n1 + C vertices. For each ai ∈ A, let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses
for ai. Then, the number of edges in GJ is m0 =
P
ai∈A
P
hj∈Ai cj. Hence, the complexity
of applying the algorithm of [29] to J is Ω(min(z∗√
n1 + C,n1 + C + z∗)m0). It follows
that the cloning approach is slower by a factor of Ω(m0/m).
7.5 Generous Maximum Matchings
For a given CHAT instance I, we say that a feasible s-proﬁle X is s-right-minimal if there
is no other feasible s-proﬁle that right-dominates X. In addition, we deﬁne a matching M
whose proﬁle is s-right-minimal to be a generous s-matching. When s is the cardinality of a
maximum matching, we say that a generous s-matching is a generous maximum matching.
As in the case of greedy s-matchings, there may be more than one generous s-matching
for a given value of s, but it is clear that all generous s-matchings have the same proﬁle,
and we call this the generous s-proﬁle for the problem instance. When s is the cardinality
of a maximum matching, the generous s-proﬁle is called the generous maximum proﬁle.
We formalise the deﬁnition of a generous maximum matching as follows.
Deﬁnition 7.5.1. Given an instance of CHAT, a generous maximum matching is a
maximum matching that has minimum proﬁle under the order ≺R taken over all matchings
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in M+.
7.5.1 Finding a generous maximum matching
We may adapt Algorithm Greedy-Max, designed to ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching
in I, into an analogous algorithm for ﬁnding a generous maximum matching in I. The
remainder of this section will work towards showing this. First of all, we introduce the
following lemma, which is a counterpart to Lemma 7.3.1 for ﬁnding generous matchings.
Lemma 7.5.1. Let M be a generous s-matching in I. Then either M is a generous
maximum matching or there is a generous (s+1)-matching M0 that can be obtained from
M via an augmenting path.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if we replace all concepts relating to left-
domination and greedy in the proof of Lemma 7.3.1 by their counterparts for right-
domination and generous respectively, then this establishes the proof for this lemma.
As with ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching in CHAT, given any generous s-matching
M, we want to be able to identify an augmenting path with respect to M that will lead
us to a generous (s + 1)-matching. To do so, let us introduce the notion of a minimum
proﬁle augmenting path. Let i be an integer such that 1 ≤ i ≤ z. We assume X + i and
X −i to be those operations on z-tuples and i that were deﬁned previously in the context
of greedy maximum matchings. Then, for every house vertex hj, we deﬁne the R-value
of hj with respect to M, denoted by R(hj), to be the minimum proﬁle taken over all
alternating paths from an exposed agent vertex ending at hj. We say that an alternating
path P is a minimum proﬁle augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and
ρ(P) = min{R(hj) : hj ∈ H} where min is with respect to the ≺R order on proﬁles.
The following lemma, analogous to Lemma 7.3.2, shows that we can use the notion of a
minimum proﬁle augmenting path in tandem with the classical augmenting path algorithm
to ﬁnd a generous maximum matching in CHAT.
Lemma 7.5.2. Suppose that M is a generous s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a minimum proﬁle augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a generous
(s + 1)-matching.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if we replace all concepts relating to left-
domination and greedy in the proof of Lemma 7.3.2 by their counterparts for right-
domination and generous respectively, then this establishes the proof for this lemma.
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Hence, we are able to reuse Algorithm Greedy-Max to ﬁnd a generous maximum match-
ing for a given CHAT instance I. The diﬀerence, in this context, is that we are interested
in ﬁnding a minimum proﬁle augmenting path in each iteration of the algorithm instead.
Let M be any generous s-matching that is not a generous maximum matching for a given
CHAT instance I. If we replace all occurrences of L-values in Algorithm Max-Aug by
R-values, and replace the left-domination comparison L by the right-domination com-
parison ≺R in line 6 of the algorithm, then we can reuse Algorithm Max-Aug to ﬁnd a
minimum proﬁle augmenting path with respect to M. Note that if there does not exist
any alternating path of length 1 from an exposed agent vertex to a house hj in the ini-
tialisation step, then we set r(hj) to be O0 where r(hj) is used to compute R(hj) in the
algorithm. Let us rename Algorithm Max-Aug, after the above transformations, to be
Algorithm Min-Aug. Then, if every house vertex has an R-value that is equal to O0 after
execution of Algorithm Min-Aug, then there is no augmenting path, and M is a generous
maximum matching. Otherwise, we ﬁnd the house vertex hj with minimum R-value, and
obtain the minimum proﬁle augmenting path P by alternately tracing the predecessor
values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hj).
7.5.2 Proof of correctness
As in the greedy maximum case, we want to show that the augmenting path P obtained
by executing Algorithm Min-Aug is a minimum proﬁle augmenting path with respect to
the current generous s-matching M. The next two lemmas prove results analogous to the
greedy maximum case in the generous maximum context.
Lemma 7.5.3. When Algorithm Min-Aug terminates, r(hj) = R(hj) for each house vertex
hj ∈ H.
Proof. We replace all concepts relating to left-domination and greedy by their counterparts
for right-domination and generous respectively in the proof of Lemma 7.3.3 to obtain our
proof for this lemma.
Lemma 7.5.4. Let P be the sequence of agents and houses obtained by alternately tracing
predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hj) where the R-value of hj
right-dominates the R-values of all exposed house vertices. Then, P terminates at some
exposed agent vertex.
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Proof. We again replace all concepts relating to left-domination and greedy by their coun-
terparts for right-domination and generous respectively in the proof of Lemma 7.3.4 to
obtain our proof for this lemma.
This gives us the following result with respect to generous maximum matchings in
CHAT.
Theorem 7.5.1. Let M be a generous s-matching M that is not generous maximum.
Then, executing Algorithm Min-Aug (adapted from Algorithm Max-Aug as described above)
ﬁnds a minimum proﬁle augmenting path with respect to M.
7.5.3 Time complexity analysis
It is straightforward to verify that it takes O(C2mz) time to ﬁnd a generous maximum
matching using the same arguments as in the greedy maximum case. In practice, as in the
generous maximum case, we can speed up the running time by halting Algorithm Min-Aug
when no house h that is assigned in the current matching had r(h) updated in the last
iteration of the algorithm.
Finally, we remark that we can ﬁnd a generous maximum matching given an instance I
of CHAT by a reduction to the Assignment problem in a similar way to that for the greedy
maximum case. In the generous maximum case, however, the appropriate weight to assign
to each edge (ai,hj) should be wt(ai,hj) = ((n+1)z−1 −(n+1)k−1 +1)+(n+1)z where
(n + 1)z is again the large constant added to ensure that any maximum weight matching
in the underlying weighted graph has maximum cardinality. As with the greedy maximum
case, such an approach would take O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time. Furthermore, we can
assume that C/logn ≥ 1 for most practical applications. Hence, the reduction method is
again faster than an augmenting path approach using the Bellman-Ford algorithm by a
factor of Ω(C max(1/logn,m/n2)) for most practical cases.
7.6 Open Problems
We conclude this chapter with the following open problems.
• In this chapter, we have given diﬀerent eﬃcient algorithms for the individual prob-
lems of ﬁnding a greedy maximum, a rank-maximal and a generous maximum match-
ing given an CHAT instance. It was observed in Section 7.4 that an approach util-
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ising the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition gives us a faster algorithm for ﬁnding a
rank-maximal matching than several straightforward alternatives such as by an aug-
menting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the
Assignment problem. We have also shown that the reduction approach gives a faster
algorithm than the augmenting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm
for constructing greedy and generous maximum matchings for most practical cases.
Hence, the question arises as to whether we can ﬁnd direct, more eﬃcient algo-
rithms for constructing greedy and generous maximum matchings, given an instance
of CHAT, by also making use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition.
• For a given instance I of CHAT, and a given proﬁle, can we determine whether I
admits a matching with that proﬁle in polynomial time?
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Proﬁle-based optimal matchings in
HRT
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we studied three diﬀerent types of proﬁle-based optimal matchings in the
context of CHAT. These are the concepts of a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal
matching and a generous maximum matching. In this chapter, we extend these results
to the bipartite matching problem model with two-sided preference lists, focusing on the
Hospital-Residents problems with Ties (HRT). The deﬁnitions of a greedy maximum,
rank-maximal and generous maximum matching respectively are the same as those given
in Chapter 7. Furthermore, we reuse most of the terminology and notation as deﬁned in
Chapter 7, and we explicitly deﬁne here the relevant concepts only where we need to adapt
them to HRT.
The main results of this chapter, and their organisation are as follows. First of all,
Section 8.2 introduces the terminology and notations that will be used for the rest of
this chapter. We then show how to ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal
matching and a generous maximum matching given an instance of HRT in Sections 8.3,
8.4 and 8.5 respectively. In each of these sections, we give two algorithms, one based on the
augmenting path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm, and the other through
reduction to the Assignment problem (both as described in Chapter 7), to give eﬃcient
solutions to the problem. Finally, since SMTI is a special case of HRT, we remark that
the algorithms described in this chapter can also be used to solve the analogous problems
in SMTI.
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8.2 Basic terminology
Let I be an instance of the Hospitals-Residents problem with Ties (HRT). This comprises
two disjoint sets R and H, where R = {r1,r2,...,rn1} is the set of residents and H =
{h1,h2,...,hn2} is the set of hospitals. We assume all the terminology and deﬁnitions that
were introduced for HR in Chapter 1. Moreover, we now allow the preference list of each
agent to contain ties. Let G = (R,H,E) be the underlying graph of I where E is the
set of edges in G representing the acceptable hospitals of the residents (and vice versa).
Recall that C =
Pn2
j=1 cj denotes the sum of the capacities of the hospitals. We assume
that no resident or hospital has an empty preference list so that m = |E| ≥ max{n1,n2}.
Given a resident ri ∈ R and an acceptable partner hj for ri, we deﬁne rankri(hj)
to be the number of hospitals that ri prefers to hj plus 1. If rankri(hj) = k, we say
that hj is a kth choice of ri. In a similar way, we deﬁne rankhj(ri) and a kth choice
of hj. Let z be the largest rank of a resident or hospital taken over all preference lists
in I. Let (ri,hj) ∈ E be any edge. Then, we deﬁne the rank of (ri,hj) to be the pair
r(ri,hj) = (min

rankhj(ri),rankri(hj)
	
,max

rankhj(ri),rankri(hj)
	
).
Given a matching M for an instance I of HRT, we deﬁne a vertex v in the underlying
graph G of I to be exposed with respect to M, if v is a resident vertex that is unassigned
in M, or if v is a hospital vertex that is undersubscribed in M. An augmenting path in G
is an alternating path both of whose end vertices are exposed.
For a given HRT instance I, the deﬁnition of a feasible s-proﬁle X = (x1,...,xz) is
analogous to that in CHAT. However, in HRT,
P
xi = 2s. Let M be the set of all
matchings in I. Furthermore, let M+ denote the set of maximum matchings in M.
8.3 Greedy Maximum matchings
Let L be the total order deﬁned on proﬁles of matchings as in Section 7.2. The following
formalises the deﬁnition of a greedy maximum matching with respect to HRT.
Deﬁnition 8.3.1. Given an instance of HRT, a greedy maximum matching is a maximum
matching that has maximum proﬁle under the order L taken over all matchings in M+.
8.3.1 Finding a greedy maximum matching
Given any instance I of HRT, we may ﬁnd a greedy maximum matching in I by using
Algorithm Greedy-Max, which was used to solve the analogous problem in CHAT. We
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ﬁrst introduce the following lemma, which is analogous to Lemma 7.3.1 for ﬁnding greedy
matchings in the CHAT case.
Lemma 8.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching in I. Then either M is a greedy maximum
matching or there is a greedy (s + 1)-matching M0 that can be obtained from M via an
augmenting path.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.1 may be adapted to prove this lemma.
As with ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching in CHAT, given any greedy s-matching
M in I, we want to be able to identify an augmenting path with respect to M that will
lead us to a greedy (s+1)-matching. To do so, we extend the notion of a maximum proﬁle
augmenting path from CHAT to HRT. Recall the concept of left-domination on z-tuples
as deﬁned in Chapter 7. That is, given the z-tuples X = (x1,...,xz) and Y = (y1,...,yz),
we say that Y L X, or Y left-dominates X, if there exists some k (1 ≤ k ≤ z) such that
xi = yi for 1 ≤ i < k and yk > xk. Let (a,b) be a pair of integers such that 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ z.
We then deﬁne the following operations on z-tuples and (a,b). That is, if a < b, we then
deﬁne X + (a,b) to be
X + (a,b) = (x1,...,xa−1,xa + 1,xa+1,...,xb−1,xb + 1,xb+1,...,xz)
and we deﬁne X − (a,b) to be
X − (a,b) = (x1,...,xa−1,xa − 1,xa+1,...,xb−1,xb − 1,xb+1,...,xz)
Otherwise, a = b, and we deﬁne X + (a,b) to be
X + (a,b) = (x1,...,xa−1,xa + 2,xa+1,...,xz)
and we deﬁne X − (a,b) to be
X − (a,b) = (x1,...,xa−1,xa − 2,xa+1,...,xz)
Let P = hr0,h0,r1,h1,...,rx,hxi be an alternating path from an exposed resident vertex
r0 to a hospital vertex hx, such that (ri,hi−1) ∈ M for 1 ≤ i ≤ x. We then deﬁne the
proﬁle of P to be
ρ(P) = O + r(r0,h0) + r(r1,h1) + ... + r(rx,hx)
– r(r1,h0) − r(r2,h1) − ... − r(rx,hx−1)
130Chapter 8. Proﬁle-based optimal matchings in HRT
where O = (o1,...,oz) is the z-tuple such that oi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ z. It follows that if
P is an augmenting path, then ρ(P) corresponds to the net change in the proﬁle of M
if we augment M along P. For every hospital vertex hj, we deﬁne the L-value of hj
relative to M, denoted by L(hj), to be the maximum proﬁle taken over all alternating
paths from an exposed resident vertex ending at hj. We say that an alternating path P
is a maximum proﬁle augmenting path for M if P is an augmenting path, and ρ(P) =
max{L(hj) : hj ∈ H} where max is with respect to the L order on proﬁles.
Let M be any greedy s-matching that is not a greedy maximum matching for a given
HRT instance I. The following lemma, analogous to Lemma 7.3.2, shows us that we can
use a maximum proﬁle augmenting path to obtain a greedy (s + 1)-matching from M.
Lemma 8.3.2. Suppose that M is a greedy s-matching which is not maximum. Let P
be a maximum proﬁle augmenting path. Then, augmenting M along P gives a greedy
(s + 1)-matching.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.2 may be adapted here.
It now remains to show how to ﬁnd a maximum proﬁle augmenting path with respect
to M. We remark that we may reuse Algorithm Max-Aug from Chapter 7 for this by
making the following changes to the algorithm:
• replace the agent vertices and house vertices in Algorithm Max-Aug by resident and
hospital vertices respectively; and
• replace the arithmetic operations used by the edge relaxtion operation in line 5 of
Algorithm Max-Aug by those deﬁned with respect to z-tuples and integer pairs in
this chapter, instead of those deﬁned in Chapter 7.
As in CHAT, if every hospital vertex has a L-value that is (0) after execution of
Algorithm Max-Aug, then there is no augmenting path, and M is a greedy maximum
matching.
8.3.2 Proof of correctness
Let I be an instance of HRT. Let P be the sequence of residents and hospitals obtained
by alternately tracing predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hr)
where the hospital vertex hr has left-maximum L-value over all exposed hospital vertices
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after an execution of Algorithm Max-Aug (as modiﬁed above). As in the CHAT case, we
want to show that the augmenting path P is a maximum proﬁle augmenting path with
respect to the current greedy s-matching M. The next two lemmas prove the analogous
results for the CHAT case in the context of HRT.
Lemma 8.3.3. Let Algorithm Max-Aug (as modiﬁed above) be executed. When Algorithm
Max-Aug terminates, l(hj) = L(hj) for each hospital vertex hj ∈ H.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.3 may be adapted here.
Lemma 8.3.4. Let P be the sequence of residents and hospitals obtained by alternately
tracing predecessor values and matched edges in M starting from pred(hr) where the hos-
pital vertex hr has left-maximum L-value over all exposed hospital vertices. Then, P
terminates at some exposed resident vertex.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 7.3.4 may be adapted here.
Lemmas 8.3.3 and 8.3.4 give us the following result.
Theorem 8.3.1. Let M be a greedy s-matching M that is not greedy maximum. Let
Algorithm Max-Aug (as modiﬁed above) be executed. Then, the algorithm ﬁnds a maximum
proﬁle augmenting path with respect to M.
8.3.3 Time complexity analysis
The time complexity for ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching in an instance I of HRT
may be easily veriﬁed to be the same as that for solving the same problem in any instance
of CHAT, that is O(C2mz), where C is the total capacity of the hospitals, m is the total
length of preference lists and z is the maximum length of any preference list respectively
in I. As with CHAT, we can speed up the actual runtime of Algorithm Greedy-Max
through the observation that if no hospital had its L-value updated in the last iteration
of Algorithm Max-Aug, then no further improvement to an L-value can happen. Hence,
we may choose to halt Algorithm Max-Aug at that point.
Recall that a straightforward approach to constructing a greedy maximum matching
in the setting of CHAT was by reduction to the Assignment problem. We remark that
it is possible to reuse a similar reduction to that described in Section 7.4.4.1 to also ﬁnd
a greedy maximum matching in the context of HRT as follows. Let (ri,hj) be an edge
where rankri(hj) = k and rankhj(ri) = l. Then, we let wt(ri,hj) = (n+1)z−k+(n+1)z−l.
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We are then interested in ﬁnding a maximum weight matching M in this weighted graph
G0 that has maximum cardinality. To ensure that M has maximum cardinality, we add
a suﬃciently large constant to the edge weights as in the context of CHAT. Here, the
largest edge weight that we might have is 2(n + 1)z−1, so adding a constant of 2(n + 1)z
is suﬃcient. Then, it is straightforward to reuse the arguments for the analogous case
in CHAT to verify that a maximum weight matching M in G0 must be a maximum
cardinality matching, and is a greedy maximum matching for I. Since the underlying
graph of I is capacitated, we require to use Gabow’s algorithm for maximum weight DCS
again to ﬁnd a maximum weight matching in G0. Hence, we can ﬁnd a greedy maximum
matching in I in O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time by reduction to the Assignment problem.
Comparing this to the approach using Algorithm Greedy-Max, it is straightforward to see
that the reduction approach is again faster by a factor of Ω(C max(1/logn,m/n2)) for
most practical cases.
8.4 Rank-maximal matchings
Let I be an instance of HRT. We formalise the deﬁnition of a rank-maximal matching in
I as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.4.1. Given an instance of HRT, a rank-maximal matching is a matching
that has maximum proﬁle under the order L taken over all matchings in M.
8.4.1 Finding a rank-maximal matching
As in the case of greedy maximum matchings, we can ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching in
a given HRT instance I either by constructing an algorithm based on the augmenting
path approach utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment
problem. In the former case, the next lemma shows that we can use this approach by
extending the results of Lemmas 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 in a subtle way to obtain the analogue of
Lemma 7.4.4.
Lemma 8.4.1. For each i, let Mi be a greedy i-matching with proﬁle ρi. If ρi+1 L ρi
for i = 1,2,...,k − 1 and ρk L ρk+1, then Mk is a rank-maximal matching, and ρk is the
rank-maximal proﬁle.
Proof. Let ρk = (x1,...,xz) and suppose that Mk is not rank-maximal. Then, there is a
matching M such that M L Mk. Let ρ = (x1,...,xi−1,yi,...,yz) be the proﬁle of M. It
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follows that yi > xi for some i. Now, it must be the case that k + 2 ≤ |M| ≤ C since
M L Mk but ρk left-dominates the proﬁles of all matchings of cardinality 1 to k+1. Let
G be the underlying bipartite graph of I. Let us consider X = Mk ⊕ M. Then, it follows
that each connected component of X is either (i) an odd length alternating path, (ii) an
even length alternating path or (iii) an alternating cycle. Since M L Mk, there must
exist at least one connected component C of X such that ρC(M) L ρC(Mk).
Suppose that C is of type (i). Let M0 = Mk ⊕ C. Clearly, M0 L Mk. Now, the end
edges of C cannot be in Mk, for otherwise M0 is a (k − 1)-matching which left-dominates
Mk, a contradiction. Hence, the end edges of C must be in M. It follows that C is then an
augmenting path with respect to Mk. However, this implies that M0 is a (k+1)-matching
which left-dominates Mk, which is a contradiction by the statement of the lemma.
Hence, suppose that C is of either type (ii) or (iii). Since ρC(M) L ρC(Mk), we
can create a new matching M0 of cardinality k by replacing the Mk-edges in C by the
M-edges in C, giving ρ(M0) L ρ(Mk), which is a contradiction since Mk is a greedy
k-matching.
What Lemma 8.4.1 thus implies is that we can reuse the approach of Algorithm Greedy-
Rank-Max to ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching in O(C2mz) time given an instance I of HRT.
As mentioned above, an alternative approach to ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching in I may
be by reduction to the Assignment problem. To do so, we reuse the reduction as described
in Section 8.3 for ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching by making just one change. Since
we do not require to ﬁnd a maximum weight matching in the underlying graph that must
be of maximum cardinality, we remove the large constant that was added to the weight
of each edge. Then, it is straightforward to verify that Lemma 7.4.3 also holds in the
HRT case. Hence, any maximum weight matching M in the weighted graph is also a
rank-maximal matching for I. As with the greedy maximum case, it follows that we can
ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching in I in O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time by reduction to the
Assignment problem.
By comparing the time complexities of the augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford approach and the reduction to the Assignment problem, it is straightforward
to see that the latter is faster than the former by a factor of Ω(C max(1/logn,m/n2)) for
most practical cases.
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8.5 Generous Maximum Matchings
Given an instance I of HRT, an alternative optimality criteria as opposed to looking
for greedy maximum matchings or rank-maximal matchings may be to look for generous
maximum matchings. Let ≺R be the total order deﬁned on proﬁles of matchings as in
Section 7.2. We formalise the deﬁnition of a generous maximum matching as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.5.1. Given an instance of HRT, a generous maximum matching is a maxi-
mum matching that has minimum proﬁle under the order ≺R taken over all matchings in
M+.
8.5.1 Finding a generous maximum matching
Now, as with the greedy maximum and rank-maximal case, we have two possible algorithms
for constructing a generous maximum matching based on the augmenting path approach
utilising the Bellman-Ford algorithm and reduction to the Assignment problem.
In the former case, it may be veriﬁed that the results of Lemmas 7.5.1-7.5.4 and
Theorem 7.5.1 can be extended from CHAT to HRT using the same proofs that established
these results in the CHAT case. What this shows is that we can reuse the algorithm for
ﬁnding a generous maximum matching in CHAT for the analogous problem in HRT.
That is, we start from the empty matching, and then use Algorithm Greedy-Max, as
transformed for ﬁnding a generous maximum matching in CHAT, to repeatedly increase
the cardinality of the current generous matching in stages. In each stage, we use Algorithm
Min-Aug, as transformed for ﬁnding a minimum proﬁle augmenting path in CHAT, for
ﬁnding a similar type of augmenting path to augment the current generous matching M
in I until no such path can be found. When this happens, M is a generous maximum
matching for I. Since the algorithm for ﬁnding a generous maximum matching in HRT is
then the same as that for solving the analogous problem in CHAT, the time complexity
for this is also O(C2mz). As in the CHAT case, we can speed up the runtime by halting
Algorithm Min-Aug when no hospital which is assigned in the current generous matching
had its R-value updated in the last iteration of the algorithm.
To reduce the problem of ﬁnding a generous maximum matching to the Assignment
problem, the correct edge weight1 to use for each edge (ri,hj) should be wt(ri,hj) =
(2(n+1)z−1−(n+1)k−1−(n+1)l−1+1)+2(n+1)z. We can then easily extend the results
1The term +1 is to ensure that all edge weights are positive.
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for generous maximum matchings in the CHAT case to show that a maximum weight
matching in the weighted graph as constructed above also gives a generous maximum
matching in O(zC min(mlogn,n2)) time in the context of HRT.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that the reduction approach is again faster by a
factor of Ω(C max(1/logn,m/n2)) for most practical cases.
8.6 Proﬁle-based optimal matchings in SMTI
Since SMTI is a special case of HRT, we observe that each of the algorithms described
above for ﬁnding a greedy maximum matching, a rank-maximal matching and a generous
maximum matching can also be used to ﬁnd a matching of the same kind given an SMTI
instance I. We remark that in the case of the augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford algorithm, since the maximum cardinality of a matching in I is O(n), we
only need to replace the C factor in the time complexity of the algorithm in order to obtain
its respective running times in I, i.e. O(n2mz). In the case of reduction to the Assignment
problem, it follows that we can use the fastest algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum weight
matching in an uncapacitated bipartite graph since all agents in I have capacity 1. Recall
from Section 1.2 that this takes O(nm + n2 logn) time [14]. In view of the time required
to perform arithmetic operations on steeply decreasing weights [42], the resulting running
time of the algorithm is Oz(nm + n2 logn). It follows that if nm ≤ n2 logn, then the
reduction gives a faster solution by a factor of Ω(m/logn). Otherwise, the reduction is
faster by a factor of Ω(n). Hence, as in the case of HRT, reduction to the Assignment
problem gives a faster solution to the problem than an augmenting path approach based
on the Bellman-Ford algorithm in SMTI.
8.7 Open Problems
We conclude this chapter with the following open problems.
• It was observed in Chapter 7 that an approach utilising the Edmonds-Gallai De-
composition led to a faster algorithm for ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching given a
CHAT instance than alternatives such as using an augmenting path approach based
on the Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment problem. This
raises the question as to whether we can also obtain similar results for the case of
HRT.
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• Each of the open problems posed for CHAT at the end of Chapter 7 could be
naturally extended to HRT. Can we then ﬁnd solutions to these problems in the
context of HRT?
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9.1 Summary of thesis contribution
The contribution of this thesis can be divided into three main classes based on three
diﬀerent types of optimality criteria that can be applied to a matching in the context of a
bipartite matching problem with preferences. These are the concepts of
1. a Pareto optimal matching
2. a popular matching
3. a proﬁle-based optimal matching, which may be sub-divided into the concepts of
(a) a rank-maximal matching
(b) a greedy maximum matching
(c) a generous maximum matching
For each optimality criterion, we ﬁrst studied the concept in the setting where pref-
erences are only one-sided (i.e. the cases of CHA, WCHA or CHAT as appropriate),
and then extended the results to allow preferences to be two-sided (i.e. the cases of HR,
SMI, HRT or SMTI as appropriate). Figure 9.1 sumarises the main contributions of
this thesis according to this classiﬁcation by giving the fastest algorithm for computing
an optimal matching in each case. In the table, the second column indicates the type of
preference lists in the problem instance, by using a ‘s’ to indicate strict preferences and a
‘t’ to indicate that ties are allowed. In addition, we indicate the chapter number of this
thesis in square brackets, where the results of each algorithm can be found. We remark
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that all the results mentioned in Figure 9.1 are new and contained in this thesis. With
reference to this ﬁgure, we now present some conclusions regarding the results contained
in this thesis.
9.2 Pareto optimal matchings
1. Figure 9.1 indicates that a maximum Pareto optimal matching can be found in
polynomial time given an instance of CHA, SMI or HR. The time complexities of our
algorithms are each bounded above by the time taken to ﬁnd a maximum matching
in the underlying graph of the problem instance. Hence, these algorithms may be
considered eﬃcient in the sense that any improvement to their time complexities
would imply an improved algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum matching in a bipartite
graph (capacitated or uncapacitated as appropriate).
2. As can be seen from Figure 9.1, the ties case in HR is still open. Given that a com-
binatorial approach gave a faster solution for ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in each of the listed problems where preferences are strict, and given the
close relationship of these problems to one another, it is likely that a combinator-
ial approach to one of the problems in the presence of ties would also yield faster
solutions to each of these problems.
9.3 Popular matchings
1. The problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching, or determining that none
exists, can be solved in polynomial time given an instance of CHAT or WCHA.
2. We remark that it is likely that a polynomial-time algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum
popular matching, or determining that none exists, given an instance of WCHAT,
can be obtained by extending in a natural way the algorithm for WCHA, in much
the same way as our algorithm for CHAT was extended from that for CHA.
3. Finding an algorithm to construct a maximum popular matching in a given bipartite
matching problem with two-sided preferences remains open. However, we can test
whether any matching in a given SMTI-SYM instance is popular using the O
√
nm)
time algorithm described in Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is likely that any combina-
140Chapter 9. Conclusion
torial solution to the problem would be required to use our characterisation results
for popular matchings in SMTI-SYM as presented in Chapter 6.
9.4 Proﬁle-based optimal matchings
1. Each of a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching can
be found in polynomial time given an instance of CHAT, HRT or SMTI.
2. It is faster to ﬁnd a rank-maximal matching given an instance of CHAT if the
underlying approach makes use of the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition rather than
straightforward alternatives such as an augmenting path approach based on the
Bellman-Ford algorithm or by reduction to the Assignment problem. Hence, it is
likely that any combinatorial approach utilising the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
would also oﬀer a faster algorithm for each of the problems of ﬁnding a greedy
maximum and a generous maximum matching in an instance of CHAT. Indeed, the
viability of the augmenting path approach based on the Bellman-Ford algorithm sug-
gests such a possibility since the approach using the Edmonds-Gallai Decomposition
is also inherently based on augmenting paths.
3. The above observations and results are also likely to extend naturally to the problems
of ﬁnding a rank-maximal, a greedy maximum and a generous maximum matching
in an instance of HRT or SMTI.
9.5 General observations
We make some conclusions here on the results of this thesis in general, in addition to those
speciﬁc to each of the optimality criterion studied as above.
1. All the problems that were studied in this thesis turned out to be solvable in polyno-
mial time. The existence of a polynomial-time algorithm is often inherently associ-
ated with establishing some kind of underlying structure for the problem concerned.
For instance, the solution to ﬁnding a maximum Pareto optimal matching requires
the identifying and then satisfying of certain types of coalitions in the underlying
graph of the problem instance. To ﬁnd a maximum popular matching, the identiﬁ-
cation of the f- and s-partners of each participating agent in the problem instance
allows us to restrict our attention to only a subgraph of the underlying graph to
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generate an eﬃcient solution to the problem. In addition, the fastest algorithm for
ﬁnding a rank-maximal matching is reliant on utilising the Edmonds-Gallai Decom-
position to label vertices and then identify only those edges that can belong to any
solution.
2. The optimality criteria studied in this thesis can be considered to be superﬁcially
similar in some respects but a simple change to the problem deﬁnition often requires
a signiﬁcant change to the algorithm.
3. The problem of ﬁnding a matching of maximum cardinality in the underlying graph
of the problem instance often seems to inﬂuence the time complexity of the resulting
algorithm for its solution. This is the case even if the underlying problem seems on
the surface not to be associated with maximum matchings, e.g. popular matchings.
9.6 Future work
There is a wide range of possibilities for future study beyond the problems considered in
this thesis. These include the open problems listed at the end of each of the preceding
chapters, as well as the following.
1. Can we establish any further structural results for the sets of Pareto optimal match-
ings for a given instance of CHA or HR? The same question arises for each of the
other optimality criteria studied in this thesis.
2. For a given bipartite matching problem, there may be many diﬀerent matchings
of a certain type, e.g. Pareto optimal, popular, rank-maximal etc. However, it is
open as to whether we can ﬁnd algorithms to eﬃciently generate all matchings of a
given kind. Towards this, we note that Uno [62] has given algorithms for generating
all the perfect, maximum and maximal matchings in a bipartite graph, so that
any eﬃcient algorithm could possibly extend his approach. As a ﬁrst step, given
a bipartite matching problem and an optimality criterion to satisfy for a matching
in the problem instance, it would be useful to ﬁnd eﬃcient algorithms to determine
whether the problem instance admits a unique matching of the required type, and if
not to ﬁnd a second such matching.
3. From a practical point of view, perform empirical analyses of the algorithms pre-
sented in this thesis in order to gain a greater degree of understanding of their
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behaviour in real-life situations, e.g. how “good” are these diﬀerent kinds of match-
ings likely to be for a given instance of CHA, HR etc. derived from some practical
application?
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